THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NICARAGUA:
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

THE REPORT OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
DELEGATION TO OBSERVE THE NICARAGUAN
GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 1984

An official publication of the
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BOLETA ELECTORAL PARA REPRESENTANTES A LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL
REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL

REGION IV

1. PPSC
2. MAP-ML
3. PCDN
4. FSLN
5. PC de N
6. PLI
7. P.S.N.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In August, 1980, the Sandinista (FSLN) government in Nicaragua pledged that elections would take place within five years (i.e., sometime in 1985). That timetable was accelerated, primarily due to external pressures. The date of November 4, 1984, was selected so that Nicaragua would have a legitimate, elected government in place before the anticipated re-election of Ronald Reagan in the United States on November 6. The Sandinistas hoped that a competitive election with heavy turnout would help to deter a U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua.

The electoral process was marked by a high degree of "open-endedness," taking the form of continuous bargaining between the FSLN and opposition groups over electoral rules and structures, as well as more general aspects of the political system and public policies. The record shows that both before and during the campaign, the Sandinistas made major concessions to opposition forces on nearly all points of contention.

The national voter registration effort was remarkably successful, especially considering that it was conducted under wartime conditions. In just four days, 93.7 percent of the estimated voting-age population was registered.

The Nicaraguan electoral law of 1984 provided a broad array of protections to assure fair access, procedural honesty, and an accurate vote count. The actual voting process was meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses. The vote was truly a secret ballot, and was generally perceived as such by voters. We observed no evidence of irregularities in the voting or vote-counting process.

Despite efforts by U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary groups and several non-participating political groups to encourage voter abstention, 75 percent of the registered voters cast ballots. Most voters interviewed by our delegation and by foreign journalists did not feel coerced into going to the polls.

The FSLN won 63 percent of the total votes cast and 67 percent of the valid votes. Invalid ballots comprised only 6.1 percent of the total votes cast. Twenty-nine percent of the valid votes went to three parties ideologically and programmatically to the right of the FSLN; and another 3.8 percent was divided among three parties distinctly to the left of the FSLN. The opposition parties together took 36.5 percent of the seats in the 96-member National Assembly elected on November 4, including six seats that will be held by their defeated presidential candidates. The Sandinista government deliberately chose a West European-style proportional representation system that would maximize representation of opposition parties in the national legislature, rather than a U.S.-style single-member district system.

The range of options available to the Nicaraguan voter on most issues was broad, but it would have been even broader if the U.S. Government had not succeeded in persuading or pressuring key opposition leaders to boycott or withdraw from the election. We found that the behavior of U.S. officials during the six months preceding the elections was clearly interventionist, apparently designed to delegitimize the Nicaraguan electoral process by making sure that the FSLN had no externally credible opposition to run against.

External critics of the Nicaraguan process have argued that, because legitimate opposition groups (especially Arturo Cruz and his Coordinadora coalition) were "excluded" from the process, the elections were illegitimate and uncompetitive. The facts do not support this notion of exclusion. No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984. The only parties that did not appear on the ballot were absent by their own choice, not because of government exclusion. The weight of the available evidence suggests that the Coordinadora group made a policy decision to pursue its political goals in 1984 outside of the electoral process.

While all the opposition parties which chose to run candidates had some valid complaints about the government's management of the electoral campaign, no party was prevented from carrying out an active campaign. Opposition parties received their legal allotments of campaign funds and had regular and substantial access to radio and television. The legally registered opposition parties were able to hold the vast majority of their rallies unimpeded by pro-FSLN demonstrators or by other kinds of government interference. Most of the restrictions on political activity imposed in March, 1982, in response to an upsurge in counterrevolutionary activities were lifted at the beginning of the electoral campaign, and government censorship of the press was notably relaxed (though not eliminated).

The FSLN took substantial advantage of its incumbent position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the abuses of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic, and neither the nature of the abuses (e.g., use of neighborhood-level Sandinista Defense Committees to distribute FSLN campaign propaganda and to mobilize people to attend FSLN rallies) nor their frequency was such as to cripple the opposition parties' campaigns or to cast doubt on the fundamental validity of the electoral process. Generally speaking, in this campaign the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less than ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally have done.

Neither did the FSLN use its control of mass organizations, the food rationing system, or police to create a generalized climate of fear and intimidation. Our delegation interviewed some individuals who clearly felt intimidated by the Sandinista government, but we also observed that many people in Nicaragua are not reluctant to criticize the government, in public, and often in the harshest possible terms. In this election year the government made little effort to stifle the vigorous criticism of its policies and performance that the electoral campaign generated.
The 1984 elections brought about significant changes in the Nicaraguan political process. In addition to an unprecedented relaxation of political controls, a "National Dialogue" involving all of the country's political and economic power groups (including those that chose to boycott the November 4 elections) was launched. This ongoing process of negotiations between the FSLN and opposition forces will determine many of the rules of the political game to be followed in the post-election period. Newly-elected opposition party members of the National Assembly have vowed to use their enhanced role in the political system to challenge FSLN positions on major issues like the military draft and to shape the constitution that will be drafted by the National Assembly beginning in January. The Sandinista government has committed itself to holding regular elections in the future.

These developments augur well for the future of political pluralism in Nicaragua. However, the political opening process could be truncated, or even reversed, by an intensification of U.S.-financed counterrevolutionary activities or by continuation of the three-year-old undeclared economic blockade of Nicaragua by the United States. If the pressures of a war economy and war psychology are relieved, there is a good chance that political liberalization will proceed. Despite U.S. interference, the elections of November 4, 1984, were an impressive beginning.

Members of the LASA delegation discuss opposition party complaints submitted to the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), with CSE official Rosa Marina Zelaya.
REPORT OF THE
LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
DELEGATION TO OBSERVE THE NICARAGUAN
GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 1984

PREFACE

On August 15, 1984, an invitation was extended to the Latin American Studies Association by the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua, the fourth branch of the Government of National Reconstruction, to observe the electoral campaign and the general election to be held in Nicaragua on November 4, 1984. In mid-September the LASA Executive Council considered and accepted this invitation, and asked Professor Thomas W. Walker and Professor Richard R. Fagen, Co-Chairs of the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua, to make preparations and assemble a delegation. During the week of October 22, the LASA Executive Council reconsidered its earlier decision to send the delegation, in light of the October 21 decision of a key Nicaraguan opposition party, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), to withdraw from the election. Once again, by majority vote, the Executive Council approved the sending of a delegation to Nicaragua.

This was the first time in LASA’s history that an official LASA delegation was sent to observe an election in Latin America. The Executive Council believed that in light of the unusual international circumstances surrounding this particular election, and the paucity of information from academic (rather than journalistic and governmental) sources concerning these matters that was available to LASA members and to the general public in the United States, a LASA-sponsored fact-finding mission could perform a valuable service. Accordingly, the delegation was charged with conducting a wide-ranging investigation of the Nicaraguan electoral process and the various political and economic forces -- both domestic and international -- that impinged upon it. The delegation was to write a detailed report based on its observations, interviews, and documentary research, for publication as quickly as possible in the LASA Forum, with wide dissemination of the findings in a variety of formats to public officials and other non-academic groups.

The delegation to Nicaragua included the LASA President-elect and one former President, several members of the LASA Executive Council, several members of the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua, and other members of the Association with special expertise on Central America. Half of the delegation members had had substantial field research experience in Nicaragua. In forming the delegation, special care was also taken to insure that a wide range of views regarding the Nicaraguan Revolution would be represented, which was, in fact, the case. Although four women members of the Association were invited, only one was able to participate. The delegation members were as follows:

Wayne A. Cornelius (Political Science, University of California-San Diego), President-elect of LASA. (Head of the delegation)

Michael E. Conroy (Economics, University of Texas-Austin; Co-Director, Central America Resource Center), member of LASA Task Force on Nicaragua. (Co-Coordinator of the delegation)

Thomas Walker (Political Science, Ohio University, Athens), Co-Chair, LASA Task Force on Nicaragua. (Co-Coordinator of the delegation)

Laura Enríquez (Sociology, University of California-Santa Cruz, in residence in Nicaragua), member of LASA. (Local Arrangements Coordinator of the delegation)

Max Azicri (Political Science, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania), member of LASA.

John A. Booth (Political Science, North Texas State University), member of LASA.

Thomas Bossert (Political Science, Sarah Lawrence College), member of LASA.

Michael Dodson (Political Science, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth), member of LASA.

Paul Doughty (Anthropology, University of Florida), former President of LASA.

James Malloy (Political Science, University of Pittsburgh), member of LASA Executive Council.

Lars Schoutz (Political Science, University of North Carolina), Co-Chair of LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom.

Richard Sinkin (History, University of Texas-Austin), Executive Director of LASA.

Charles Stansifer (Latin American Studies, University of Kansas), member of LASA Task Force on Nicaragua.

John Weeks (Economics, American University), member of LASA Task Force on Nicaragua.

Norman Whitten, Jr. (Anthropology, University of Illinois-Urbana, member of LASA Executive Council.

The delegation was accompanied by Professors Howard Frederick and John Higgins (Telecommunications, Ohio University, Athens), who produced a documentary videotape on the Nicaraguan election including interviews with many of the individuals who were interviewed by our delegation.1

The members of the LASA delegation received credentials from the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua as official international election observers, but we were not guests of the Nicaraguan government. All expenses incurred by delegation members were covered by themselves personally, their home institutions, or by LASA. This was deemed

1 We also benefited greatly from a background paper on the history of electoral politics in Nicaragua, prepared especially for the delegation by Laura Enríquez.

2 The one-hour videotape will be available for purchase by late January, 1985, from: Department of Telecommunications, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701, U.S.A.
essential to maintain the delegation’s independence and neutrality. While a few of the delegation’s interviews were arranged with the assistance of the Supreme Electoral Council, the vast majority of contacts were made directly by delegation’s Co-Cordinator, Michael Conroy, its Executive Secretary, Laura Enríquez, or other members of the delegation. Some logistical assistance was provided by the Nicaraguan Federation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO), with which LASA had had a cooperative agreement since 1983.

THE CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY

Most members of the LASA delegation arrived in Managua on October 28 and departed on November 5. Throughout this period, there were no restrictions on the members’ mobility, except in the Atlantic Coast region. The delegation rented a 20-person microbus for use during its entire stay in Nicaragua. We determined our own itinerary and spoke with anyone whom we chose to approach (as well as numerous people who spontaneously approached us). During the last days of the electoral campaign and on election day, we travelled throughout the city of Managua and to provincial cities (Masaya, Matagalpa, Granada) and smaller localities (e.g., an agricultural cooperative near Matagalpa). We visited two war zones (Matagalpa, Puerto Cabezas) where counterrevolutionary forces (the “contras”) are active.

The delegation sought information from representatives of all of the key political and economic actors in Nicaragua today, as well as “grass-roots” organizers and development practitioners. We conducted detailed (one- or two-hour) interviews with a total of 45 “key informants,” including national and regional leaders of all of the political parties participating in the November 4 elections and two of the parties that boycotted or withdrew from the election. The list of interviewees is as follows:

**Political Party Leaders**


*Sergio Ramírez*, member of the Nicaraguan Junta de Gobierno and Vice Presidential Candidate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).

*Adan Fletes*, President of the Social Christian Party (PSC) and Vice Presidential candidate of the Democratic Coordinating Committee (“La Coordinadora”).

*Clemente Guido*, Presidential candidate of the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD). [Tape-recorded interview provided to the LASA delegation by Professor Martin Diskin of M.I.T.]


*Luis Humberto Guzmán*, Head of International Relations and candidate for the National Assembly from Managua, Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC).

*Carlos Zamora*, regional director of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Matagalpa region.

*Celestino Gutiérrez González*, regional coordinator of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), Matagalpa.

*Eli Altamirano Pérez*, Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCdeN), Managua.


**Electoral Officials**

*Mariano Fiallos*, President, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), and Rector, National University of Nicaragua, León (on leave).

*Rosa Marina Zelaya*, Executive Secretary, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE).

*Sádros Eseleodón*, Director, Regional Electoral Council (CRE), Matagalpa.

*Francisco Gutiérrez*, Secretary, Regional Electoral Council (CRE), Matagalpa.

*Danilo Taylor*, representative, Regional Electoral Council (CRE), Zelaya Norte region.

*Myrna Taylor*, representative, Regional Electoral Council (CRE), Zelaya Norte.

*William Rivera*, representative, Regional Electoral Council (CRE), Zelaya Norte.

**FSLN Government Officials**

*Jaime Wheelock*, Comandante de la Revolución; Minister of Agrarian Reform, Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction.

*Nora Astorga*, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, Nicaraguan Government.

*Alejandro Bendaña*, Director of International Organizations, Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.

*A senior official*, Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry. (no more specific identification permitted)

*Carlos Tunnermann Bernheim*, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States.

*Francisco Campbell*, Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy of Nicaragua, Washington, D.C.

*Comandante Julio Ramos*, head of military intelligence, Nicaraguan Government.

*Paulino Castillón*, Director of International Relations, Nicaraguan Ministry of Health.

*Nicolás Quirós*, Regional Director, Ministry of Health, Zelaya Norte region.

*Dr. Montoya*, Regional Director, Ministry of Health, Matagalpa region.

*Freddy Cruz*, President, Nicaraguan Federation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO).

*Silvia Narváez*, Vice President, Nicaraguan Federation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO).
E.V.K. Fitzgerald, senior economic advisor to the Nicaraguan Junta de Gobierno.

**U.S. Government Official**

A senior U.S. diplomat in Central America (no more specific identification permitted under the ground rules established by the U.S. Embassy for this interview).

**Nicaraguan Scholars**

Xavier Gorostiaga, S.J., Director, Institute of Economic and Social Research (INIES).

Carlos Vilas, advisor to the Center for Research and Documentation on the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA).

Juan Hernández Pico, S.J., researcher, Institute of Central American History, Universidad Centro-Americana (UCA).

**Church Leader**

Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, President, Nicaraguan Council of Bishops.

**Development Practitioners**

Sister Beatriz Zaragoza, Maryknoll Order, community development worker, Managua.

Rev. James Goff, Presbyterian missionary, Centro Valdivieso.

Margaret Goff, Presbyterian missionary, Centro Valdivieso.

Douglas Murray, health and occupational safety consultant to CARE, Inc., in Nicaragua.

**Local Community Leaders**

Unidentified community leader, officer of a Sandinista Defense Committee (CDS), Ciudad Sandino, Managua.

Three unidentified rural cooperative leaders, Cooperative “Valdivia,” Matagalpa region.

**Private Business Owner**

Gladys Bolt, large private farm owner (coffee producer), Matagalpa region.

**U.S. Journalist**


In addition to these key interviews, the delegation had conversations with dozens of individual citizens whom we encountered on the streets or in other public places.

The delegation was not able to interview anyone in a position of authority at La Prensa, the principal conservative opposition newspaper in Nicaragua. Both its editor, Pedro J. Chamorro, and its co-director, Pablo Antonio Cuadra, were reportedly out of the country during the entire period of our visit. Also, despite more than ten telephone requests, we were not able to secure an interview with an officer of the principal association of private business owners in Nicaragua, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). However, the views of COSEP are strongly reflected in most articles appearing in La Prensa (which was read daily by the delegation), as well as by the “Coordinadora,” whose vice-presidential candidate, Adán Flenties, we interviewed.

The delegation was given unrestricted access to all records of the Supreme Electoral Council concerning complaints of campaign abuses filed by all of the political parties participating in the November 4 elections. Three members of the delegation spent several hours examining these files, taking extensive notes, and photocopying a large number of documents, which we selected. The results of this documentary research are summarized in the section of this report entitled “Issues Raised by the Electoral Process.”

**THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF THE ELECTION**

The general elections held in Nicaragua on November 4, 1984, were the first since the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle on July 19, 1979. The intention to hold elections was part of the platform of the Sandinista National Liberation Front even before Somoza’s fall. On July 20, 1979, the day after the Sandinistas took power, the government junta promulgated a “Fundamental Statute” which specifies that “to the extent that the conditions of national reconstruction permit it, general elections will be held for the constitution of a National Assembly...in accordance with the Electoral Law which shall be promulgated at an opportune time.” In a speech on August 23, 1980, celebrating the end of the FSLN government’s national literacy campaign, Comandante Daniel Ortega pledged that elections would take place within five years (i.e., sometime in 1985), with the formulation of electoral laws and other preparatory activities in 1983.

Discussion of various drafts of a law on political parties commenced in March, 1981. The debate on this law continued into 1982 but was suspended in March of that year, when the ruling Junta declared a state of emergency in response to an upsurge in acts of sabotage and other counter-revolutionary activity financed by the U.S. Government. (In December, 1981, President Reagan approved an initial expenditure of $19 million for the “secret war” against the FSLN government.) The Political Parties Law was finally approved by the Council of State on August 17, 1983.

On February 21, 1984, the Government Junta issued Decree No. 1400 which set November 4, 1984, as the date for elections. Thus the 1984 elections had been in the making for more than five years, and the Sandinistas had essentially adhered to their own publicly announced schedule for holding them. Yet the issue of scheduling and guaranteeing the freedom of these elections has increasingly become a focus of controversy for the FSLN government, on both the domestic and the international front.

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4 The speech is reported in Barricada (Managua, Nicaragua), August 24, 1980, p. 3.
Historical Background

The 1984 elections represent a major departure in Nicaragua’s political history. The Nicaraguan people effectively have had no democratic tradition.5 In fact, the country had a tradition of non-democratic, militarized politics with rampant human rights violations. While the Nicaraguan people have long desired democratic rule, for most of them the 1984 electoral process was their first experience with participatory democracy.

In this century the most constant feature of Nicaragua’s electoral history was the fact that the incumbent party was almost never voted out of office. Up to 1932, the changes from Liberal to Conservative party governments (and vice versa) were usually accomplished by armed revolt, because electoral manipulation assured the party in office more votes than its competitor. Fraudulent vote counting was the standard practice.6 The buying of votes was another method commonly used to insure reelection, especially during the Somoza years. The Somozas routinely bought votes for their Liberal Party with allotments of rum and food. (This explains Article 45-b of the 1984 electoral law, which prohibits the distribution of basic foodstuffs, drugs, and alcoholic beverages during the electoral campaign “for purposes of [political party] propaganda.”)7 Still another means used by incumbent parties to perpetuate themselves in power was the frequent rewriting of the constitution or electoral laws. The Somoza family relied on such measures prior to several different elections, when existing laws would have otherwise prevented their reelection.

There were exceptions to this pattern. The presidential elections of 1928 and 1932, organized and supervised by the United States, are generally accepted as having been free of fraudulent vote counting, but even then the leading contender was not permitted to run.7 The United States had maintained an occupying military force in Nicaragua almost without interruption since 1912, and during this period four elections were organized and conducted under U.S. military supervision, including the posting of a U.S. Marine at every polling place.

In fact, one of the hallmarks of Nicaraguan electoral politics in this century is the central role played by the U.S. government. Beginning with its participation in the ouster of Jose Santos Zelaya in 1909, the United States has participated actively in determining who would fill the presidency. During the 1909-1933 period Nicaraguan presidential candidates actively sought U.S. endorsement in order to insure their success. Anastasio Somoza García — the first of three Somozas to rule Nicaragua — was especially successful in consolidating his political position through U.S. endorsement, first as head of the National Guard and then as founder of a political dynasty that lasted until 1979. For most Nicaraguans, therefore, elections prior to the present year meant little more than automatic ratification of candidates chosen by the incumbent party and the U.S. government.

The insurrection that brought the Somoza family’s political tenure to an end in 1979 was, on a per capita basis, one of the largest insurgencies in Latin American history. Led by the FSLN, which had a very small organizational structure (never more than about 3,000 militants at any point during the struggle), the movement included much of the private business community, which had been alienated by Somoza’s monopolizing of the lucrative reconstruction effort and of international assistance that flowed into the country following the earthquake of 1972. The broad anti-Somoza coalition also included the traditional opposition parties and most of the Church hierarchy. These different sectors varied greatly in their vision of a post-Somoza society, but they shared a determination to overthrow the dictator. In the years since 1979, the lack of consensus on a national development proyecto or model became a key source of conflict between the Sandinista government — which was actively pursuing its own proyecto of societal transformation — and some of its allies in the struggle to oust Somoza, such as the Church hierarchy.

The situation inherited by the Sandinistas in July, 1979, could hardly have been less favorable to an incoming government. Somoza had looted the treasury and left behind a $1.6 billion foreign debt. Material damages after two years of war were estimated by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) at $480 million.8 The economy had to be reconstructed at a time of rapidly rising interest rates and dramatically deteriorating terms of trade for Nicaragua’s agricultural commodity exports, making large trade deficits inevitable. The international commercial banks whose assets in Nicaragua were nationalized in 1979 were no longer supplying loans, and new credits from multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank began to dry up in 1981, under pressure from the Reagan Administration.

The fall of the Somoza regime, including the collapse of Somoza’s virtual private army, the National Guard, had left the nation’s governmental infrastructure in ruins, and there was a vacuum of political power. The FSLN sought to fill the political and institutional vacuum by creating new political structures that responded to its agenda of social transformation. That agenda defined national priorities according to “the logic of the majority,” which meant that

5 By “democratic tradition” we mean that those who exercise political authority are chosen and continue in power through the expressed will of the citizenry. Consent, then, is the result of active participation in political life.


Nicaragua’s poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs.9

Since the overthrow of Somoza, Nicaragua has been governed by the Government of National Reconstruction, dominated by the FSLN. Executive authority was exercised by a government junta and, after May, 1980, legislative authority was shared between the junta and the Council of State, which included representatives of opposition political parties (as well as the FSLN), trade unions, professional associations, business associations, and the mass organizations established by the FSLN government. To promote and implement new policies reflecting the “logic of the majority,” mass organizations were created for peasants, urban and rural labor, youth, women, and residents of each block or neighborhood (the Sandinista Defense Committees). These mass organizations, in turn, were given functional representation in governmental institutions at all levels.

In the five years of FSLN rule, these neighborhood committees (CDSS) have become the most numerous of the mass organizations and encompass the largest membership. By 1984 there were some 15,000 CDSS block-level committees with a total membership of more than a half-million.10 This represents about one-third of Nicaragua’s estimated adult population (above age 15) in 1983. The block-level CDSS elect their own leaders and make decisions by majority rule. They are integrated into larger CDSS structures at the zone, regional, and national levels. As discussed in a later section of this report, the CDSS are viewed by some as authentic vehicles of mass participation in the distribution of basic goods and social services, and by others as coercive instruments of state political control.

Determinants of FSLN Political Support

The first major policy initiative undertaken by the Sandinista government was the National Literacy Crusade, which began in March, 1980, and was concluded in August of that year. Over 400,000 Nicaraguans were taught basic literacy skills during this campaign, which involved a massive mobilization of nearly 100,000 volunteer literacy teachers drawn mostly from the government-sponsored mass organizations. The country’s illiteracy rate of 50.4 percent (in October, 1979) was more than halved.11 Such an improvement in literacy was a fundamental prerequisite for meaningful elections. In the process, of course, political support for the FSLN was also deepened.

Two other areas of policy innovation that are of special importance to understanding the support base of the FSLN as it approached the 1984 elections are health care and agrarian reform. Since 1979 the Sandinista government has extended free health services into remote rural areas, carried out mass vaccination campaigns against polio and measles, and made innovative efforts in malaria control. New hospitals and health centers were built throughout the country. Emphasis was placed on improvements in child and maternal health care.

The CDSS and other mass organizations have mobilized extensive participation in sanitation campaigns, health education, occupational health and safety, and nutrition programs. Over 70,000 volunteers participated in the 1981 health campaign, for example. These programs have significantly reduced the incidence of communicable diseases, malnutrition, and infant mortality, which is estimated to have dropped from 120 per thousand to 80 per thousand (0-12 months of age).12 A U.S. citizen who has lived in poor neighborhoods of Managua since 1959 told us: “Before the revolution, we saw baby funerals here every day. Now it is rare. Babies here are basically healthy and adequately nourished.” Our delegation’s observations in both low-income urban and rural areas support this generalization. Contrary to widely publicized reports in the U.S., we saw no children with obvious symptoms of protein deficiency or other nutritional problems.

The Sandinistas’ agrarian reform program also created a large class of beneficiaries. Extensive landholdings belonging to the Somoza family and some public officials and private citizens associated with them were nationalized. Even so, only 35 percent of the country’s arable land has been affected by the land redistribution program to date; and according to Agrarian Reform Minister Jaime Wheelock, who was interviewed by our delegation, the redistributive phase of the government’s agricultural program will be essentially completed by the end of 1984. Nearly two-thirds of the affected land is now farmed by individual peasant proprietors (the remainder is divided between large, state-owned farms — 21 percent of the affected land — and agricultural cooperatives — another 14-15 percent). Like most first-generation recipients of land under agrarian reform programs anywhere in Latin America, these campesinos are staunch supporters of the government that made them landowners. Much the
same could be said of campesinos now involved in the cooperative sector. Even workers for the state-owned agricultural enterprises enjoy mechanisms for participation in the management of such enterprises.

These and other government initiatives since 1979 have generated very large numbers of beneficiaries. Living standards for the large population at the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid seem to have improved significantly, especially among the rural population, even while the standard of living for middle-class professionals and skilled workers has declined. Even though real money wages have not risen appreciably, access to government-subsidized foodstuffs and other products through the basic-commodity rationing system has helped to raise living standards for the bulk of the population. Because the FSLN government has delivered concrete benefits to a large proportion of the Nicaraguan people, it enjoyed a broad base of popular support going into the 1984 elections.

Offsetting the political benefits to the FSLN accruing from its record of performance were the general deterioration of economic conditions and the implementation of a number of highly unpopular policies (military conscription, economic austerity measures) during the last 12 months. In January, 1984, some 200,000 youths aged 16-22 were required to register for the military draft. Conscription was initiated immediately, in anticipation of a major increase in Reagan Administration support for the activities of the contras. The conscription law was harshly criticized by the Church hierarchy, and there have been reports of resistance to the draft from both youths and their parents. On October 22, 1984, the government secured a pledge from all political parties participating in the November 4 elections to refrain from criticizing the military draft for the duration of the electoral campaign, reportedly in return for a supplemental contribution of 5 million córdobas (U.S. $500,000 at the official 10:1 rate of exchange) by the government to each party for campaign expenses.13

Even more unpopular have been the drastic austerity measures that were imposed by the government this year to deal with Nicaragua’s deepening economic problems. Prices of basic foodstuffs were doubled in early August, 1984, to reduce government outlays for food subsidies. Consumption taxes on soft drinks and beer were also raised sharply in 1984, also to help reduce the government deficit, and once again restrictions on currency exchange were tightened up.

Shortages of all kinds of consumer goods have become more acute in 1984, as the demands and economic distortions of the war effort against the contras became more pronounced and lack of foreign exchange restricted imports. Up to 50 percent of the nation’s maize and bean crops are now lost, according to government economic advisor E.V.K. Fitzgerald, because these crops are grown primarily in the zones most affected by the war, and peasants are either unable to plant or to harvest them. “This is a war economy,” Fitzgerald reminded us, “and all war economies involve shortages and hardships.”

Officially, at least 25 percent of the government’s total budget is now consumed by military expenses; most authorities believe the true figure is higher. In addition to the cost of arming the 60,000 men and women (including support personnel) involved in the fight against the contras, the costs of the war also include: direct destruction of productive facilities (damages totalling 2.5 billion córdobas, or U.S. $250 million, since 1981), lost production in the fishing, mining, and forestry industries which are concentrated in the war-torn Atlantic Coast areas (conservatively estimated at U.S. $50 million per year), huge losses in corn and bean production in the mountainous areas (equivalent to about U.S. $25 million per year), and a host of less visible costs such as motor vehicles and other machinery that is idled or wears out prematurely due to poor maintenance (most of the country’s technicians have been mobilized for military maintenance).14

In many ways, the human costs of the war are more serious -- and also far more difficult to measure -- than the material losses. As economist E.V.K. Fitzgerald told our delegation, “The country’s best leaders, its best technicians, its most promising young people must devote themselves to killing people rather than to developing the country. In a country that is desperately short of human resources, that is a tragedy...A whole generation of trained personnel is being lost.” The only quantifiable human losses are the lives that have been lost in the three-year-old war against the contras: more than 8,000 lives to date, the majority of whom have been civilians.15

Even under wartime conditions, Nicaragua’s economy is still growing (GDP expanded by 5 percent in 1983, and by an estimated 2 percent in 1984); but inflation (now running at an annualized rate of 50 percent) is up sharply since mid-1983, due to war-induced government budget deficits and scarcities. At least a portion of the shortages and upward pressure on prices reflects the success of Sandinista policies in terms of income and public service redistribution: Among working-class Nicaraguans, consumption of products like milk, pork, chicken, eggs, and medicines has increased

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13 Nine million córdobas (U.S. $900,000) had already been provided to each registered party, in early August, as prescribed by the 1984 Electoral Law. The supplemental campaign financing was reported by New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer in an article published on October 31, 1984. The October 22 agreement, a copy of which was obtained by our delegation, also includes a pledge by the political parties to refrain from calling for abstention and to participate actively in getting out the vote on November 4.

14 The figures are from the delegation’s interview with E.V.K. Fitzgerald. Dr. Fitzgerald is a distinguished British development economist, formerly at Cambridge University and the Institute of Social Research at The Hague, who has advised the Nicaraguan government on economic policy during the last five years. He is now based full-time in Managua.

15 A proportionately equivalent death toll in the United States would exceed one-half million.
significantly since 1979. Prices for goods that are not controlled by the state have risen dramatically in recent months.

All this has taken its toll in terms of popular support for the Sandinista government. Some foreign journalists have observed a growing sense of public weariness during the last 12 months and an increased tendency to blame the economic problems on Sandinista leaders. Other international observers based in Nicaragua told our delegation that public discontent is growing in the capital city of Managua, but support for the FSLN government in rural areas remains strong.

According to international development consultants, the psychological impact of FSLN investments in the countryside has been relatively greater than urban-based projects because there was virtually no government investment in rural areas before the Sandinistas took power. When our delegation asked campesinos at one cooperative farm how their living conditions had changed since 1979, they mentioned free and readily available health care, children who now attend school, income improvements that have enabled them to build their own houses (formerly they lived in ramshackle housing provided by local hacienda owners), and a new kind of relationship with government authorities.

"Now I can go to a bank myself; I can talk to a government official," one campesino told us.

Even in urban areas, a longtime U.S. resident in Nicaragua observed, frustrations over the faltering economy do not necessarily translate into opposition to the government; and even those housewives and others who complain endlessly about shortages would "fight to the end" to repel a U.S. invasion.

In retrospect, an academic observer told our delegation, the "greatest error committed by the Sandinistas was not to have held elections in September, 1979," just after the triumph of the FSLN-led revolt against Somoza. At that time, it is generally agreed, the FSLN was riding the crest of a great wave of public enthusiasm. And despite the virtual collapse of the national economy in 1979 (a 30 percent decline in GDP, in real terms), there were strong hopes for reconstruction and recovery. In the fall of 1984, by contrast, all the FSLN could offer the electorate was the probability of further sacrifice and hardship, resulting from the U.S. policy of economic strangulation and military pressure. This somber message was driven home to prospective voters by FSLN Presidential candidate Daniel Ortega at the FSLN's final rally of the 1984 electoral campaign, which was attended by at least 150,000 residents of Managua. Ortega did not dwell on the FSLN government's accomplishments of the past five years, nor did he make any promises of benefits to be delivered in the future. Instead, he repeatedly stressed the danger of U.S. military intervention and the need to prepare for the defense of Managua.

The Sandinista government made little effort in this election year to stifle public criticism of its performance. In fact, complaints about government management of the economy, alleged "high living" by some Sandinista officials, the military draft, and other issues have been amplified by a significant loosening of press censorship and increased access to the electronic and print media by the FSLN's opposition, both as a result of the government's decision to hold elections this year and to permit opposition parties to campaign vigorously against the FSLN. Our delegation's perusal of opposition party statements and advertising during the last week of the campaign revealed that virtually no subject was taboo. Even the opposition parties' pledge to avoid further criticism of the military draft was violated openly.

The Domestic Political Contenders

The main contender in the Nicaraguan elections of 1984 was, of course, the incumbent party, the FSLN. The elections were, inevitably, a referendum on the performance of the FSLN-dominated government during the last five years, as well as an opportunity for opposition parties to define more sharply their differences with the FSLN and to demonstrate that there was a mass constituency for their ideas.

The FSLN was formed in 1961, out of the conviction that negotiations with Somoza would never lead to a significant change in Nicaraguan politics and public policy. Headed by a nine-member National Directorate formed in 1979, the FSLN is the dominant influence over most aspects of public life in post-Somoza Nicaragua. It has used the five years since Somoza's removal to build up its base of support throughout the country, especially through the numerous mass organizations that are linked to it. In addition to these mass organizations (CDSs, youth and women's groups, etc.), the FSLN as a political party has established thousands of community or neighborhood-level organizing committees (comités de base) through which its campaign and other mobilizing activities are conducted.

This nationwide organizational infrastructure gives the FSLN a powerful advantage over all other political parties. In the Matagalpa region, for example, where 200 FSLN comités de base were functioning during the 1984 electoral campaign, the FSLN claimed to have 3,000 FSLN militants working in

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16 Interviews with international community development workers in Managua. According to official sources, consumption of medicines has increased by 300 percent, causing serious shortages at many clinics.


18 Estimates of the attendance at this rally vary widely. Members of our delegation who attended it variously estimated from 150,000 to 300,000 persons. Pro-FSLN newspapers (Barricada, Nuevo Diario) claimed 350,000; the Voice of America reported a turnout of 80,000; and the leading opposition newspaper in Nicaragua, La Prensa, totally ignored the event. The total population of Managua was estimated at 833,000 in 1983.
the campaign. According to the regional FSLN leader in Matagalpa, these party workers visited 15,000 homes, reaching an estimated 64,000 people, in the region during the three months preceding the 1984 elections. While the vast majority of the FSLN’s activists are volunteers, the party’s regional committees are staffed by full-time professional organizers. There is no other political party or movement in Nicaragua that can even begin to approach the FSLN in terms of organizational breadth and capacity to mobilize people.

FSLN leaders make no apologies about this kind of organizational strength. They interpret it as the result of five years of hard work and propagandizing since the Sandinistas took power, not to mention several years of clandestine organizational activity that preceded el triunfo. As FSLN militants frequently put it, “We began our [electoral] campaign twenty years ago.” They claim that most of the party’s income is derived from dues paid by FSLN members, who must earn their membership during a 6-12 month period of work for the party and who are required to contribute at least 4 percent of their income to the party coffers. The mass organizations also make collective contributions. FSLN leaders claim that the state does not directly pay FSLN expenses, but FSLN members who are public officials contribute as individuals.

As in other Latin American political systems with a dominant (“hegemonic”), government-sponsored party, there is a high degree of fusion between the FSLN as a political party and the post-Somoza state in Nicaragua. For example, we were told that most FSLN members are also leaders of mass organizations (youth groups, labor unions, CDSs, etc.) which are not formally part of the FSLN structure. In fact, to become an FSLN member, one must have a record of service in one of the mass organizations and be nominated for FSLN membership by one of them. In addition, FSLN militants who serve as government officials give the party de facto control over the public bureaucracy, the military, and police forces. All of this is true of the government party in countries like Mexico, of course, and it goes largely unchallenged both at home and abroad. However the “official” party-state fusion evident in Nicaragua was one of the key issues in the 1984 elections, and it was seized upon by the United States and other foreign critics of the Sandinistas as evidence of egregious “abuse of incumbency” which allegedly made it impossible for legitimate elections to be held.

In addition to the FSLN, there were 11 other political parties legally registered in Nicaragua during 1984. Six of these opposition parties registered candidates to stand for election (although one of these, the Independent Liberal Party, PLI, later tried to withdraw from the election); three parties affiliated with the Democratic Coordinating Committee (“La Coordinadora”) refused to register candidates for the election; and two other parties applied too late to register candidates, according to the Supreme Electoral Council.

Among the opposition parties that contested the elections, three could be considered to the right of the FSLN ideologically and programmatically, and three to the left. Parties to the right included:

- **Democratic Conservative Party (PCD)**, with Clemente Guido as its presidential candidate. Founded in 1979, the PCD has roots in the Conservative party tradition of Nicaragua. It is regarded by many as the “pro-Sandinista” wing or faction of the Conservative movement; one of its leaders, Rafael Córdoba Rivas, is a member of the ruling Sandinista junta. The PCD has positioned itself as a center-right party, arguing for negotiations with the contras, separation of the FSLN party from the state, and a complete lifting of the emergency decrees imposed in March, 1982. At the PCD’s October 28 party convention there seemed to be significant support for withdrawal from the November 4 elections, but presidential candidate Guido dissolved the meeting before any vote was taken.

- **Independent Liberal Party (PLI)**, with Virgilio Godoy as presidential candidate. The PLI was founded in 1944, to challenge the dominance of the Somoza within the Liberal Party organization, and its adherents participated actively in the armed struggle to remove Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The PLI has a substantial popular base. Prior to the November 4 elections it was regarded as the only party, other than the FSLN, with a nationwide organization and until its presidential candidate withdrew from the contest the PLI was generally expected to finish second in the balloting. Affiliated with the Liberal International, the PLI originally formed part of the Popular Revolutionary Front, the coalition of parties that were in basic agreement about the revolutionary process during the first four years of Sandinista rule. The PLI’s current leader, Virgilio Godoy, served as Labor Minister in the Sandinista government until February, 1984. When Godoy resigned from the cabinet (still on good terms with the FSLN leadership, by his own report), the PLI withdrew from the “Revolutionary Front” alliance and adopted a more conservative position vis-à-vis the Sandinistas’ revolutionary proyecto. The PLI still argues for social transformation, but with greater moderation. At least some of its leaders remain critical of private capitalists (both domestic and foreign) and see the parties affiliated with the “Coordinadora” as being tied too closely to U.S. interests. On October 21, Virgilio Godoy announced that he and his party would not be participating in the November 4 election because “minimum conditions” for free elections did not exist.

- **Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC)**, with Mauricio Díaz Dívila as presidential candidate. The PPSC developed from a split in the Social Christian Party (PSC) in 1976. Like the PLI, it was a member of the Popular Revolutionary Front from the Front’s creation in 1980; unlike the PLI, it has remained in basic agreement with the Sandinista’s revolutionary proyecto. The PPSC characterizes itself as the “Christian Democrats of the left,” while the parent Social Christian Party
represents “Christian Democrats of the right.” Its program stresses “democratic socialism,” but differs strongly with the FSLN in two key areas: relations between the Catholic Church and the state, and Sandinista foreign policy. The PPSC criticizes the FSLN for having acrimonious relations with the Church hierarchy, and it considers FSLN foreign policy to be aligned too closely with the Soviet Union. The PPSC leadership believes that unjust international criticism -- especially from the United States -- has discredited the November 4 elections and “ruined” them as a device for reducing external pressure on the Nicaraguan revolution; therefore, the party favors a new, externally legitimating election for seats in the National Assembly, to be held within a year or two.

The opposition participating in the November 4 elections also included three parties that stand to the left of the FSLN:

- **Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN),** with longtime trade union leader Domingo Sánchez as its presidential candidate. The PSN is the oldest leftist party in Nicaragua, having been founded in 1944. It is aligned with and has the official recognition of the USSR. Prior to 1979 it was somewhat discredited for having collaborated with the Somoza government during the 1940s. During the war against Somoza in the 1970s, the PSN criticized the FSLN as being “adventurist,” but after Somoza’s ouster it joined the Popular Revolutionary Front. The PSN’s social base is concentrated in the urban working class.

- **Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCdEN),** with Allan Zambrana Salmerón as presidential candidate. The PCdEN is a traditional Latin American communist party, aligned with the Soviet Union although not recognized by it. A left-wing breakaway from the Nicaraguan Socialist Party in 1971, the PCdEN regards the FSLN as a party of petty-bourgeois reformers. The PCdEN initially opposed the idea of holding elections this year, arguing that they were premature (given the need for a “mano dura” to deepen the revolutionary process) and an unnecessary concession to external forces, including the “capitalist” Contadora nations. Eventually the party decided to participate in the elections because, as one of its leaders told our delegation, “We approve of some of the things that the FSLN government is doing, and we didn’t want to give aid and comfort to the right, whose strategy is abstentionism and sabotage of the electoral process.”

- **Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML),** with Isidoro Tellez as presidential candidate. By far the smallest of the parties contesting the November 4 elections, the MAP-ML also stands the farthest to the left of the FSLN. Like the PCdEN, the MAPistas consider the FSLN to be a bourgeois party. They oppose granting any political role to the Nicaraguan business community, and consider the elections and the Contadora agreement to be concessions to domestic reactionary interests and to the United States. They also oppose any accommodation with the Catholic Church and call for an officially “atheistic” state. The MAP-ML is ridiculed by the FSLN for taking such unrealistic positions “in a Catholic, Christian country like this,” as FSLN vice-presidential candidate Sergio Ramirez told our delegation. Leaders of the MAP-ML were jailed by the Sandinistas in 1980 when they pressed too hard for an acceleration of the revolutionary process. The MAP-ML today is the Nicaraguan equivalent of the MIR movement in Chile under Allende.

Throughout the 1984 electoral campaign in Nicaragua, international attention focused not on the participating opposition parties just described, but upon the abstentionist opposition, led by Arturo Cruz. The abstentionist forces included several small political parties (three legally registered, one with no legal status), the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), much of the Catholic Church hierarchy, the newspaper La Prensa, and two small trade union federations. In 1984 the four most conservative opposition parties (the Social Christian Party, PSC; the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, PLC; the Social Democratic Party, PSD; the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, PCN -- not legally recognized as a party) joined with COSEP and the two above-mentioned labor federations to form the “Ramiro Sacasa Democratic Coordinating Committee,” popularly known as “La Coordinadora.” The Social Christian Party, affiliated with the international Christian Democratic movement, is the oldest (founded in 1957) and largest of the four parties belonging to the Coordinadora; but its influence within the coalition is generally believed to be second to that of COSEP, the business council.

The Social Democratic Party (PSD), founded in 1979, is the vehicle of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, co-director of La Prensa, the newspaper that has served as the organ for both the PSD and the Coordinadora generally. Our delegation found La Prensa to be a virulently partisan newspaper, intensely opposed to the FSLN government and to the holding of the 1984 elections, and supportive of Reagan Administration policy toward Nicaragua. (The other two daily newspapers that circulate in Managua, Barricada and Nuevo Día, are equally ardent partisans of the FSLN government.)

While the Catholic Church hierarchy did not formally participate in the activities of the Coordinadora, the Church’s principal leaders -- Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo and Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega -- strongly supported the positions taken by the Coordinadora, and their views were extensively reported by La Prensa. In early August, The New York Times reported that Archbishop Obando y Bravo, in a meeting with U.S. businessmen, acknowledged that he and his diocese had been actively involved in efforts to secure the removal of the FSLN government. During 1984, public statements by Church leaders criticized the military draft, questioned the legitimacy of the FSLN government, and called for direct negotiations between the government and the contras -- an idea strongly resisted by the Sandinistas.
Shortly after the FSLN came to power, the Church hierarchy published a pastoral letter endorsing a transition to socialism in Nicaragua, so long as individual rights were preserved. The bishops, particularly Archbishop Obando y Bravo, had been prominent in the opposition to Somoza. Despite this initial appearance of harmony between the Church and the FSLN, serious tensions developed in subsequent years. In retrospect, it seems that Church leaders like Obando y Bravo were anti-Somoza, but never accepted the *proyecto político* of the FSLN. The bishops have viewed the Sandinistas' promotion of mass organizations as an ominous step toward totalitarianism. They have also shown growing concern over the fate of private education, despite the fact that 50 percent of the country's secondary schools remain private (mostly church-run). The hierarchy now sees the Marxist, mass-mobilization elements of the Sandinista revolution as a threat both to individual liberty of conscience and to the institutional integrity of the Church. As a member of an independent religious order reminded our delegation, "There is no historical precedent for a collaborative, conciliatory relationship between a leftist, revolutionary state and the Catholic Church, and there is skepticism that Nicaragua will produce such an innovation. It is easier to accept the thesis that they will be incompatible, sooner or later."

But the Catholic Church in Nicaragua is a complex institution composed of ideologically diverse groups and functioning at more than one level. Groups more closely associated with the grassroots level of the Church -- the "Christian Base Communities" and the independent religious orders such as Maryknoll and the Jesuits -- work actively in support of government programs. Priests serving in the Sandinista government have become identified with the grassroots or "popular Church," which is viewed by the hierarchy as a direct threat to its authority. Sandinista leaders, on the other hand, accuse the Church hierarchy of utilizing religious symbolism and abusing its religious authority for purely political purposes (e.g., promoting the candidates and positions of the Coordinadora).

COSEP, the prime mover in the abstentionist opposition during 1984, represents many of Nicaragua’s largest business firms. It is not necessarily representative of the private sector as a whole, half of which consists of small and medium-sized producers. At one point in the struggle against Somoza, COSEP represented virtually all of the businessmen and farmers who were not tied to the Somoza family. It objected to the Somozas’ efforts to monopolize business opportunities and profits. After the Sandinistas took power, COSEP was awarded five seats in the Council of State, but it withdrew its representatives in November, 1980, and has not participated since that time. Since December, 1983, COSEP has exerted its political influence primarily through the Coordinadora. Within the Coordinadora, it has strongly opposed participation in the electoral process; opposed any accommodation between the FSLN government and its domestic opposition; and aligned itself with the *contras* and external forces seeking the removal of the Sandinista regime. COSEP’s leadership blames the country’s economic problems on Sandinista mismanagement, claiming that the economy was in decent shape even through the war against Somoza and that production did not collapse until the FSLN began to socialize the economy and undermine private business confidence.

The Sandinistas respond that, since the beginning of their rule, they have shown a willingness to compromise with private sector interests in order to maintain a functioning mixed economy. Subsidized loans, access to scarce foreign exchange and voluntary labor have been among the incentives offered to the private sector to enhance production levels and profits. Nationalization of property has been limited to clearly defined areas of the economy (primarily banking, insurance, foreign commerce, mining, and part of the agricultural sector), and the process has not been implemented arbitrarily.

The Sandinista leaders and advisors interviewed by our delegation uniformly asserted that the FSLN government is committed to the survival of the mixed economy, as a matter of internal and geopolitical necessity, and because it is so deeply ingrained in Nicaraguan society ("almost a folkloric thing," as Comandante Jaime Wheelock put it). They emphasized that in what Wheelock characterized as "the second phase of the Revolution, beginning in January, 1985," one of the key objectives of government policy will be to provide incentives and security to the private sector.

Nevertheless, resistance to the FSLN government from the private sector continues to harden. Many businessmen argue that they have no incentive to invest, since in their view, the socialization of the economy is likely to continue. The fundamental source of tension seems to be the private sector’s lack of influence over public policy-making, and the disparity between their still formidable economic power (60 percent of the economy is still in private hands) and their much diminished political influence.

The government now negotiates with private producers on a sectoral basis (as groups of coffee producers, cotton producers, etc.), rather than as members of COSEP, which the Sandinistas view as primarily a political action group. The FSLN government has also stepped up capital investment by the public sector (now 22 percent of the national budget, vs. about 5 percent under Somoza), to compensate for lack of investment by private businesses. Three-quarters of new investment in productive facilities now comes from the public sector.

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19 Opposition party members of the National Assembly, all but two of whom (the deputies representing the MAP-ML) were elected on platforms which recognize the capitalist character of Nicaragua’s economy, have served notice that they will hold the Sandinistas to their promises. As a deputy-elect from the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), the largest opposition party in the Assembly, told a foreign journalist after the election, “We will fight any proposal that is Marxist in nature or that limits people’s freedom to produce and sell as they please. There will never be another Cuba here, never.” (Stephen Kinzer, “Nicaraguans Vow Strong Opposition,” *The New York Times*, November 18, 1984, p. 6.)

20 Interview with government economic advisor, E.V.K. Fitzgerald, November 3, 1984. A low level of capital investment by the private sector has been a longstanding problem in Nicaragua, which predated the FSLN revolution. By 1979, Ni-
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTIONS

Negotiating the Structure

One of the most notable characteristics of the electoral process in Nicaragua this year was its "open-endedness," based on a continuous process of negotiation between the politically dominant FSLN and opposition parties and civic organizations. There are strong indications that this process of formal and informal bargaining will continue in the post-election period, both within the newly elected, 96-seat National Assembly and through the formal "National Dialogue" that was convoked in early October by the seven political parties participating at that time in the elections. By election time, the "National Dialogue" had evolved into a much broader negotiation involving all 33 major political groupings in the country, including all political parties (whether participating in the election or boycotting it), all trade union federations, all church groups, and all the private sector organizations.21

At earlier stages of the movement toward elections, the FSLN also demonstrated its openness to pragmatic compromise with opposition groups. FSLN proposals for the Political Parties Law (passed in final form by the Council of State in August, 1983) and the Electoral Law (finalized in March, 1984) were altered in many ways through a long process of discussion and debate with opposition groups. The Electoral Law, which went through multiple drafts between initial discussions in 1981 and final enactment in 1984, was further modified at several points during the pre-campaign period, in response to new demands by opposition parties. Among the concessions to opposition groups that resulted from this bargaining process are the following:

- A definition of political parties that characterizes them as contenders for power, not just participants in public administration or political discussions. The object of a political party, according to the final version of the parties law, is to achieve political power.
- The expansion of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) from three members, appointed by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, to five members, including two nominated by the National Council of Political Parties, in which all opposition parties participating in the elections were represented. The expansion was sought by the opposition parties because they questioned the independence of the three initial CSE appointees from the FSLN government.
- The allocation of a seat in the National Assembly elected on November 4 to any losing presidential candidate who receives the "electoral quotient" (effectively, 1/90th of the total votes cast nationally in the election). This provision has the effect of increasing opposition party representation in the Assembly, beyond the number of seats that they won through the proportional representation system established by the electoral law.
- A significant increase in the amount of free campaigning time on state-run radio and television stations provided to all parties that had registered candidates for the November 4 election.
- Extension of the closing date for campaign activities from October 31 to November 2.
- Multiple extensions of the deadline for registration of candidates, from July 25, to August 4, to October 1. None of the opposition parties (i.e., those affiliated with the Coordinadora) which had declined to register their candidates by the original deadline took advantage of the extension periods.
- A guarantee that all political parties participating in the November 4 elections will maintain their legal status, regardless of the number of votes they received in the 1984 elections.
- A review by the FSLN government of the cases of all opposition party militants who were in jail ostensibly for violations of criminal laws. As a result of this review, the Council of State released 40 out of approximately 300 such "political prisoners" prior to the elections.
- A procedure whereby all voter registration cards presented on election day would be retained by election officials, to eliminate any possibility that in the future the failure to vote (as evidenced by the lack of a validated voter credential) could be used as the basis for government reprisals or denial of public services. (Our delegation observed on election day that some voters were reluctant to surrender their voter registration card, which they had expected to retain.)

On a few points, the FSLN refused to accommodate opposition party proposals. The Sandinistas insisted that the minimum voting age remain 16 years, because of the extensive participation of this age group in the national literacy campaign, defense, and agricultural production. There was also a powerful demographic rationale: The median age in Nicaragua is about 16 (as compared with 30 years in the United States). The FSLN also insisted that members of the armed forces have the right to vote (the opposition wished to exclude them from the electorate). The FSLN rejected an opposition party proposal to require representatives (poll-watchers) from all of the parties participating in the November 4 election to sign the final vote tally for each precinct before the votes from that precinct would be considered valid. Since most of the opposition parties were unable to supply poll-watchers for more than a minority of the 3,892 polling places, the practical effect of the proposed requirement would have been to throw more than half of the total number of ballots cast into a "contested" category, which would have provided further ammunition for abstentionist
groups and external forces seeking to discredit the elections. Most importantly, in its negotiations with Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora, the FSLN refused to accede to the demand for direct talks between the government and the contras prior to the November 4 elections.

Reviewing the history of the negotiations between the FSLN and the opposition parties since 1981, and especially during the current election year, Stephen Kinzer, the Managua-based correspondent of The New York Times, told our delegation: “The FSLN gave in on almost all of the opposition parties’ demands concerning how the electoral process would be run. Their stance seemed to be, ‘If any clause of the election law causes serious controversy, we’ll modify it.’ Most of the opposition’s complaints about the process had nothing to do with the mechanics of the elections, but rather were more general criticisms of the political system... What some of these groups want is a complete change in the political system: to abolish the CDSNs (Sandinista Defense Committees), get the Sandinistas out of the army, prohibit [incumbent] government officials from running for office, and so forth. In short, they want Nicaragua to become a parliamentary democracy first, before they will participate. But this isn’t Switzerland!”

At least one of the opposition parties -- the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) -- apparently shares this assessment. As the PPSC’s vice-presidential candidate told our delegation, in his view, “El Frente Sandinista negocia todo menos el poder.” (“The FSLN Front negotiates everything -- except political power.”) Other opposition party representatives whom we interviewed were less generous in their views toward the FSLN’s negotiating posture, but most indicated that the Sandinistas had given important ground on one or more points of major concern to their party. These acknowledgements, as well as the record of changes actually made in electoral laws and procedures, led our delegation to conclude that the FSLN had shown considerable flexibility and a disposition to compromise in its dealings with opposition groups during the pre-election period. This evidence contrasts markedly with the image of FSLN intransigence and rigidity emphasized in most U.S. media coverage and official U.S. government statements about the Nicaraguan electoral process.

The Electoral Law

The electoral system established by Nicaragua’s 1984 electoral law (as modified) is rooted in the classical liberal-democratic concepts of territorial representation and “one citizen, one vote.” The law provides for presidential government and separation of powers between executive and legislative authorities and functions. The electorate is defined as all citizens sixteen years of age or older, who would cast one ballot for the offices of president and vice-president and one ballot for a pre-determined, party-specific list of candidates for the Assembly.

In the short term, the key institution will be the National Assembly, since it will function first as a constituent assembly empowered to define and promulgate the basic constitution of a new political system. At the outset, the National Assembly will be a unicameral body with 96 members (90 regular members plus the defeated presidential candidates of the six opposition parties, who are entitled by law to hold a seat in the Assembly) who will serve six-year terms.

As presently stipulated the Assembly will function first for up to two years as a constituent assembly, then become a legislature unless the Assembly itself, acting in its constituent role, modifies its own term, powers, and functions. Under the law, the Assembly could dissolve itself and call new elections as soon as the constitution has been drafted and promulgated. As mentioned above, this course of action has been specifically advocated by the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), among others. For the moment, the FSLN government is downplaying any possibility of new elections in the near future (i.e., before the six-year term of the Assembly members just elected expires).

The election of the Assembly was based on a standard model of proportional representation. The country was divided into nine territorial districts with a varying number of members per district, apportioned by population. The members elected to the Assembly were chosen from ordered lists of candidates stipulated by each legally inscribed party; the number elected from each party depended upon the fraction of the vote won in each district by each party. The choice of this kind of proportional representation system is significant because it tilts the National Assembly toward political pluralism, by assuring the representation of a wider range of interests and opinions within the electorate than would be achieved under a U.S.-style single-member district system. Proportional representation should also encourage the institutionalization of a multi-party opposition in the legislature.

Without it, the smallest opposition parties would have had virtually no chance of winning seats in the National Assembly. Also, the system of legislative election based on a single ballot with candidates rank-ordered by the parties themselves is likely to strengthen internal discipline within the system.

Election of the president under the 1984 electoral law is by simple plurality. The future functions, powers, and term of the executive branch are all subject to modification by the newly elected Assembly, acting in its role as a constitutional convention. The powers of the National Assembly itself remain to be determined, as part of the constitution-making process. A key question is whether the Assembly will have the power to approve or reject proposals for the national budget. The constituent assembly will also define the basic terms of the future relationship between the state and the private sector.

The Supreme Electoral Council

The 1984 Electoral Law created the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), which immediately assumed responsibility for the electoral apparatus. Following the pattern of Costa Rica and several other Latin American republics, the CSE was given the status of a fourth, fully autonomous branch of government. It was given the authority, at least in theory, to
make decisions independently of the Junta de Gobierno, the Council of State, and the National Directorate of the FSLN.

The CSE was required by law to consult with the National Council of Political Parties on such matters as the electoral calendar and voter registration procedures. The National Council of Political Parties is comprised of one representative from each of the legally recognized political parties. Actions taken by the CSE during the 1984 campaign indicate that it did, in fact, exercise considerable independence. Nevertheless, as noted above, the Electoral Law was modified several times during the pre-election period in response to pressure from opposition parties seeking even stronger guarantees of CSE impartiality.

Initially the CSE consisted of three individuals chosen by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. One of these, Dr. Mariano Fiallos, was named President of the CSE. Fiallos is a widely respected, U.S.-trained political scientist who was twice elected (in 1974 and 1979) by the faculty to the rectorship of the National University of Nicaragua, and was on leave as Rector of the University's León branch during the electoral campaign period. Fiallos is a supporter of the Sandinista government, although not a member of the FSLN. The other two originally appointed members were Leonel Ariglio, a former director of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), and Amada Pineda, a feminist activist of peasant origins. They assumed their duties on April 4, 1984. When the opposition parties claimed that these three Council members were too closely identified with FSLN policies, the Council of State amended the law to allow the Supreme Court to add two more persons nominated by the National Council on Political Parties. The individuals selected were Carlos García Caracas of the PPSC and José María Icazbalceta of the PCD. Despite this expansion of the CSE, some opposition parties -- especially the Independent Liberals (PLI) -- continued to complain that the CSE could not function in an independent manner, because the majority of its members had been named by an institution (the Nicaraguan Supreme Court) whose autonomy had been compromised under FSLN rule. Nevertheless, our delegation concluded on the basis of the evidence available to us (from interviews with CSE members and opposition party leaders, the CSE's own files, and the record of the CSE's actions) that the CSE functioned in a professional and impartial manner, both before and during the electoral campaign.

The CSE named nine regional Electoral Councils (CREs), which in turn named 91 subregional electoral boards (Junta Zonales Electorales). Finally, the CSE set up 3,892 precinct-level voting boards (Junta Receptoras de Votos, JRVs), which operated the polling places and certified the initial vote counts. The CSE was responsible for the appointment of a president and secretary for each JRV, but a further modification of the electoral law was made to allow the National Council of Political Parties to name a second secretary, with full voice and vote, for each precinct. However, by the time of the elections, only about 60 percent of the precincts had second secretaries appointed.

Every political party that had registered to participate in the elections was given the right to appoint a fiscal (poll-watcher) to be present at every meeting and every action of each level of the electoral process, from the CSE down to the precinct-level Juntas Receptoras. But not all parties were able to field a sufficient number of poll-watchers to cover every precinct. The total number of poll-watchers provided on election day by each participating party was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th># of Poll-watchers</th>
<th>% Precincts Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>3,599</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSC</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCdeN</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSN</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP-ML</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The PLI as a party had withdrawn from the election by November 4, but some PLI candidates continued to run, and had their own poll-watchers in place.

Source: Data supplied to the delegation by the Supreme Electoral Council, November 6, 1984.

The parties were entitled to name poll-watchers right up through election day, but it was clear that none of the opposition parties had the capacity to cover the majority of polling places. In the cases of several of these parties, it is highly doubtful that their total number of active members approached 3,892. The FSLN's much larger number of party workers gave it a commanding advantage over the opposition in terms of poll-watcher coverage. However, given the elaborate precautions to minimize the possibility of electoral fraud that had been built into the system (described below), our delegation concluded that the disparity in poll-watcher coverage was unlikely to have affected the election results to any appreciable degree.

In addition to managing the registration of voters, parties, and specific candidates, the CSE was charged with supervising the use of campaign propaganda, distributing paper donated by several foreign countries to the participating parties, providing them with substantial portions of their campaign funding, responding to complaints of campaign law violations or abuses, training local and regional election officials, distributing ballots and other voting equipment, and counting and reporting the vote.

Two advisers from the Swedish Electoral College assisted the CSE in technical design of electoral procedures and in training matters. For example, the decision to print dark colored stripes across the back of the white ballot so that one's vote could not be seen by holding the folded ballot up
Voter Registration: Procedures and Results

The Electoral Law called for a mandatory nationwide registration process that was carried out over a four-day period from July 27-31, 1984. Registering to vote (but not the act of voting itself, which remained voluntary) was required by law because the information generated through this process was to serve as a basis for the first official, nationwide census to be carried out since 1971. Although it was illegal not to register, there have been no reported cases in which penalties were imposed for non-registration.

The registration procedure was technically straightforward and occasioned very few complaints, either formal or informal. The CSE organized and paid for a national education campaign using radio, television, newspapers, local governments and the various mass organizations (labor unions, CDSs, etc.) to inform people of the requirement to register and of the procedure to be followed. Residents of each precinct registered either by presenting positive identification (birth certificate, driver’s license, social security card) or by the testimony of two registered witnesses from the same precinct. Each registrant received a registration card (libreta cívica) bearing the person’s name, date of birth, place of habitual residence, sex, type of identification presented, signature, and thumbprint. The libreta cívica also identified the location of the precinct and the volume, page, and line number of the registration catalogue that includes the entry for the registrant. At the end of each of the four registration days, lists of the new registrants were posted for a 10-day period. Both individual citizens and political parties were invited to inspect the lists and to file complaints about persons who had registered improperly or who did not live within the precinct.

Although one opposition party leader interviewed by our delegation -- from a party that chose to boycott the elections -- claimed that there were people who had registered three or four times, he offered no evidence and later admitted that the registration was “basically clean.” In fact, the procedures employed made multiple registrations quite difficult. The CSE received no formal complaints from any of the parties with respect to the voter registration process.

The results of the registration process were remarkable. In just four days, a total of 1,560,580 persons registered, representing 93.7 percent of the estimated voting-age population.23 The proportion of eligible voters registered ranged from a low of 58.5 percent in one war-troubled Atlantic Coast region to nearly 100 percent in other regions. The overall results surprised even Sandinista government leaders, who had expected only about 1.2 million persons to register.24 The Swedish electoral technicians who had advised the government expressed pleasure at the outcome. A spokesman remarked that “To carry out a voter registration like the one that has been done in Nicaragua is quite difficult, above all when there are inexact data on the total population of the country. If we add together all the difficulties that the Supreme Electoral Council has had in carrying out registrations [under wartime conditions], we consider them to be a total success.”25

No political party or other group in Nicaragua -- including those that boycotted the November 4 elections -- will now admit that they opposed voter registration. Even the Church hierarchy publicly supported the registration effort. However, the parties affiliated with the Coordinadora did not advocate registration until just before the process began, and their organ, La Prensa, refused to accept paid promotional advertising for the registration effort from the Supreme Electoral Council.26

Guarantees and Protections in the Electoral Process

Electoral laws are only as good as the means they establish to assure fair access, procedural honesty, and an accurate count. The Nicaraguan electoral law of 1984 provided a broad array of protections and guarantees.

As noted above, the law created a system of open scrutiny of all electoral proceedings (registration, campaigning, voting, vote tabulation) by party-nominated observers, at each level of electoral organization. Systems for receiving complaints and appeals for each step in the process were also established, as well as mechanisms for evaluation of complaints, reports to the interested parties, and correction of abuses or violations of the law. The Supreme Electoral Council had ultimate appellate authority over disputes and complaints that were not resolved at local or regional levels. The electoral councils at local and regional levels as well as the precinct-level voting boards were endowed with legal authority to require cooperation from all other government agencies.

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22 The ballots were also printed on heavy, opaque white paper. The contrast with Somoza-era elections is striking: The Somozas used translucent ballots, so virtually everyone assumed that their vote was not secret. The same problem occurred in the 1984 elections in El Salvador, where thin-paper ballots were deposited in transparent ballot boxes. The vote in Nicaragua in 1984 was truly a secret ballot.

23 The base population of eligible voters was estimated using population projections prepared by the United Nations’ Latin American Center of Demography, CELADE (fascículo F-NIC, November 1, 1983), and by the Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics and Census, INEC. The country’s total population in 1983 was estimated at 3,057,979, with the capital city of Managua accounting for 27.3 percent of the national total (833,298 inhabitants). Breakdowns of the estimated 1983 population by geographic region (departamento) and age group can be found in: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Nicaragua en cifras, 1983 (Managua: INEC, July, 1984), Tables 1-6 and 1-7.

24 Interview with Comandante Jaime Wheelock, Managua, November 3, 1984.


26 “Los partidos políticos de Nicaragua en dos meses de campaña electoral,” Envel (Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, Managua), Vol. 4, No. 40 (October, 1984), p. 2B.
agencies in order to carry out their functions. The precinct boards were also provided with Electoral Police (trained volunteers from the regular police force and private citizen volunteers) under the control of the precinct board, to guarantee public order and compliance with legal procedures for voting and registration (e.g., the prohibition on electioneering, placement of party propaganda, or bearing of arms near polling places).

The electoral law provided for equity in financial resources among the competing parties, through public financing of the campaign in the amount of 9 million córdobas (U.S. $900,000) for each party. This amount probably covered only a fraction of the costs for a full national propaganda and organizing effort for the larger parties. But the law also permitted parties to receive additional funding from both domestic and foreign sources. The CSE also sought, received, and distributed substantial donations of materials (paper, ink, etc.), which it provided to the parties in equal amounts. The total government outlay for the elections was 400 million córdobas (U.S. $40 million), including the costs of the registration drive and government contributions to the participating parties for their campaign expenses.27

The actual voting process on November 4 was meticulously designed to minimize the potential for abuses. The citizen arriving at a polling place presented his or her registration card, which was then verified against the precinct’s registration lists. When approved for voting, the citizen received his or her two ballots (one for the presidential race, one for the National Assembly), and a check mark was placed next to the voter’s name in the voter registration catalogue to indicate that that person had voted. (This also provided an independent basis for determining the total number of votes cast in each precinct.) The voter’s registration card was stamped in a box indicating that it had been used. In response to a request by opposition parties, all voter registration cards were retained by election judges so that there would be no possibility of them being used as an ex post facto way of checking on whether a person had voted (as allegedly happened in connection with the 1984 elections in El Salvador).

Each voter was then shown to a heavily curtained booth in which he marked the ballots, using an indelible marker, with a simple “X” beneath the party name and symbol of his choice. Ballots were designed for simplicity, and all party emblems were printed in full color. Once marked, each ballot was then folded, brought out of the booth, and deposited in one of two ballot boxes color-coded to match the dark colored stripes on the back of each ballot (gray for the Assembly ballot; blue for the presidential-vice presidential ballot). The voter then placed his right thumb or forefinger in a dish of indelible red ink, covering the nail, as a final means of preventing multiple voting.

In order to assure that the voting occurred in secret and free of coercion, only one voter at a time was allowed into the room containing the election officials and voting booth. (At some of the larger polling places, which had two lines of voters, two sets of election officers, and two voting booths, it was possible for two voters to be in the room simultaneously.) This procedure clearly slowed the pace of voting, but guaranteed maximum secrecy. In addition, polling places were required to be free of all party propaganda, last-minute electioneering activity, and all firearms other than the sidearm of the electoral police officer at each precinct. No persons other than the precinct voting board members, official (CSE-certified) international election observers, and accredited poll watchers were allowed in the room where voting occurred.

Prior to opening each polling place, ballot boxes were opened, certified to be empty by all the precinct voting board members and party poll-watchers, and then sealed. The voting period lasted from 7:00 a.m. until either 100 percent of the precinct’s registered voters had cast ballots, or until 7:00 p.m. (The average precinct had approximately 400 registered voters.) Anyone still in line at 7:00 p.m. was also allowed to vote.

Once the poll was closed, precinct election officials counted the check marks beside the names of those who had voted, recorded the count on an official form in the registration book, and signed the report. Poll-watchers were also permitted to sign the report if they wished. The ballot boxes were then opened, and votes were tallied in the presence of poll-watchers.

After the votes were counted at each precinct, the totals were recorded in official reports and signed by all members of the precinct electoral board and by any poll-watchers who wished to sign. One copy of the results was sent by courier to the CSE in Managua, and a telegram reporting the results was also sent to the CSE. The registration books, ballots (including any unused ones, which had to be carefully accounted for), and the precinct voting report were taken to the regional Electoral Council office, where the tally of ballots was repeated and another telegram reporting the results was sent to the CSE in Managua. Poll watchers from the participating parties were present at the regional Electoral Councils and at the CSE, and copies of the telegrams from precinct-level officials were made available to each poll-watcher.

### Election Day Observations and Results

The members of our delegation observed the voting process at more than 30 different polling places, chosen at random, in five different localities (the cities of Managua, Granada, and Masaya; the town of Nindiri; and a rural community, El Crucero). We were able to observe freely at all the polling places that we visited, and at most of them we also talked with election officials and poll-watchers.

The voting that we observed was very orderly, with no sense of commotion nor tension. Everyone, however, appeared to be taking the process very seriously. There was

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27 Data supplied to our delegation by the Supreme Electoral Council.
no cheerleading, no campaigning near polling places, no political materials being distributed. All party propaganda had been scrupulously removed or painted over in the vicinity of polling places. All soldiers who approached the polls to vote were unarmed or handed over their arms before entering the lines of voters. Only the electoral police responsible for security at each polling place were armed. Polling places functioned in an extremely formal, bureaucratic manner. We observed no evidence of irregularities in the voting process, at any of the polling places visited.

At most polling places, only poll-watchers representing the FSLN were present, although a few from other parties (PCD, PSN) were also observed, and we were told at several polling places that "circulating" opposition party poll-watchers had spent some time at those places. Given their manpower constraints, some opposition parties apparently relied upon rotating poll-watchers who did not attach themselves to any particular polling place for the entire day.

In some parts of the country, voting was interrupted or prevented by the presence of the contras. According to CSE President Mariano Fiallos, 11 polling places in the northern regions could not function because of contra activities. Two polling places were attacked by the contras, and an electoral policeman was killed in one of these mortar attacks. Several days before, contra leaders had announced a cease-fire for election day; but apparently some rebel units did not get the word, or the cease-fire was not, in fact, observed.

Voter turnout was heavy. By the opening of the polls at 7:00 a.m., over 100 people -- 10 percent of the total registered voters in the precinct -- were lined up to vote in one low-income neighborhood of Managua that we visited. Lines there and elsewhere had begun to form at 4:00 a.m. In general, we observed heavier turnout and more enthusiasm among voters in low-income areas than in more affluent neighborhoods. Throughout election day, the Supreme Electoral Council preempted all programming on all of the country's radio stations. The message "Your vote is secret, your vote decides" was broadcast continuously, alternating with popular music and explanations of voting procedures.

In spite of efforts by some elements of the FSLN's opposition to encourage voter abstention,\(^28\) Not surprisingly, the highest rates of abstention were in areas most affected by the war. While not quite meeting the FSLN government's own expectations (several high-ranking officials had predicted a turnout of 80 percent), the rate of participation in Nicaragua's November 4 elections compares very favorably with the rates achieved in 11 other recent Latin American elections, as well as the 1984 U.S. presidential election (see Table 2).

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\(^{28}\) As mentioned above, the Electoral Law of 1984 forbids any party or individual to promote abstention. However, numerous statements by groups affiliated with the Coordinadora, published regularly in La Prensa, could easily be construed as supportive of abstention. The thrust of these statements was to deny the legitimacy of the electoral contest and to emphasize the non-participation in the elections of the Coordinadora and, in the last two weeks preceding the election, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). Propaganda distributed by the contras in northern areas was more explicit in advocating abstention (see the handbill reproduced in the appendix to this report).

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### BOLETA ELECTORAL PARA REPRESENTANTES A LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL

**REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 PPSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 MAP-ML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 PCDN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FSLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 PC de N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 PLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 P.S.N.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PARTIDO POPULAR CRISTIANO**

**MOVIMIENTO DE ACCION POPULAR MARIÑISTA LENINISTA**

**PARTIDO CONSERVADOR DEMOCRATA DE NICARAGUA**

**FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL**

**PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE NICARAGUA**

**PARTIDO LIBERAL INDEPENDIENTE**

**PARTIDO SOCIALISTA NICARAGUENSE**

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Ballot used to vote for candidates for the National Assembly, Nicaraguan General Elections of November 4, 1984.
TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Election*</th>
<th>Total Vote (thousands)</th>
<th>% Adult Population Voting**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>15,180</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>48,440</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>6,816</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>22,523</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICARAGUA</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>P, CA</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>4,030</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>P, L</td>
<td>6,741</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*P=Presidential, L=Legislative, CA=Constituent Assembly.
**Estimates based on votes cast as a percentage of total population age 20 or over.

Source: Based on Table 1 in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean," Current Policy Statement No. 605 (August, 1984), p. 1. Data on Nicaragua are from the Supreme Electoral Council (total vote) and from: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Nicaragua en cifras, 1983 (Managua: INEC, July, 1984), Table 1-7 (estimated population age 20 or over). Data on United States from U.S. Bureau of the Census and press reports on 1984 election results.

Sandinista officials had stressed the need for a high turnout, to demonstrate the validity of the electoral process and to "send a message to Washington." "Turnout is the most important thing," Comandante Jaime Wheelock told our delegation the day before the election. "It doesn't matter how the vote is divided." Some FSLN leaders had predicted that their party would receive 80 percent of the votes. In fact, the FSLN received 67 percent; 29 percent was divided among three opposition parties to the right of the FSLN (the PCD, PLI, and PPSC); and less than 4 percent was divided among three parties to the left of the FSLN (PCdeN, PSN, and MAP-ML). The opposition parties together won 35 seats in the National Assembly (36.5 percent), including six seats for their losing presidential candidates. The detailed breakdown of votes won by each party is shown in Table 3.

Invalid ballots comprised only 6.1 percent of the total votes cast. These include completely unmarked (blank) ballots, ballots on which more than one party or presidential candidate had been selected, and ballots improperly marked or spoiled in some other way. Before the election some anti-Sandinista voters had said that they would cast a protest vote by defacing their ballots or submitting blank ballots. But even if 100 percent of the invalid ballots tallied in the November 4 election were considered votes against the FSLN, a large protest vote did not materialize.

Interpretations of the election results will vary. Critics of the Sandinistas will claim that the FSLN’s "poor" showing — "only" two out of three Nicaraguans voted for the Frente — demonstrates its weakness, even in the face of "token" opposition. Could the FSLN have polled even a bare majority, they will ask, if the "real" opposition had run? Defenders of the FSLN will interpret the results as evidence not only of the FSLN’s strength — despite the country’s severe economic difficulties and the FSLN’s identification with unpopular policies like conscription — but of the free and competitive character of the elections. A 33-percent share of the vote going to opposition parties, in their view, represents meaningful opposition, which the FSLN government had the political courage to recognize through a clean vote count and accurate reporting of results.

We find greater merit in this second view of the results. Prior to the election, a Nicaraguan social scientist had expressed to us his concern that the credibility of the elections would be diminished by the inability of the combined opposition parties to garner more than 20-25 percent of the vote, due to their lack of an attractive alternative pro-

TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th># of Votes (Presidential)</th>
<th>% of Valid Votes Cast</th>
<th>Seats Won in Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>735,967</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>154,327</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>105,560</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSC</td>
<td>61,199</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCdeN</td>
<td>16,034</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSN</td>
<td>14,494</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP-ML (null)</td>
<td>11,352</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>1,170,142</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
gram and poor organization. His concerns proved unfounded. However, the Independent Liberal Party’s share of the November 4 vote was probably diminished to some extent by the confusion surrounding the attempt of its presidential candidate, Virgilio Godoy, to take the party out of the elections, just two weeks before election day. Since the ballots had already been printed and distributed by that time, Godoy’s attempt to have the names of himself and other PLI candidates withdrawn from the ballot was disallowed by the CSE. Therefore, the PLI was among the seven choices offered to voters on November 4. 29 All ballots marked for the PLI were recognized and counted by election officials as valid votes.

As to the potential strength of what FSLN critics term the “real” opposition -- i.e., the parties affiliated with the Coordinadora -- any assessment must be highly speculative. There were no pre-election political opinion polls to demonstrate the relative strength of opposition parties. However, there is no evidence that the Coordinadora parties possessed a mass base comparable to that of such parties as the PLI and the PCD, which were tested in the November 4 election. Even if the Coordinadora alliance had participated and received 15 percent of the votes -- more than any of the opposition parties that actually competed in the election -- the FSLN would still have won a majority.

What the results did demonstrate is that the opposition parties continue to command the loyalty of a significant portion of the population, and that in the unlikely event that they chose to run against the FSLN as a unified front, the election could be a close contest. Despite its much-discussed “coercive” capabilities, the FSLN garnered 63 percent of the total votes cast and 67 percent of the valid votes. This is a far cry from a totalitarian political system that has frozen out all legitimate opposition -- the kind of regime that some U.S. officials profess to see in Nicaragua today. It is also far removed from the Cuban system, which in the last quarter-century has never come close to having the kind of competitive elections that Nicaragua had on November 4.

Without question, the November 4 election was the cleanest held in Nicaragua since 1928, when U.S. marines were organizing and supervising the balloting. The New York Times’ correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, reported on November 6: “Representatives of several parties and their supporters had reported irregularities at various polling places, but none produced serious evidence of large-scale fraud.” The Miami Herald’s reporter on the scene, Juan Tamayo, observed on election day: “Through some people said that they felt pressurized by the Sandinistas to vote, most said they were voting for the first time in their lives because they perceived the balloting as clean. ‘Under Somoza you voted once, and someone else voted two more times in your name,’ said Manuel Antonio González, 67, a carpenter in a poor Managua barrio. ‘These elections have a different air.’”

La Prensa, the FSLN government’s most vociferous media critic, could come up with only two reports of alleged irregularities, both in Managua: At polling place No. 451, 34 votes for the PLI allegedly were recorded by precinct-level officials, but at higher levels the PLI tally for this precinct was allegedly reduced first to 33 votes and finally to 23 votes. At polling place No. 262, a mentally ill person allegedly voted, with the assistance of another person. The rather unlikely (for the conservative La Prensa) source for both of these uncorroborated reports was a poll-watcher representing the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). As of the close of business on November 7, not a single formal complaint about voting or vote count irregularities had been presented at the Supreme Electoral Council, by any party. Spokesmen for several of the participating opposition parties attested to the cleanliness of the elections. “It was an honorable process,” a PPSC representative told The New York Times (November 6, 1984). “We received the vote we expected,” he added.

ISSUES RAISED BY THE ELECTION

Scope of the Electoral Choice

One of the most controversial aspects of the Nicaraguan elections of 1984 was the range of choices available to the voter. The range-of-choices question is separable from the issues of competitiveness and “free access” to campaign media (and ultimately to the voter), which also figured prominently in the debate over the Nicaraguan elections. It should also be disaggregated into two component issues: (1) Why did some opposition parties abstain from the elections? (2) How did their abstention affect the range of alternatives (programmatic, ideological, etc.) presented on the ballot?

External critics of the Nicaraguan electoral process have argued that, because legitimate opposition groups (especially Arturo Cruz and his Coordinadora coalition) were excluded from the process, the elections were illegitimate and uncompetitive. However, the facts simply do not support this notion of “exclusion.” No major political tendency in Nicaragua was denied access to the electoral process in 1984.

The only exception to this generalization was the armed counterrevolutionaries (contras) who have been trying for three years to topple the Sandinista government by force. The estimated 14,000 contras were excluded, at the insistence of the FSLN, from direct participation in the elections and in the National Dialogue that began in October, 1984. We know of no election in Latin America (or elsewhere) in which groups advocating the violent overthrow of an incumbent government have themselves been incorporated into the electoral process, particularly when these groups have been openly supported by a foreign power. The contras nevertheless had a voice in the 1984 election campaign. Two of the Coordinadora-affiliated parties, the PSD and the PLC, supported their inclusion in the elections. And while denying that they represented the contras, Arturo Cruz and the Coor-
didadora seemed to endorse and promote their cause, both within Nicaragua and abroad. For example, after a one-hour meeting with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington on October 30, Cruz emerged to tell reporters that “the contras are our esteemed fellow citizens who chose the route of war.”

As far as legally recognized political parties are concerned, the only ones that did not appear on the ballot on November 4 were absent by their own choice, not because of government exclusion. This is an uncontroversial point, at least in Nicaragua. Controversy arises, however, over the motivations of the parties which chose to abstain. Determining motivations is necessarily a delicate issue for foreign observers and must be approached with some caution and respect for the internal dynamics of Nicaraguan politics. Nevertheless, it was possible for our delegation to reach some conclusions regarding the non-participation of the Coordinadora group, whose absence from the elections caused the greatest concern among most observers in the United States.

The following chronology of events is important to an understanding of the Coordinadora’s behavior:

**December, 1983:** After the FSLN government announces that elections would take place, as promised in 1979 and 1980, the Coordinadora publishes a list of nine points, characterized as requirements for “authentic elections.” Several of these demands address conditions for free elections: abolition of press censorship, access to state-owned mass media, and suspension of the emergency restrictions on freedom of assembly, political mobilization, and union activity which had been imposed by the government in March, 1982. But other demands call for major changes in the political system and orientation of the FSLN government’s policies, before the elections — i.e., as a condition for the Coordinadora’s participation in the electoral process. The proposed changes include separation of the FSLN party from the state (especially the armed forces, the police, state-run television stations, and various mass organizations), repeal of certain laws providing for nationalization of private property, and direct negotiations between the FSLN government and representatives of the contras.

**July 21, 1984:** The Coordinadora parties name Arturo Cruz as their presidential candidate for the 1984 elections. Adán Fletes, who had already been nominated by one of the Coordinadora parties (the PSC) as its presidential candidate, steps aside and becomes Cruz’s vice-presidential running mate. At this time, Cruz is still in Washington, D.C., where he is an officer of the Inter-American Development Bank. Neither Cruz nor Fletes has yet been registered by the Coordinadora as candidates to stand for election in November.

**July 22, 1984:** Arturo Cruz arrives in Nicaragua, as presidential candidate of the Coordinadora. He warns that he and the Coordinadora will abstain from the elections unless the FSLN government complies with the Coordinadora’s “nine points” of December, 1983,” and emphasizes the demand for inclusion of the contra leaders in the national political dialogue as the Coordinadora’s “basic condition” for participation.

**July 25, 1984:** Cruz announces, in Managua, that the Coordinadora will boycott the 1984 elections, but that he will continue to campaign as if he had registered as an official candidate.

**July 25-August 5, 1984:** Cruz and the Coordinadora hold a series of campaign rallies, in Managua, Masaya, Leon, Chinandega, and Matagalpa. At several of these rallies there are serious disturbances involving both Cruz’s supporters and FSLN militants.

**August 1, 1984:** The electoral campaign officially begins.

**Late September, 1984:** The FSLN asks the Supreme Electoral Council to extend the period for registration of candidates (the previous deadline was July 25), and reopens negotiations with Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora, using Colombian President Belisario Betancur as mediator.

**September 30-October 2, 1984:** In Rio de Janeiro, at a meeting of the Socialist International, negotiations between Cruz and the FSLN (represented by Bayardo Arce) continue, with Willy Brandt serving as mediator. A provisional agreement is reached, but cannot be finalized, with each side blaming the other for blocking final approval. The FSLN government announces that the November 4 elections will be held on schedule.

**November 2, 1984:** Electoral campaign officially ends.

**November 3, 1984:** On election eve, Arturo Cruz returns to Nicaragua from Washington. In arrival remarks to the press, he pronounces the November 4 election “totally ridiculous and illegitimate... a farce.”

Several observations can be made about this chain of events. First, there is no hard evidence that Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora (at least the dominant elements within that coalition) ever intended to participate in elections this year or next, regardless of whether their conditions for participation were met by the Sandinistas. There is, in fact, circumstantial evidence that a decision to boycott the elections was made quite early (December, 1983, when the “nine points” were issued), and subsequent public statements notwithstanding, that decision was never seriously reconsidered. This was the conclusion drawn by a senior U.S. diplomat in Central America who was interviewed by our delegation:

“When the Coordinadora issued their nine-point statement [in December, 1983], the content of that statement showed that they had already decided not to participate. These were things that the Sandinistas would never accept...Cruz himself wasn’t even on the scene at that point.”

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30 When our delegation asked the Coordinadora’s designated vice-presidential candidate, Adán Fletes, whether Cruz’s statement suggested that the Coordinadora supported the overthrow of the FSLN government by violence, he hedged his response, remarking that “Cruz is an old friend of Arturo Robelo, Edén Pastora, and the other leaders” of the contras. Fletes informed us that his party, the PSC (one of the Coordinadora-affiliated parties), opposes United States aid to the contras, but blames the FSLN’s policies for the emergence and persistence of the counterrevolutionary movement.
In fact, the Sandinistas did accept many of the Coordinadora’s “nine points,” particularly those having to do with creating appropriate conditions for free elections. Most of the restrictions on political activity imposed in March, 1982, when a state of emergency was declared to deal with counterrevolutionary activities were lifted at the beginning of the electoral campaign, in early August. There was a notable relaxation of press censorship, except for military matters and some economic issues (e.g., shortages of basic goods). However, the Sandinistas did not budge on the Coordinadora’s key demand -- to initiate direct talks with the contras -- and they also took the position that the Coordinadora’s proposals for major changes in political structure and public policies should constitute the Coordinadora’s party platform for the elections, rather than conditions for the Coordinadora’s entry into the electoral process.

Judging by the agenda under discussion at the Rio de Janeiro talks in October, it seems that a significant narrowing of differences between the Coordinadora and the FSLN had been achieved in the preceding weeks. The Coordinadora dropped its demand for a direct dialogue with the contras, as well as its insistence upon pre-election changes in government policy and the FSLN-state relationship. In return, according to Adán Fleites, the Coordinadora’s vice-presidential candidate who was present at the Rio talks, “the FSLN had agreed to all our other conditions,” including a large increase in free media time to compensate for the Coordinadora’s late entry into the campaign, complete abolition of press censorship (“except for military matters and national security matters”), permission to disseminate party propaganda at all government offices and military installations, an absolute guarantee against FSLN-organized disruptions of opposition-party rallies, and a ban on movement of public transportation vehicles and state-owned vehicles on election day. The key provision of the draft agreement would have postponed the date of the elections to January 13, 1985, in return for a cease-fire by the contras, to be negotiated by the Coordinadora. A copy of the provisional accords between the FSLN and the Coordinadora was supplied to our delegation by the Coordinadora’s Adán Fleites.

There have been many different explanations for the failure to reach a final agreement in Rio de Janeiro. Adán Fleites told our delegation that the draft agreement was never signed because the FSLN’s negotiator walked out of the talks. The FSLN claims that, once the draft accords had been initialed, Coordinadora leaders in Managua insisted on a delay of several days to reconsider the agreement, which the FSLN was unwilling to grant. Some independent journalistic reports corroborate this version. Other observers believe that negotiators for both sides may have exceeded their authority in Rio, and upon checking with their colleagues in Managua, they were urged to seek any pretext for getting out of the agreement. The Sandinistas clearly wanted and needed an agreement, to enlist the Coordinadora’s participation and prevent the November 4 elections from being discredited internationally. Arturo Cruz, according to several key informants interviewed by our delegation, may also have wanted to run; but the more conservative elements of his Coordinadora coalition (especially the businessmen represented by COSEP), encouraged by hardliners within the Reagan Administration, vetoed any agreement.

The weight of the evidence available to us suggests that the Coordinadora group made a policy decision to pursue its political goals in 1984 outside of the electoral process. Its abstention from the elections was not the result of FSLN intransigence. The government was still negotiating with the Coordinadora over the election date in mid-October; clearly it had not yet made up its mind to proceed with elections regardless of whether the Coordinadora participated. Given the terms for campaigning and holding the elections to which the FSLN had agreed by October 2 in Rio de Janeiro, it is evident that the FSLN was willing to “take specific steps to create an environment conducive to genuine electoral competition,” as the Coordinadora and the U.S. State Department insisted that it do.

Assuming that both sides were negotiating in good faith, it could be argued that both erred tactically. Cruz and his coalition partners, in not taking the important concessions they had extracted from the Sandinistas and standing for election in January; the FSLN in not extending itself a bit more, either to strike a deal or to call Mr. Cruz’s bluff. What is unquestionable is that both sides were damaged by the failure of the Rio talks.

The breakdown of negotiations between the FSLN and the Coordinadora left six political parties on the ballot for November 4, in addition to the FSLN. During the last two weeks of the campaign, considerable confusion developed with regard to the participation of two of these parties. First, a split occurred in the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), in which the presidential candidate, Clemente Guido, affirmed his own and his party’s intention to participate in the elections, while other party leaders called for abstention. The PCD stayed in, and the internal dissension caused no significant change in the party’s platform.

In the case of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), when presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy withdrew from the election, claiming that the FSLN government had failed to provide “minimum guarantees” for free elections, his vice-presidential running mate and many of the party’s candidates for the National Assembly continued in the campaign. The division within the PLI was genuine and deep. A regional PLI leader in Matagalpa told our delegation that he had argued strongly for continuing in the campaign, “despite

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31 On October 5, 1984, Doyle McManus of The Los Angeles Times reported: “Cruz and Sandinista negotiator Bayardo Arce worked out a draft agreement in two days of talks in Rio de Janeiro this week. But other members of Cruz’s coalition insisted on a three-day delay to consider the plan, the Sandinistas refused, and the talks were suspended.”

all the inconveniences” resulting from FSLN control of the governmental apparatus, “because to withdraw would increase the risk of a U.S. invasion” by robbing the November 4 elections of legitimacy in the eyes of the world. However, the division of the PLI into abstentionist and participatory factions did not alter its basic program; and on election day, voters had the same range of choices as before Godoy’s withdrawal.

A close inspection of the platforms of the seven parties listed on the November 4 ballot reveals that the Nicaraguan voter had a wide range of options on major issues -- considerably wider, for example, than in recent elections in El Salvador and Guatemala. With regard to foreign policy, the FSLN government was flanked by one party attacking it for aligning Nicaragua too closely with Soviet foreign policy (the PPSC), and another party attacking it for not bringing the country closer to the Soviet camp (the PCdeN). On economic strategy, the PCD called for greater latitude for the private sector, while the MAP-ML advocated complete nationalization of private enterprise. People concerned about the military draft could also choose several alternative policies to the right of the FSLN, including that of the PCD, which wants to abolish conscription altogether. While none of the parties to the left of the FSLN called for the overthrow of the Sandinistas or a reversal of the revolutionary process, they did have significant policy differences with the incumbent government.

A senior U.S. diplomat in Central America offered our delegation the opinion that such programmatic diversity among the parties competing in the November 4 elections was of little consequence. With Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora absent, in this official’s view, the elections were totally one-sided, since the Nicaraguan voter is “not sophisticated enough” to express his disapproval of the FSLN by casting a vote for an “obscure splinter party” like the PCD or the PPSC. “The level of political awareness in this country is not high enough,” the diplomat told us.

But there are some glaring inconsistencies in the official U.S. analysis of Nicaraguan voter behavior. On the one hand, we were told that Nicaraguans are profoundly unhappy with the FSLN because of the military draft, shortages of consumer goods, and other issues. On the other hand, the same U.S. official seemed to be arguing, these concerns would not determine the way Nicaraguans voted on November 4. We find it difficult to reconcile these arguments. In any case, given the impressive political maturity which the Nicaraguan people exhibited during the 1984 campaign and elections, we would hesitate to pass such a negative judgement on their ability to choose meaningfully among the alternatives presented to them on election day.

The Issue of Abuse of Incumbency

Another argument widely used to discredit the Nicaraguan electoral process this year focused attention upon the overwhelmingly dominant role of the FSLN in the country’s political system, and the Sandinistas’ alleged propensity to abuse their position of incumbency. Essentially, the argument is that even if the electoral rules were not rigged to favor the FSLN, the rules would still operate unfairly to the FSLN’s advantage, because of its dominant position and the lack of separation between the state and the Sandinista party. Alleged abuses of incumbency by the FSLN were the most common subject of complaints (18 percent of the total) submitted to the Supreme Electoral Council by opposition parties during the 1984 campaign.

There is little question that the FSLN is, in fact, the dominant force in the present Nicaraguan political arena. Part of its strength, like that of the PRI in Mexico, derives from its historical identification with the revolution that toppled a hated dictatorship. As FSLN vice-presidential candidate Sergio Ramírez reminded our delegation, “The FSLN is not just an electoral party. It won the revolution.” Another legacy of the struggle against Somoza is the FSLN’s extensive network of local-level activists. As a party, the FSLN operates primarily at the local level, and it is the only political organization in Nicaragua with the capacity to operate at that level throughout the country.

Over the past five years, the FSLN has also consolidated its control over the governmental apparatus. It has a monopoly control over both the police and the military. The civilian bureaucracy presents a mixed picture, however, with supporters of the PLI and other non-Sandinista parties holding positions in many government agencies. As described in an earlier section of this report, there is a high degree of fusion between the FSLN and the various mass organizations (Organizaciones Populares) which have been set up or refurbished since the fall of Somoza, including the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs) which theoretically operate in all neighborhoods throughout the country. Finally, the FSLN has control over a substantial portion of the country’s mass media, via the two state-run television stations (the only television stations in Nicaragua), 16 state-owned radio stations (out of a total of 39 in the country), and two of the nation’s three daily newspapers (Barricada, the official government organ, and Nuevo Diario, which is closely aligned with the Sandinistas).

In spite of the fact that the FSLN is the dominant political force in Nicaragua today, it was obvious to our delegation that it does not have total control over the society. And there continues to be a substantial amount of “noise” in the political system, from the top level on down. The image of tight, centralized FSLN control over society and polity which the Sandinistas’ critics at home and abroad have cultivated is greatly exaggerated. This applies even to the conduct of official censorship of the media. A particularly striking example occurred late in the electoral campaign: On the same evening when the government heavily censored the issue of La Prensa devoted to coverage of Virgilio Godoy’s withdrawal from the electoral contest, Godoy was announcing his decision on national television (completely uncensored), and several days later La Prensa’s front page (uncensored) featured the story of Godoy’s withdrawal.

Many of the “abuses of incumbency” which could be witnessed in Nicaragua during the 1984 electoral campaign are common occurrences in U.S. political campaigns: the use of government vehicles and government buildings for cam-
campaign activities, dedications of public works by incumbent party candidates, giving public employees time off from normal duties to work in campaign activities, and so forth. More serious are the frequent accusations by some opposition politicians and U.S. officials that the FSLN has utilized its “institutional hold” on the Nicaraguan people to induce their support for FSLN candidates.

The most commonly cited channel or vehicle for such abuses is the neighborhood-level CDSs, which allegedly use their control over the distribution of food rations books to compel political obedience. We could find no evidence to support these allegations, however. The ration booklets in use in Nicaragua enable the holder to buy several basic products (e.g., rice, sugar, beans, cooking oil, soap) at state-subsidized prices through local privately-owned stores.33 They are distributed through the CDSs, once a year -- not on a weekly or monthly basis. Our interviews with neighborhood social workers and individual residents revealed that everyone automatically receives a ration card, whether or not they participate in CDSs activities, and regardless of their political views. Community development practitioners told us that while some CDS officers may occasionally abuse their authority and “act as lord and master” over their neighbors, such abuses are neither widespread nor systematic; and they are usually motivated by personal feuds rather than political considerations. In our conversations with average citizens, we found no instances of withholding or threatened withholding of ration cards by CDS officials.

The only abuse involving the CDSs which we found to be common was the use of these organizations by the FSLN to distribute its campaign materials and to help mobilize residents to attend FSLN rallies. In the neighborhoods which we checked, CDS leaders had distributed only the materials of the FSLN. However, opposition parties were free to campaign in these areas, and their campaign posters and graffiti were quite visible. We were also informed by an official of the Supreme Electoral Council that there had been some cases of CDSs telling their members not to attend opposition party rallies.

A more troublesome area is that of official censorship. There was relatively little press censorship in Nicaragua until March, 1982, when the government declared a state of emergency in response to the escalation of contra activities. On August 1, 1984, restrictions on media coverage of all subjects except for military developments (e.g., attacks by the contras) and some economic matters (e.g., food shortages) were lifted, as part of the implementation of the 1984 Electoral Law. However, censorship of some explicitly political news occurred intermittently during the electoral campaign. The most egregious case was the initial censorship of La Prensa’s coverage of Virgilio Godoy’s withdrawal from the election; but news about disruptions of Arturo Cruz’s political rallies by FSLN sympathizers in the pre-campaign period was also suppressed.

Most acts of censorship are justified by government officials as a reflection of wartime conditions. “A country at war,” FSLN leader Sergio Ramírez told us, “can’t allow a newspaper which is the instrument of the enemy to publish its opinions freely.” La Prensa is generally viewed by Sandinista officials and FSLN supporters in the general population as a mouthpiece for both the contras and the Reagan Administration. Our reading of La Prensa during the nine days we spent in Nicaragua revealed a newspaper which, while not openly subversive, is unremittingly hostile to the incumbent government in virtually every article it publishes and which self-censors any news which reflects favorably upon the FSLN. For example, on the day after the FSLN’s massive end-of-campaign rally in Managua, at which the head of the FSLN junta, Daniel Ortega, delivered his most urgent warning to date of an imminent U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, not a word about this event appeared in La Prensa.

The official explanation for censoring news of Godoy’s electoral withdrawal was legalistic: “It’s illegal to promote abstentionism, and La Prensa’s issue of October 22 was full of abstentionist propaganda,” Comandante Jaime Wheelock told our delegation. He was technically correct: the 1984 electoral law does prohibit advocacy of abstentionism. But the material censored from La Prensa on October 22 (a photostat of which was obtained by our delegation), while politically embarrassing to the government, did not contain an explicit call for voter abstention.

Independent observers of the FSLN interviewed by our delegation concurred that press censorship is probably the weakest point in the Sandinistas’ style of governance. In their view, the initial imposition of press controls in 1982 was a major error, not justified by the military circumstances at that time, and probably counterproductive. Virgilio Godoy, for example, in his televised announcement of withdrawal from the electoral campaign, used the government’s censorship of this news in La Prensa as one of the justifications for his decision to withdraw. But these observers believe it will be very difficult for the government to extricate itself from the censorship business, especially so long as Nicaragua is under intense diplomatic and military pressure from the United States.

For purposes of this report, it is important to ask whether the press censorship practiced by the government seriously restricted the electoral candidates’ freedom of speech or prevented them from getting their party’s message to the electorate. Our delegation concluded that it did not. Apart from the obvious fact that censorship of La Prensa’s coverage of the opposition parties was far from complete (indeed, each day’s edition during the last week of the campaign was full of anti-FSLN and pro-Coordinadora propaganda), there was no censorship of the country’s 39 radio stations, including two stations run by the Church hierarchy.

33 Only a portion of the available food supply is regulated by the state through this rationing system. There is a large, flourishing, “parallel market” for nearly every product, and consumers can buy all the foodstuffs and other goods which they want (or can find) in public marketplaces, at free-market prices. In addition, free food is provided to undernourished children and nursing mothers, through local health centers.
and others in neighboring countries run by the contras. Television stations carried a series of uncensored debates involving the presidential or vice-presidential candidates of all seven parties participating in the elections. Also uncensored was the formal campaign programming of each party, broadcast free of charge on state-run television and radio stations under a provision of the 1984 Electoral Law. By the end of the campaign, each party had been given access to a total of 22 hours (15 minutes per day) of free, uninterrupted television time, in prime early evening hours, on both channels; and 44 hours (30 minutes per day) of free radio time on all state-run radio stations.

To summarize from both our discussions with various political groups and our observations, it seems clear that the FSLN took substantial advantage of its incumbent position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the abuses of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic and neither the nature of the abuses nor their frequency was such as to cripple the opposition parties' campaigns or to cast doubt on the fundamental validity of the electoral process. While censorship of La Prensa continued, on a selective basis, throughout the campaign, the Sandinistas made no attempt to "shut down" their opposition. Generally speaking, in this campaign the FSLN did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less than ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally have done.

Some critics of the November 4 elections have argued that, even if the Sandinistas scrupulously avoided using their incumbency, the elections were meaningless because of the FSLN's overwhelming domination of Nicaragua's political life. The "skewed" political climate resulting from the FSLN's hegemonic role was a matter of concern to our delegation, and we probed this issue in all of our interviews with Sandinista leaders as well as independent observers. We found the comments of Sergio Ramírez, the FSLN's vice-presidential candidate and one of the three members of the current Sandinista government junta, particularly candid and useful in putting the issue into proper perspective: "We [the FSLN] do have an advantage over our opposition: We are in power. It is more difficult for an opposition party to get an air force helicopter to go to campaign in Bluefields [an isolated town on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua]. But it's like in the United States. Your President can command prime time whenever he wants it. It's certainly easier to run for President from the White House; but nobody accuses Ronald Reagan of anything illegal because he takes advantage of all that apparatus. We haven't used all the propaganda capacity that we possess. We have tried to run a limited campaign...."

There is a dominant party here -- the FSLN. We can't change that overnight. Political equilibrium cannot be created artificially. We are having elections here, hardly five years after a revolution; a true political earthquake. By contrast, in Mexico, the leadership introduced multi-party competition (pluripartidismo) including the left only six years ago. I can't say that we have a balanced political equation here. These [opposition] parties are very small parties. To us, the real danger was that these parties would not poll enough votes to gain a seat in the National Assembly, and would simply disappear. That's why we chose a proportional representation system. Our goal is to open a political space, for the future."

A similar perspective was offered by Stephen Kinzer, the New York Times' correspondent in Managua: "Are the elections [in Nicaragua] meaningful? If the only object of an election is to choose a president and a policy course for the country, then the answer is 'no.' But assume that you can't use the election to affect these kinds of choices. Is there still some value [to the opposition] in staying in? They are creating a political space for themselves in the future, and the government has made a commitment to hold regular elections. A standard has been set, by which the government's future conduct can be judged."

**Government Interference in Opposition Campaigning**

Undoubtedly the single most highly publicized issue raised by the Nicaraguan elections of 1984 was the question of FSLN harassment or interference in the campaign activities of its opponents. Specifically, it has been charged that the FSLN systematically disrupted the campaign rallies of opposition candidates, often violently, using gangs of young toughs known as "turbas." These attacks allegedly were orchestrated by FSLN-controlled state agencies (the Interior Ministry, police forces, Sandinista youth organizations, etc.). Given the seriousness of these charges, our delegation devoted considerable effort to investigating them.

We turned first to the files of the Supreme Electoral Council, which contained documentation on formal complaints lodged by the political parties participating in the November 4 election concerning disruptions of rallies and other alleged campaign irregularities. We found only eight written complaints about "turbas" activities, most of them filed by the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). Five of these complaints were substantiated through investigation by the CSE staff; three could not be substantiated upon investigation.

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34 It must be recognized, however, that several private radio stations have disappeared since 1979, with their owners alleging government harassment.

35 These televised debates, each 30-45 minutes in duration, were aired throughout the month of October, 1984.

Mr. Ramírez's comments about the Mexican political system (a reference to the 1977 political reform law enacted at the behest of President José López Portillo) were echoed by several other Sandinista officials whom we interviewed. The FSLN leader in Matagalpa, for example, observed that "The PRI in Mexico is also a hegemonic party; but Mexican elections have never been discredited in the United States."
CSE President Mariano Fiallos told us that, in addition to the five substantiated cases of disruptions by "turbas" which occurred during the official, three-month campaign period (August 1-November 2), there had been four other cases during the pre-campaign period. Most of these cases involved Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora-affiliated parties. It was generally agreed among our informants that these were the most serious alterations of the entire political year in Nicaragua, and they received extensive publicity abroad. Moreover, the FSLN’s presidential candidate, Daniel Ortega, made a public statement on the anti-Cruz disturbances, noting that they demonstrated the frustration and anger of the Nicaraguan people, upset by the counterrevolutionary activities which Cruz and his party seemed to condone. Ortega’s statement could have been construed by some as an endorsement of "turbas" activity, although neither he nor any other Sandinista official directly advocated such disruptions.

There is evidence that on at least one occasion, a "turbas" attack was precipitated not by the FSLN but by supporters of Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora. On August 4, in the city of Matagalpa, a group of Cruz supporters emerged from a theater where Cruz had given a speech and assaulted a group of approximately 200 women carrying placards that protested the Coordinadora’s call for direct talks with the contras. Three of the women protesters were wounded in the melee. The group of women reportedly included numerous widows of men killed by the contras or during the insurrection against Somoza.

Reports published in the United States have implied that all of the Coordinadora’s rallies were violently disrupted by FSLN thugs, while the Sandinista police stood by doing nothing to restrain them. An eyewitness account of a Cruz rally held in Masaya on September 22, 1984, contradicts this generalization. A U.S. citizen who was living in Nicaragua during this period recalled the incident this way:

"Dr. Arturo Cruz...arrived, unannounced, and addressed about 50 of his supporters at the headquarters of the Social Democratic Party. Within minutes, several thousand Masayans gathered and began chanting anti-counterrevolutionary slogans. I had the opportunity to talk with several of the people opposing Dr. Cruz and found that they were housewives, students, artisans, teachers, and shopkeepers. They had one thing in common: they believed that Arturo Cruz is collaborating with the Reagan Administration’s effort to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. Many of the ‘thugs’ had brothers, fathers, or sons who had been killed by the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionaries, or contras. Because of the protection of the Sandinista police, Dr. Cruz delivered his speech unmolested. Among the crowd, Sandinista Front activists used their loudspeaker and credibly with the people to call for restraint and discipline."

Our conclusions concerning the problem of the "turbas" can be summarized as follows:

- The total number of incidents reported, including those which occurred in the pre-campaign period, was quite small, in the context of a thirteen and one-half week campaign, which included more than 20 political rallies or demonstrations throughout the country in any given week.

- The most serious incidents of this type occurred before the formal campaign even began (on August 1). Only five alleged disturbances of this type occurred during the campaign itself, and apparently none occurred during the last six weeks of the campaign.

- Whenever the Supreme Electoral Council had advance warning that disruptions of campaign rallies might occur, preventative measures were taken. In addition, the CSE placed paid advertisements in the press urging citizens to respect the right of all political parties to hold rallies without interference.

- In spite of Daniel Ortega’s unfortunate statement on these disruptions, there is no evidence that the FSLN had a coherent strategy of stimulating or orchestrating them.

- At the time of all disturbances involving Arturo Cruz, Cruz and his party were not legally registered as participants in the electoral campaign (indeed, they had just announced their decision to abstain from the elections), and the Cruz rallies which were disrupted were held in violation of Article 38 of the 1984 electoral law, which requires all organizations seeking to conduct public campaign rallies to apply to the CSE for a permit at least one week in advance. The same article promises police protection against any groups which try to disturb public rallies or demonstrations which have been duly authorized by the CSE, but specifies that this and

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37 Because no records were kept at the CSE on disruptions of political rallies that occurred before the beginning of the official campaign period, and because Mr. Cruz and the Coordinadora parties declined to register as participants in the electoral campaign, there is no documentation in CSE files concerning alleged disruptions of Coordinadora rallies. Several of the alleged incidents involving Cruz occurred in the pre-campaign period, and others during the first two months of the campaign, during which Cruz and the Coordinadora continued to hold rallies despite their avowed intention to boycott the elections.

38 Our sources of information on this incident include interviews with CSE staff members and extensive press reports published in Barricada and Nuevo Diario on August 5. La Prensa reported Cruz’s August 4th appearance in Matagalpa, but made no mention of the violence which followed it.

39 See, for example, the detailed (but second-hand) descriptions of the disruption of the Cruz rally at Chinandega in Robert S. Leiken, "Nicaragua’s Untold Stories," The New Republic, October 8, 1984, pp. 16-22; and Leiken, "gestures and Realities in Nicaragua," The Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1984, Part II, p. 7.

other rights and protections for political parties established in that chapter of the electoral law "shall only be exercised by those who have registered to participate in the elections." In other words, given their decision not to register, Cruz and the Coordinadora were deliberately campaigning outside of the legal framework of protections which had been created by the electoral law.

- Disruptions of the campaign activities of other opposition groups were sporadic and followed no systematic pattern. There was no organized, "brown shirt" phenomenon.
- The legally registered opposition parties were able to hold the vast majority of their rallies unimpeded by pro-FSLN demonstrators or by other kinds of government interference. National or regional leaders of several different opposition parties (PPSC, PSN, PLI) told our delegation that they had been able to run their campaigns relatively unhindered by the FSLN, and that after the initial "turba" disruptions in late July and early August, the FSLN had made efforts to gain better control over its own supporters. PPSC leaders attributed the initial disturbances to "lack of discipline" among some of the FSLN's younger enthusiasts.

Table 4 summarizes the complete set of complaints regarding campaign irregularities which were presented by all legally registered parties participating in the elections to the Supreme Electoral Council, during the official campaign period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject of Complaint</th>
<th># of Alleged Incidents</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Sustained</th>
<th># of Complaints Not Sustained</th>
<th>Inconclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disturbances by &quot;turbas&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of electoral propaganda, illegal painting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slandering candidates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal threats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair treatment by the mass media</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small fist-fights and other coercive behavior</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination by employers against their workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunshot incidents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government abuse of its incumbency, powers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal arrests of campaign workers by police</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to provide campaign materials (paper, etc.) as required by law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDSs or police intimidating people (threatening to take away ration cards, etc.)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These data were compiled through our own inspection of the CSE’s complaint files. It is not possible to determine the total number of complaints made during the campaign, since some were presented to the regional Electoral Councils rather than to the Supreme Electoral Council in Managua. The political parties had been instructed by the CSE to lodge their complaints initially with the Regional Councils. However, according to the CSE’s executive secretary, these instructions were generally disregarded, and most complaints (“95 percent,” according to the CSE officer) were sent directly to the CSE in Managua. Based on our interviews with opposition party leaders, it seems likely that the most serious alleged incidents were reported to the CSE, and would therefore fall into the subset of complaints which are recorded in the CSE’s files. Those files contain records of the investigations undertaken by the CSE in order to verify the complaints, as well as communications from the CSE to other government agencies (the military, police, etc.) and to the political parties (both plaintiffs and defendants) seeking or reporting remedial actions.

We independently verified the number of complaints filed by the opposition parties, through our interviews with leaders of these parties. However, some parties (particularly the Communist Party) informed us that they had declined to submit complaints to the CSE, either because they questioned the CSE’s independence and impartiality or because they had no confidence in its ability to solve the problems that bothered opposition party leaders.

The number of complaints being received by the CSE peaked during the first two weeks of September (11 complaints in the week of September 5-12 in the week of September 12), with only two letters of complaint received during the last month of the campaign. The Independent Liberal Party (PLI) registered the largest number of complaints (14) during the campaign, followed by the Communist Party (PCdeN) (10 complaints). Even the FSLN presented two complaints, one of which described an incident in which an FSLN candidate was allegedly stabbed by a PLI supporter, in the course of an “unauthorized” PLI demonstration. But not one person lost his life as a result of campaign violence -- a remarkable record in a country experiencing its first open electoral campaign in any Nicaraguan’s lifetime, at a time of armed conflict and high emotions.41

When the 61 alleged incidents reported to the CSE were investigated, 50 percent were validated, 44 percent were shown to be untrue (or the events reported in the complaints were found to be different than alleged), and 5 percent remained ambiguous (the evidence was inconclusive), according to the CSE records which we examined. In the single largest category of allegations -- concerning governmental abuses of power -- specifics were often lacking in the complaints, making investigation difficult. Only three of the eleven allegations were sustained upon investigation; six were refuted; and no determination could be made in two cases.

At times, complaining about campaign irregularities seems to have been a campaign tactic, used by certain parties to gain attention in the media. For example, the CSE on its own initiative pursued several complaints aired in radio speeches by Socialist Party candidates, inviting the party to submit the complaints in writing; but none were forthcoming. In another instance, PLI presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy told a reporter for the Wall Street Journal that all members of the PLI youth committee in one city had suddenly been drafted. The committee was reconstituted, according to Godoy, but then the replacements were drafted, too. However, upon reviewing the CSE’s file of complaints received from the PLI during the entire campaign period, we found that no formal complaint was ever lodged by the PLI concerning this serious allegation. By contrast, the PLI did not hesitate to file a formal complaint alleging that rooms in a government-owned hotel in Bluefields had been denied (ostensibly for political reasons) to a visiting PLI delegation.

In summary, while all the opposition parties had some valid complaints about the government’s management of the 1984 elections, no party was prevented from carrying out an active campaign. The opposition leaders with whom we spoke indicated that they did, in fact, receive their legal allotments of campaign funds; were given access to paper, paint, gasoline and other necessary campaign materials (although not as quickly as some would have preferred); and were given their legal allotment of free media time. Even the casual observer could not fail to be impressed by the profusion of prominently displayed opposition-party billboards, posters, wall paintings, and graffiti which in some cities seemed to occupy every available square inch of space.42 The opposition could, and did, get its message out.

A Climate of Fear and Intimidation?

An even more fundamental issue raised by the Nicaraguan elections relates to the psychological climate in which they were held. Critics have charged that “minimum conditions for free elections” did not exist because of a generalized climate of fear and intimidation, created by the Sandinista regime. Most often mentioned in this context is the alleged use of the neighborhood-level CDS apparatus to coerce and intimidate through “spying” on potential dissidents, threats of retaliation in the form of denial or withdrawal of ration cards, peer pressure in the schools, and arbitrary use of the military draft to silence opponents.

41 In the week of October 21, for example, 43 civilians were killed in various parts of the country as a result of contra activities. On October 29, six children aged 5-8 were killed instantly when a contra mortar shell landed in a house in the village of San Gregorio, near the Honduran border.

42 What we saw in Nicaragua bears no resemblance to the image of non-competitiveness that was common in U.S. media coverage of the elections. For example, an Associated Press dispatch by Sol Sussman, which appeared in numerous U.S. newspapers on November 4, 1984, claimed that aside from the FSLN’s end-of-campaign rally in Managua, “there were few other visible signs of the election other than the usual black and red advertisements of the Sandinista front.”
This was one of the most difficult issues for our delegation to assess, given the time limitations and our inability to observe systematically such institutions as the CDSs in action. However, based on our interviews, observations, and casual conversations with individual citizens, we would characterize the situation in Nicaragua in the immediate pre-election period as follows:

Complaints by opposition leaders and foreign critics of the Sandinistas cannot, in our opinion, be taken as evidence of a climate of fear and intimidation. However, our delegation interviewed some individuals who clearly felt intimidated by the Sandinista government. It was impossible to estimate how large a stratum of the population such individuals represent, nor in most instances to ascertain whether their fears were well-grounded. For some low-income persons whom we interviewed, fear takes the form of a generalized sense that “something will happen” to them if they don’t do what the government wants (e.g., vote in the November elections). Others have more specific concerns, such as fear of losing their ration cards. Some parents feel that their children must participate in FSLN-sponsored youth organizations.

Especially among low-income people, it is difficult to disentangle such fears from the legacy of somocismo. Under Somoza, opposition to the government was frequently cause for dismissal from employment, imprisonment, or death. The National Guard commonly beat up residents of poor barrios and extorted money from parents of boys who had been rounded up and taken to jail. “There are still people who have the old fears,” one resident of Ciudad Sandino, a low-income neighborhood of Managua, told us. But would this affect whether they voted on November 4, or how they would vote? Our informant responded this way:

“No, some people won’t vote, but it’s not because they are afraid. It’s because they are opposed to the Frente [FSLN], and they don’t care for any of the opposition parties. They think it was their civic duty to register, but they don’t feel compelled to vote. So they will stay home. People who go along with the government will do so because they appreciate the things being done by the government for the poor. Most of them are not FSLN members or militantes.”

Whatever their role as “the eyes and ears of the revolution” in the struggle against Somoza and the first years of FSLN rule, the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs) do not currently seem to be functioning as a heavy-handed domestic “spying” network. A community development worker interviewed by our delegation who has lived in one of Managua’s low-income neighborhoods continuously since 1979 reported that she had not heard “a single complaint” about such spying in her neighborhood. While such information is anecdotal, we have no reason to question its veracity. Individual citizens with whom we talked seemed to view the CDSs primarily as groups of community activists (each block has a six-person committee elected by residents of the block, with no fixed term of office) which represent the residents before higher-level authorities and mobilize residents for public health campaigns (e.g., vaccinations), street cleaning, nightly street patrols (vigilancia), and other routine functions. The CDSs are also responsible for distributing ration cards, helping eligible residents (e.g., nursing mothers) to obtain free food supplements from local health clinics, and civic education (e.g., for the voter registration campaign of July, 1984).

The CDSs’ control of ration cards is viewed by critics of the Sandinista government as the key to their coercive capacity; yet in our interviews in many neighborhoods in several cities, we found no evidence that ration cards were being held back or withdrawn by CDS officers, for any reason. Among the complaints lodged with the Supreme Electoral Council by opposition parties, there were five reports that CDSs had been intimidating people by threatening to take away their ration cards, but none of these allegations was sustained upon investigation. As noted above, the only concrete cases of governmental abuse involving CDSs during the pre-election period which we encountered was their use in at least some neighborhoods to distribute FSLN campaign propaganda (exclusively), and to mobilize people to go to FSLN campaign rallies.

We observed that the CDSs are a more complex, less centrally directed phenomenon than is commonly believed. They seem to be most active in the poorest neighborhoods and in rural areas, where they may constitute the principal mode of civic organization. In middle and upper-class neighborhoods, the CDSs are much less visible (if not invisible), and residents are indifferent to them. Some residents perceive them to be extensions of the FSLN political machine, and may cooperate with CDS leaders only to avoid problems with routine service delivery.43 We also observed that many people in Nicaragua are not reluctant to criticize the Sandinista government, in public, and often in the harshest possible terms. Every member of our delegation was approached at least once by an irate citizen, as we walked around Managua and other cities. Several of these encounters turned into heated arguments between the individual who had approached us and passers-by who joined the discussion. Frequently the people who complained to us about the incumbent government identified themselves as fervent anti-somocistas who felt that the Sandinistas had “betrayed” the revolution through their embrace of “Communism.” These people did not feel intimidated. They were, however, intensely opposed to the FSLN’s proyecto de transformación, which they had not anticipated.

Outspoken criticism of government policy may, however, become a casualty of the atmosphere of crisis and invasion fears prompted by increased U.S. pressure on the FSLN government. In his closing speech of the 1984 campaign, FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega essentially equated voter abstention from the election with “aid and

43 This psychology is essentially the same as can be observed in some parts of the United States where local political machines still operate. As a resident of Chicago’s 47th Ward recently told an interviewer, “If you don’t let them [the precinct-level Democratic party organization] hang their signs in your window, you might not get that extra trash picked up” (Newsweek, November 5, 1984, p. 43).
comfort" to the enemy -- the United States and domestic "fifth column" elements seeking to undermine Nicaragua's democratic process. We view this as a disturbing sign that the siege mentality resulting from intense U.S. military and psychological pressures on Nicaragua may begin to blur the lines between legitimate dissent and "treason."

Should this come to pass, it would be a large step backward for a government that, having replaced a regime with a brutal record on civil liberties and human rights, has made major efforts to control abuses. Reports by human rights organizations published since 1979 confirmed an early elimination of torture and political kidnappings ("disappearances"). Significant human rights abuses did occur during the FSLN government's removal of the Miskito Indians from combat zones near the Honduran border, although Amnesty International concluded that "reports of shootings and other deliberate brutality during the transfer were later shown to be false." More recently, charges by opposition parties of politically motivated arrests and detention suggest the possibility of civil rights abuse under the state of emergency declared by the government in March, 1982. Nevertheless, compared to other nations in the region and in the face of the war against the contras, such abuses are on a very small scale.

However, in one area -- university autonomy -- there seems to have been a significant deterioration in recent years. This has been a major point of dispute between the FSLN and the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), which tends to agree with the Sandinistas on other issues of domestic policy. The PPSC accuses the government of "killing university autonomy" in Nicaragua. Several well-informed sources consulted by our delegation expressed concern about what they termed a "serious erosion" of university autonomy -- one of the objectives of the struggle against Somoza -- which has occurred since 1979. Now, the rectors of the two divisions of the National University are appointed by the government rather than elected by their faculties; and the activities of at least one other academic research center have been heavily politicized. It is not clear, however, whether reduced institutional autonomy has been translated into less freedom of expression for individual scholars.

Finally, in assessing the psychological climate for the November 4 elections, it is important to differentiate between the "climate of fear and intimidation" that some FSLN policies and actions allegedly have created, and the fear generated by the activities of the contras and the U.S. military, which during the week before the election began daily supersonic flyovers of Nicaragua which have caused loud sonic booms across much of the national territory and a sense of near panic among the population.

We found the war-induced climate of fear to be most intense in the Atlantic coast region, in and around the town of Puerto Cabezas, which was visited by two members of our delegation and our videotape crew. This area is home to 54,000 Miskito Indians, a people who have become a symbol of international concern over indigenous rights and national responsibilities in guaranteeing such rights. Today, the Miskito and their neighbors in the Atlantic coast region suffer the consequences of an economic system paralyzed by armed conflict. Agricultural production, fishing, and local commerce have all been seriously disrupted.

Because of the armed conflict, fifteen Miskito communities could not be included in the national voter registration effort in late July, and nine polling places in the region were closed on election day due to contra activities. During the last weeks of the electoral campaign, the contras operating in this area focused their efforts upon convincing the local population to boycott the elections. From a radio station in Costa Rica, the contras were broadcasting a very clear message: people who vote, and their families, would be marked for killing by the contras. People of the region who discussed the situation with our delegation emphasized the "high price of dying" that might have to be paid by those who turned up at the polls on November 4. But a few persons also suggested, obliquely, that failure to vote might place individuals and communities in a situation of potential jeopardy, with regard to Sandinista troops stationed in the region. In short, people who live in the Puerto Cabezas area felt both a fear of voting and a fear of abstention, and spoke of the negative consequences of doing either.

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

International actors had a profound impact on the Nicaraguan electoral process. They influenced the timing of the elections, the institutional structure of the electoral process, the number of electoral contenders (and therefore the range of choice for voters), the environment in which the process occurred, and even the amount of attention which the election outcome received internationally.

Throughout the three-year period prior to February 21, 1984, when the FSLN government announced the date of this year's elections, the Reagan Administration had cited the
absence of elections in Nicaragua since the overthrow of Somoza in 1979 as one of the principal justifications for the Administration’s policy of hostility toward the Sandinistas. Not only had the Sandinistas “betrayed” their promises of 1979-1980 to hold free elections; the failure to hold elections was proof, in the Administration’s view, that the FSLN was bent on constructing a totalitarian regime. But when the Sandinistas made their announcement on February 21 of this year, the U.S. administration changed its position, now arguing that conditions for a truly democratic election did not exist in Nicaragua. CSE President Mariano Fiallos recalls that “within a matter of days” after the February 21 announcement, “pressure began to build [from the U.S.] to postpone the elections.”

In a recent policy statement on “Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” the U.S. State Department attributes the Sandinistas’ decision to hold elections on November 4, 1984, to “widespread internal pressures and disillusionment abroad.”46 But all Nicaraguan political leaders whom we interviewed, irrespective of their feelings toward the FSLN, told us that internal pressures, whether from opposition parties or individual citizens, were not a factor in the decision to call for elections this year. In their view, the pressures were all external.

By 1983, the Reagan Administration’s criticisms of the failure to hold elections had seriously eroded international support for the Sandinista government, particularly among the West Europeans on whom the government depends for most of its foreign economic assistance, as well as among key members of the Democratic Party in the United States. The Sandinistas clearly understood that the continued lack of elections reduced their ability to defend themselves abroad.

As a senior official of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry told us, the November 4 elections were “a key element in our national defense strategy. Our internal legitimacy is not in question. What is in question is our international legitimacy.” The date of November 4 was selected so that Nicaragua would have a legitimate, elected government in place before the anticipated re-election of Ronald Reagan in the United States on November 6. The Sandinistas expected (correctly, as subsequent events have demonstrated) that the Reagan Administration would sharply increase military and political pressure on Nicaragua once the U.S. elections were over. They hoped that a competitive election with heavy turnout would help to shield Nicaragua against this anticipated onslaught.

Thus in the official Nicaraguan view, holding elections this year (rather than in 1985, as originally promised) would help the FSLN’s friends abroad, and “our friends will help us.” The key “friends” referred to in this context include the Contadora nations and the and the Socialist International, as well as the individual leaders associated with these movements (e.g., Willy Brandt, Carlos Andres Perez, Belisario Betancur), who had been pressing the Sandinistas to reach an agreement with their domestic opposition. Even so, most groups both within and outside of Nicaragua were caught off guard by the Sandinistas’ decision to set an election date in 1984. Several opposition party leaders told us that they had not been expecting elections until 1985.

The FSLN government made extensive efforts to obtain Western input as it structured the electoral process. A delegation of Nicaraguan officials made two tours of democracies in Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States in search of information on electoral procedures. Special attention was devoted to the European systems of proportional representation that maximized the role of minority parties. In the end, the Nicaraguans selected key components of the French, Italian, Austrian, and Swedish electoral systems.

The Sandinistas also sought material support from abroad to mount the elections. Substantial contributions came from Norway ($800,000 for paper for campaign activities and the election itself), Sweden ($400,000, also for paper, as well as technical assistance from the Swedish Electoral College), and Finland ($450,000 for 50 electronic calculators, 500 rolls of calculator paper, 700 tons of newsprint, and hundreds of gallons of printer’s ink). France also provided technical assistance and modest financial aid. It should be noted that foreign assistance for the electoral process came exclusively from countries with vigorous Western democratic traditions. None of the donors subsequently complained that their aid had been misused.

The U.S. Role

The role of the United States in the Nicaraguan electoral process was quite different. Within three months after the Sandinistas’ announcement that elections would be held this year, a new U.S. policy on elections in Nicaragua had crystallized. According to a report by New York Times correspondent Philip Taubman, based on statements by unnamed “senior Administration officials,” that new policy line was as follows:

“Since May, when American policy toward the election was formed, the Administration has wanted the opposition candidate, Arturo Cruz, either not to enter the race, or, if he did, to withdraw before the election, claiming the conditions were unfair, [senior Administration] officials said. ‘The Administration never contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race,’ one official said, ‘because then the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to oppose the Nicaraguan Government.’”

The principal instrument for implementing this policy, according to Taubman’s official sources, was COSEP, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise, “which was in frequent contact with the C.I.A. about the elections,” and whose mission was to prevent Mr. Cruz from reaching an agreement with the Sandinistas.


A senior U.S. official in Central America, interviewed at length by our delegation, declined to respond specifically to the statements made in the October 21 New York Times article, although he denied, in general terms, that the U.S. had attempted to prevent opposition candidates from participating in the November 4 election.48

Nevertheless, in the six-month period leading up to the election, the Reagan Administration used a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments in a systematic attempt to undermine the Nicaraguan electoral process and to destroy its credibility in the eyes of the world. Within Nicaragua, the behavior of U.S. diplomats was clearly interventionist. This behavior included repeated attempts to persuade key opposition party candidates to drop out of the election, and in at least one case, to bribe lower-level party officials to abandon the campaign of their presidential candidate, who insisted on staying in the race.

Apparently one of the first steps taken to implement the new, post-February 21 U.S. policy toward the Nicaraguan elections was the elevation of Arturo Cruz and his Coordinadora coalition to the status of the country's "strongest" opposition group. The Reagan Administration effectively focused media attention on the participation or non-participation of Cruz as the litmus test of free elections in Nicaragua. While there was never any credible evidence that Cruz and the Coordinadora had a broad popular following in Nicaragua (Cruz himself had lived in Washington, D.C. since 1970, returning to Nicaragua for only a year, in 1979-80), the Administration successfully portrayed them as the significant opposition force, without whose participation any election in Nicaragua would be meaningless.

The senior U.S. official in Central America interviewed by our delegation claimed that "the U.S. didn't need to pressure the Coordinadora and Cruz not to participate" in the November 4 election, since, judging by the Coordinadora's provocative "nine points" statement of December, 1983, "they had already decided not to participate." Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration continued to focus public attention on the controversy generated by the Coordinadora's refusal to register for the elections, and Cruz's on-again, off-again negotiations with the Sandinistas which continued almost until the eve of the election. Even liberal Democrats in Washington who are usually critical of Reagan Administration policy toward Nicaragua were swept up in the crusade to have the November 4 elections postponed until January 15, 1985, ostensibly to give Arturo Cruz and the Coordinadora sufficient time to campaign.

The collapse of the final talks between Cruz and the FSLN in Rio de Janeiro in early October has been analyzed in an earlier section of this report. Whatever the real explanation for this outcome, it was consistent with the U.S. strategy of seeking to delegitimize the Nicaraguan elections by giving the FSLN no externally credible opposition to run against.

With Arturo Cruz and his followers definitely out of the electoral contest, attention shifted to Virgilio Godoy, leader of the Independent Liberal Party. Godoy was, until February of this year, the Minister of Labor in the FSLN government. His anti-Somoza credentials were impeccable, and it was widely believed in Nicaragua that of all the opposition parties, the PLI had the broadest social base and the only nationwide organization.

Godoy was one of several opposition party leaders in Managua with whom U.S. officials maintained virtually continuous contact during the six months preceding the election. There was a well-beaten path to his door. Godoy told our delegation that his headquarters, located in a tiny, run-down private house, had been visited several times during this period by the U.S. Embassy's Political Counselor, who met with both Godoy and his vice-presidential running mate. Other visitors, according to Godoy, included Langhorne Motley, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Harry Shlaudeman, the Administration's special envoy for Central America. On October 20, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Harry Bergold and the Embassy's Political Counselor, J. Michael Joyce, visited Godoy again. The next day, just two weeks before the election, Godoy announced that he was withdrawing from the elections, claiming that the Sandinistas had failed to provide "minimum conditions" for conducting a political campaign. (By that time, the PLI had been actively campaigning for two and one-half months.) When our delegation asked Godoy what had been discussed in his October 20 meeting with the U.S. diplomats, the timing of which he described as "unfortunate, in retrospect," Godoy replied: "The Ambassador wanted to express the point of view of his government regarding the elections; that this was not the best time to hold elections."

The senior U.S. official in Central America whom we interviewed described the October 20 meeting with Godoy as follows: "We were not pressuring him. We only wanted to know what he was going to do. Godoy voted along with the majority of his party's leadership to withdraw from the election." When members of our delegation expressed amazement that Godoy had been approached on October 20 only to ascertain his opinions about the election, the senior U.S. official responded: "The U.S. Government has made it adequately clear that we do not consider these elections to be a valid expression of the popular will in Nicaragua."

Virgilio Godoy denied that his party's decision to quit the election had been influenced by his conversations with U.S. officials, but when asked whether his personal views on participation in the election had been influenced, he declined comment, saying only that "my party has expressed its collective will." When our delegation asked one of Godoy's oldest friends to suggest an explanation for his late withdrawal from the elections, he responded: "I can't explain his behavior. He would not just sell himself to the U.S. Embassy. I think he was subject to terrible pressure from the Embassy."

48 Under the ground rules for this interview established by the "senior U.S. official in Central America," we are not permitted to identify him by name or specific location in Central America.
While at least one U.S. diplomat has admitted that Embassy officials did, in fact, pressure opposition politicians to withdraw from the elections ("It was really very light pressure," the unnamed diplomat told The New York Times), the senior U.S. official in Central America whom we interviewed denied that Godoy or other opposition politicians had been pressured in this way.

However, the preponderance of evidence from several independent sources casts considerable doubt on such assertions. Mauricio Díaz, the presidential candidate of the PPSC, was also visited by the U.S. Embassy's Political Counselor, on October 24. A PPSC leader told The New York Times' Managua correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, that the U.S. diplomat's visit was "clearly related to the American desire that as few parties as possible participate in the campaign." Díaz and the PPSC were not persuaded to drop out.

Clemente Guido, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), also opted to stand for election. However, according to Guido, the U.S. Embassy made very large financial offers to several other PCD leaders. "Two weeks before the election," Guido told The New York Times, "a U.S. Embassy official visited my campaign manager and promised to help him with money to succeed me as party leader if he withdrew from my campaign. He did." Guido confirmed this bribery attempt in a tape-recorded interview with Professor Martin Diskin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was made available to our delegation. "Your government," he told Diskin, "has an interest in making sure that these elections are not recognized as legitimate." The New York Times correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, also learned that senior U.S. diplomats had been in regular contact with "influential members" of Guido's party, "including several who urged the party at a convention on October 28 to drop out of the campaign." Still another opposition party leader interviewed by Kinzer recalled "very clear pressure" from the United States to withdraw from the election.

U.S. efforts to induce the withdrawal of the PCD and the PLI from the elections provoked a major split in each party. PLI dissidents charged that U.S. officials had offered Virgilio Godoy $300,000 not to run. The PLI's vice-presidential candidate announced his intention to continue in the elections, as did a number of the PLI's candidates for the National Assembly. The majority faction led by Godoy condemned their candidacies and threatened reprisals. In the PCD, Clemente Guido's decision to continue as a candidate was publicly denounced and declared "totally invalid" by another top PCD leader. As a result, during the last week of the campaign both of these key opposition parties were embroiled in bitter conflicts between their abstentionist and non-abstentionist factions.

The final results of Nicaragua's election were not even reported by most of the international media. They were literally buried under an avalanche of alarmist news reports, based on secret intelligence information deliberately leaked to the U.S. television networks by Reagan Administration officials, which portrayed a massive, Soviet-supplied offensive arms build-up in Nicaragua, allegedly aimed at giving the Sandinistas the capacity to invade neighboring countries. While most of the leaked information was soon proven false, and U.S. officials were forced to admit that there was no evidence that Nicaragua was planning to invade its neighbors, the uproar over the initial leaks helped the Administration's hardliners on Nicaragua to further two important objectives: (1) to build public and congressional support for a renewal of direct U.S. aid to the contras, which had been suspended by Congress earlier this year; and (2) to distract attention from the Nicaraguan elections, with their heavy turnout, absence of irregularities, and competitiveness (a 33-percent opposition vote). At least the second of these objectives was fully realized. The outcome of the Nicaraguan elections was virtually ignored in the United States and Western Europe.

Clearly, the Nicaraguan electoral process in 1984 was manipulated, as the U.S. Government so often charges. However, the manipulation was not the work of the Sandinistas -- who had every interest in making these elections as demonstrably fair, pluralistic, and competitive as possible -- but of the Reagan Administration, whose interest apparently was in making the elections seem unfair, ideologically one-sided, and uncompetitive as possible.

Why would the U.S. administration go to such elaborate lengths to undermine the nascent democratic process in a country which, for more than four decades, had known only dictatorship, blatantly fraudulent elections, and massive human rights violations? The most plausible explanation for such conduct, in our view, is the deep, ideologically-grounded hostility of the Reagan Administration toward the Sandinista government, whose elimination has been the primary objective of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua at least since December, 1981, when President Reagan authorized a CIA-run "secret war" against the FSLN government.

There seems to be a belief among senior Administration officials -- especially in the CIA, the Defense Department, and the White House National Security Council staff -- that stability cannot be achieved in Central America as long as the Sandinistas remain in power, because, in the words of Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé, "Revolutionary regimes that call themselves Marxist, or communist, and follow the Bolshevik approach to power have two particularly undesirable features: They are irreversible, and they want to expand their type of rule into neighboring countries, if need be, by force."

51 Quoted in Oakes, "'Fraid' in Nicaragua," op. cit.
52 Kinzer, "Nicaraguan Parties Cite Sandinista Aid and U.S. Pressure," op. cit., p. 4.
Upon reviewing the whole course of U.S. conduct in relation to the Sandinista government since 1981, as well as the specific actions taken this year to discredit an electoral process which by Latin American standards was a model of probity and fairness (at least to all candidates who chose to register and submit themselves to a popular test), we must conclude that there is nothing that the Sandinistas could have done to make the 1984 elections acceptable to the United States Government.

In dealing with the FSLN regime, the Reagan Administration, by its own admission, applies a double standard. When asked by our delegation why the United States enthusiastically endorsed the 1984 elections in El Salvador (where all political groups to the left of the Christian Democrats were unrepresented) yet condemned the more inclusionary electoral process in Nicaragua (seven parties, three to the right and three to the left of the FSLN), a senior U.S. official in Central America explained that

"The United States is not obliged to apply the same standard of judgment to a country whose government is avowedly hostile to the U.S. as for a country, like El Salvador, where it is not. These people [the Sandinistas] could bring about a situation in Central America which could pose a threat to U.S. security. That allows us to change our yardstick." 54

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54 The Reagan Administration’s definition of the “security threat” posed by the Sandinista government has changed several times since 1981. For nearly three years, the emphasis was on the alleged arms flow from Cuba and the Soviet Union through Nicaragua to guerrillas fighting in El Salvador. U.S. support for the contras in Nicaragua was justified as an attempt to “interdict” this flow of weapons. However, since the spring of 1981, the Administration has been unable to produce credible evidence of a substantial arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In an interview with The New York Times’ Philip Taubman, published on June 11, 1984, David C. MacMichael, a former Central Intelligence Agency senior analyst specializing in Central American politico-military affairs, revealed that “There has not been a successful interdiction, or a verified report, of arms moving from Nicaragua to El Salvador since April, 1981.” When our delegation asked a senior U.S. official in Central America for proof of such arms transfers, he expressed the belief that small arms were being carried from Nicaragua to El Salvador across the Gulf of Fonseca in small, dugout canoes whose silhouette is too low to permit detection by radar. In 1984, the Administration’s emphasis shifted to the security threat allegedly posed to Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica by an “aggressively expansionist” Sandinista regime that is preparing to invade them. Since the November 4, 1984 elections in Nicaragua, the Sandinista “security threat” has been defined as the imminent use of Nicaragua by the Soviet Union as a permanent base for projecting Soviet power into areas vital to the security of the United States, coupled with Nicaragua’s alleged development of a capacity to attack the Panama Canal as well as neighboring countries, through the acquisition of what some Administration officials characterize as high-performance, offensive weaponry from the Soviet Union. Other Pentagon officials have described the arms now being acquired by the FSLN government as essentially defensive.

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AFTER THE ELECTIONS

The 1984 elections will bring about significant changes in the Nicaraguan political process. The FSLN has emerged with a strong popular mandate, but the viability of at least several of the opposition parties (PCD, PLI, PPSC) has also been established, and with 35 opposition-held seats in the National Assembly, it seems likely that an institutionalized opposition will develop in that arena. Moreover, in the course of the election year, the opposition parties were able to develop a strategy of constant negotiation with the Frente, which has shown itself capable of considerable flexibility in the face of opposition demands.

A major area of post-election struggle will be the constitution-drafting process in the newly elected Assembly. The new constitution will have to provide appropriate guarantees for all political actors -- the opposition parties, the mass organizations, the military, the Church, and the private business sector. It must confront the issue of the lack of separation between the FSLN as a party and the state, and define the nature and limits of power-sharing between the FSLN and other political actors. There is also the problem of shifting from rule by a Council of State, with its representatives of the various mass organizations, to a governmental structure that has no established positions for these politically powerful entities.

Beginning in early October, the seven parties which had registered to participate in the November 4 elections held a summit meeting, which stretched over two weeks and involved over 50 hours of closed-door discussions. The purpose of the meeting was to begin to draw up rules of the game for the post-election period. The resulting agreement, signed by all seven parties on October 22, called for guarantees of regular elections, freedom of the press, depoliticization of the armed forces, protection of private property, a commitment to hold local elections, depoliticization of community and neighborhood-level organizations (i.e., the CDSes), and protection of the legal status of all parties after the elections.

The next step in this process of consultation and negotiation was the convening of a “National Dialogue” involving a considerably larger and ideologically more diverse set of actors. On October 31, 86 persons representing 29 organizations -- characterized by La Prensa as “practically all the political, economic, social, labor and religious forces in the country” 55 -- gathered in the Foreign Ministry building to begin the dialogue. Included in the group were the Coordinadora (with 23 representatives, including the COSEP leadership), the Church hierarchy and other religious organizations, eight labor unions, and several academic entities. Thus in the final days of the electoral campaign, the country’s key interest groups were engaged in a complicated process of bargaining with the Sandinistas, apparently aimed at influencing the distribution of power in the new, post-election government.

55 La Prensa, November 1, 1984, page 1.
Specific issues on the agenda for the dialogue included the war, the economic crisis, how to strengthen civic and labor organizations, how to assure an impartial judiciary, what roles the various business organizations will play, and the sensitive issue of amnesty for those who have taken up arms against the FSLN government. A longtime foreign resident of Managua observed that "the National Dialogue is virtually ignored in the United States, but it is taken very seriously in Nicaragua, by all of the political contenders, including those who are boycotting the November 4 elections."

We found skepticism about the commitment of some of the groups participating in the National Dialogue to an accommodation with the Sandinistas. According to the New York Times' Stephen Kinzer,

"There are some groups here that want to use the dialogue to press the FSLN for concessions; to guarantee certain political spaces, pluralism, and so forth. But other groups believe that no agreement is possible with the FSLN; that such an agreement would serve only to forfify the FSLN in power. For these groups, the goal is to get rid of the Sandinistas -- not to negotiate with them. Given their conflicting objectives, these two sets of groups must follow entirely different strategies; but they are all in the National Dialogue together. This makes it inevitable that there will be sharp disagreements, and makes the outcome of the Dialogue highly uncertain."

The Church hierarchy seems likely to be one of the most intransigent participants in the National Dialogue, in part because some Church leaders do not believe that the FSLN will survive. As a member of an independent religious order told our delegation,

"A dialogue between the Church hierarchy and the FSLN is still possible, but it will be very difficult. There are elements of the Church hierarchy -- including, perhaps, the Vatican -- who view the FSLN government as a weak, unstable regime; a regime without a future. So why should they waste time negotiating with it? Until the Church hierarchy recognizes that the revolutionary process here will endure, the prospects for reconciliation are poor."

There are also divisions within the FSLN leadership concerning the desirability of continuing the Dialogue. In his remarks to our delegation, Comandante Jaime Wheelock registered his strong personal opposition (and that of one other, unnamed Comandante) to the Dialogue, characterizing it as "a bridge invented by the abstentionist parties to exert their influence outside of the electoral process. They still want to determine the rules of the game."

Nevertheless, during the pre-election period that we observed, all the key actors in Nicaraguan politics seemed to be participating vigorously in the National Dialogue process. As Guillermo Mejia, the PPSC's vice-presidential candidate, told us;

"The Frente is cooperating and giving ground. Everything is negotiable: periodicity of elections, cabinet representation, even the possible replacement of the CDSs with nonpartisan community committees -- a proposal which we made and which has been accepted by the FSLN for discussion... The groundwork may be being laid for a further political opening after the elections. The government will keep trying to do something to gain external legitimacy if the November 4 elections fail to provide that."

As the FSLN's vice-presidential candidate, Sergio Ramírez, reminded us, the "National Dialogue" idea is not a new one in Nicaragua. Similar talks have been going on, in one form or another, during most of the period since 1979. They represent an attempt by the FSLN government to keep the doors open to its domestic opponents (at least those who have not taken up arms against the government). As the PPSC leader points out, the dialogue process also has a very strong international dimension. It keeps doors open to the various international groups (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and others associated with the Socialist International, the Liberal International, the Vatican, etc.) which are linked to the domestic actors involved in the National Dialogue.

This indicates, we believe, the larger political context and significance of the Dialogue: The Sandinistas cannot afford to lose their domestic opposition. If that occurs, they will be left alone and naked in a dangerous world. The Sandinistas must maintain both an internal and an external dialogue (though the Contadora process, the Mexico-based bilateral talks with the United States, etc.). At home, it is more important to have a credible opposition talking to the government than to "win" on any particular point; hence the numerous concessions which the FSLN has made thus far in the process. The relatively strong showing by the opposition parties in the November 4 elections has increased their leverage, and made it more likely that their participation in the debates of the National Assembly will result in even more concessions by the Sandinistas. A pragmatic response by the FSLN to the new, post-election political realities of Nicaragua has already been signalled.38

It is evident that the FSLN government is confined in its choices of alternative policies and political arrangements by certain hard, geopolitical realities. E.V.K. Fitzgerald, senior economic advisor to the Nicaraguan government, stressed this point:

"You need to recognize that this is a very small, vulnerable country, in the backyard of the United States, with long land borders which are very hard to police -- not an island like Cuba. The Nicaraguan Revolution can survive only with the support of its Latin American neighbors... The Mexicans and

36 Interview with our delegation, October 31, 1984.
37 Interview with our delegation, November 2, 1984.
the Costa Ricans are not starry-eyed radicals. They want a stable Central America. This requires Nicaragua to adopt certain strategies. These geopolitical realities are more important [as predictors of the future] than the Sandinistas' intentions....They have not yet fixated on a single model of the future; this is constantly being debated within the government. The key variable is: what happens with the war? If it persists and widens, this will force Nicaragua into a more defensive and hard-line position. Fragile institutions like the National Assembly might not survive."

This concern was shared by most of the political leaders -- including those affiliated with the FSLN -- whom we interviewed. The consensus among these Nicaraguan leaders seems to be that the 1984 elections should not be viewed as "closure," but rather as a potential opening of other political options. The National Dialogue, for example, by incorporating political forces which chose to abstain from the elections, could reinforce the constructive effects of the electoral process and influence the terms of political debate in the National Assembly. More than the unbalanced political competition of the elections themselves, the post-election political process has a potential for reinforcing political pluralism.

But this process could easily be truncated, or even reversed, by an intensification of the war or of the external economic pressure being exerted on Nicaragua by the United States, which continues to block the flow of new international credits to Nicaragua. "If the external military and economic pressure keeps up," Dr. Fitzgerald warns, "this will inevitably mean an increasingly austere economy, with one social goal after another being sacrificed." Under such conditions, it is difficult to imagine continued movement toward a democratic polity.

When pressed, the senior U.S. diplomat in Central America whom we interviewed admitted that, contrary to innumerable public statements by Reagan Administration officials, "Nicaragua is not yet a communist state, and it's not yet a totalitarian state. But they are tending in that direction."

We submit, however, that the future of freedom and democracy in Nicaragua rests primarily in the hands of the United States. As it has been almost continuously since 1909, the United States remains the principal maker of Nicaragua's political options. Our fact-finding mission leads us to believe that if the pressures of a war economy and war psychology are relieved, there is a good chance that political liberalization will proceed. Despite U.S. interference, the elections of November 4, 1984, were an impressive beginning.
Elecciones al estilo SANDINISTA son peores que las SOMOCISTAS.

ESTAS ELECCIONES SERÍAN DE TIGRE SUELTO CON BURRO AMARRADO. ¡JA, JA, JA!

SÓLO LOS BURROS PUEDEN CREER EN LOS NUEVE "PIRIS"

Handbill distributed by a group of armed counterrevolutionaries (the Fuerza Democrática Nicaraguense, FDN) in the Matagalpa region, criticizing the upcoming "Sandinista-style" elections as being worse than those held under Somoza. The handbill apparently was prepared before February 21, 1984, when the Sandinista government announced that elections would be held this year rather than in 1985 (hence the reference to "elections of 1985"). This was cited by Regional Electoral Council officials as an example of abstentionist propaganda which had been distributed by contras operating in the area.