Since Burkina Faso’s current president Ibrahim Traoré came to power through a military coup in 2022, parallels between Traoré and the country’s former president and Pan-Africanist icon Thomas Sankara (1983-1987) have become commonplace. In this context, ROAPE’s Bettina Engels urges caution in seeing Traoré simply as Sankara reincarnate. Alongside certain similarities, Engels argues that striking differences also exist.
“Is this a reasonable interpretation?”, one of ROAPE’s distinguished authors asked me in August 2025, forwarding a newsletter article titled “Thomas Sankara’s Legacy is Alive in the Sahel”. I still owe an answer on that.
Thomas Sankara was president of Burkina Faso from 1983-87—and remains today an icon of Pan-Africanism whose face appears on T-shirts and whose quotes are in email signatures: ‘Dare to invent the future’ or ‘you cannot kill ideas’. The question whether his legacy is alive refers to Ibrahim Traoré, the current president who came to power through a military coup on 30 September, 2022. There is hardly any report about Traoré that does not refer to Sankara in some way—and there is much controversy about it.
Traoré ‘is more than a leader’, wrote Modern Ghana, he is ‘a modern-day Sankara who dares to dream of a brighter future’. In the comments on the article, one reader promptly responded by calling Traoré ‘a Russian asset pretending to love his country and Africa’.
The first comparisons between Traoré and Sankara came up in media reports when Traoré appeared before the cameras on the evening of the 2022 coup. During this appearance, he announced the removal of the government of Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba and the takeover by the MPSR 2 (Mouvement patriotique pour la sauvegarde et la restauration)—MPSR 2 because the previous junta under Damiba was called MPSR.
Damiba had himself staged a coup against the previous government just eight months earlier, on January 24, 2022. In the initial media reports, the supposed similarity between Sankara and Traoré was mainly based on the fact that they were the same age (Sankara 33, Traoré 34) when they came to power, held the same military rank (captain), and wore the same red beret.
Coups against gerontocracy
These similarities are rather trivial of course. The red beret is part of the equipment of the Burkinabe army. And many military coups have been carried out by relatively young, lower and middle rank. Ndongo Sylla explains the prevalence of coup d’états in the historical franc zone with the gerontocratic political system: few civilian leaders managed to get to power at a young age, whereas those carrying arms did. Military violence opens a window for those who are young and opposed to French neocolonialism to reach state power.
It is noteworthy that four of the 13 youngest leaders in the franc zone were presidents of Burkina Faso: Alongside Sankara and Traoré, Blaise Compaoré (Sankara’s successor who was overthrown by a popular uprising in 2014) and Maurice Yaméogo (the country’s first president from 1960-66), were likewise in their 30s when they came to power. And no one would think of comparing Compaoré to Sankara or Traoré, though he was the same age (36) and held the same military rank when he succeeded Sankara.
Beyond that, however, similarities and differences exist between Sankara and Traoré in terms of their policies. Neither is a supporter of the liberal-representative model of democracy. Sankara did not seek elections at the national level (though they did take place at the local). Political parties were dissolved immediately in August 1983, shortly after Sankara became president. Traoré’s MPSR 2 initially adhered to Damiba’s announcement to hold national elections in 2024, albeit subject to what the security situation would allow for. In late May 2024, it was announced that the transitional government would be extended by 60 months. Political party activities have in any case been suspended since 30 September 2022. On 29 January 2026, political parties were formally dissolved.
Legitimacy by outcome?
However, the question remains as to what alternative idea of democracy and political rule Traoré and the MPSR 2 represent. So far, they seem to rely rather on what is often referred to as output or performance legitimacy (legitimacy based on answering the basic demands of the population and improving material living conditions).
A much noticed change concerns mining policy. With the reform of the mining law in 2024, the share that multinational mining companies must grant to the state has been increased from 10 to 15 percent. In August 2024, the government acquired the mines Boungou and Wahgnion from Lilium Mining for 90 million U.S. dollars. Lilium Mining had only taken them over a year before from the British company Endeavour Mining. In addition to the two mines, three exploration licenses were transferred to the newly founded state-owned Société de Participation Minière du Burkina (SOPAMIB).
A portrait of President Ibrahim Traoré (Wikimedia Commons, 2026)
These are important steps, but still a long way from serious resource nationalisation. In early 2025, there were 12 gold mines in operation in Burkina Faso. All (except for the two that have now been taken over by the Burkinabè state) are operated by multinational companies. In April 2025, the Russian company Nordgold received another gold mining license for a new area. Nordgold has been operating the Bissa Bouly mine since 2013, one of the mines that has seen the most extensive protests by local residents and social movements.
Protests against the industrial mines continue. For example, in 2024-2025, residents protested against evictions related to the Endeavour owned Houndé gold mine. In September 2025, protests were crushed against the establishment of the Indian Sharun mine.
Parallels to Sankara’s policies can be found in agriculture and infrastructure development. The Traoré government has subsidized fertilizer and provided tractors to farmers—highly relevant to the country where a large share of the population lives from small-scale farming. The most prestigious infrastructure project of the current government, which has been heavily promoted in the (social) media, is the construction of a highway between the country’s two largest cities, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
However, there are also some key differences between the policies of the MPSR 2 and of Sankara; for example, in relations with traditional authorities and in gender politics, topics that Sankara was famous for. Sankara was very critical of the chieftaincy system. Traoré’s government, in contrast, relies on the support of the traditional authorities and seeks to integrate them in its governance structure. In December 2023, it created the National Council of Communities, which includes religious and traditional authorities, to promote ‘national cohesion’ and strengthen ‘endogenous values’, as the Prime Minister reiterated at the end of 2024.
Sankara was famous for his promotion of the equality of women. Public campaigns were launched against forced marriage; a minimum age for marriage was introduced, the bride-price forbidden and widows’ right to inherit recognised by law. In 2025, the current government also reformed the family law. Among the progressive parts of the reform is that the minimum age for marriage has now been harmonised for boys and girls and set at 18. Women’s right to claim alimony was strengthened and it has been made possible to formally recognize religious or traditional marriages.
A key change in the law, however, is that homosexuality has been criminalized for the first time in the country’s history. ‘Homosexuality and related practices’ are now punishable by 2-5 years in prison plus a fine of 2-10 million CFA franc (Art. 210-3, Law no. 012-2025/ALT). In November 2025, a corresponding sentence was handed down for the first time.
Sankara’s legacy alive?
Sankara was a popular political figure years before he became president. He was politically trained in Marxism-Leninism, and he had strong linkages to leftist groups, though not all supported the reign of the National Council of the Revolution. Sankara enjoyed a level of trust that Traoré and the MPSR 2 first had to earn. They have set about doing this through heavily controlled (social) media work, which highlights the government’s achievements, and is based on strong anti-neocolonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric.
This resonates greatly, especially among the younger generation. Radical organisations have long been involved in anti-imperialist struggles in Burkina Faso. In recent years, however, a number of radical and liberal activists, artists and journalists have been silenced, disappeared, conscripted to the front to fight terrorism, or left the country. At the same time, several new organisations and social media activists have emerged who enthusiastically support Traoré and the MPSR 2. Civil society and media have been polarized, to put it mildly.
Sankara’s legacy is alive, for sure, in the hopes and aspirations of many, particularly in the young generation. President Traoré, as did Sankara, cultivates his image as a revolutionary, and the reference to Sankara plays an important role in this. His policies, however, are not simply a rehash of Sankara’s. Sankara’s politics is often referred to as pragmatic socialism. Traoré’s is rather more pragmatic than socialist, including conservative and authoritarian elements.
This may be strategically astute, as it appeals not only to the younger generation but also to powerful religious and traditional elites. Sankara’s experience showed how difficult it is to overcome them. He tried anyway. The main problem with the comparison of Traoré with Sankara, however, is that the reference to Sankara is used as a source of legitimacy, giving rise to a personality cult that hinders rather than promotes critical debate on political strategies and visions.