
### Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics

William D. Nordhaus, Yale University


Nobel Lecture in Economic Sciences
Stockholm University
December 8, 2018



# Climate change looms over our future

Francisco de Goya, El Coloso, Copyright ©Museo Nacional del Prado

## The circular flow of global warming science, impacts, and policy



#### The mathematics of the DICE model

(1) 
$$\max_{c(t)} W = \max_{c(t)} \left[ \int_{0}^{\infty} U[c(t)]e^{-\rho t} dt \right]$$


subject to

(2) 
$$c(t) = M[y(t); z(t); \alpha; \varepsilon(t)]$$


#### Alternative policies

- Business as usual (minimal policies)
- Cost-benefit optimum (two damage functions)
- Limit temperature increase (to  $1\frac{1}{2}$ , 2,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  °C) with hard cap
- Limit temperature increase (to  $1\frac{1}{2}$ , 2,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  °C) over 100-year or 200-year averaging period

#### Temperature trajectories in different policies



#### Abatement costs & damages, alternative policies




#### Social cost of carbon, different policies and actual

	Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)
	[2018 \$ per ton of CO2]
Year	2015
Optimal	36
Optimal (alt dam)	91
T ≤ 2.0 (100 yr avg)	130
T ≤ 1.5 (100 yr avg)	236
T ≤ 2.0	225
T ≤ 1.5	Not feasible
ACTUAL Price	3


SCC = societal damage from an additional ton of CO2 emissions.

#### Trend in global emissions



Annual growth CO2: 1.8% per year Annual growth CO2/GDP: - 1.5% per year

#### Emissions trajectories in different policies



#### The Free Rider Problem

- Many public-goods issues are hampered by "free-riding."
- Those who do nothing ride free, while those who undertake costly reductions pay dearly.
- The present rides free, while the future pays.
- Free rider problem is particularly severe for climate change.
- What to do? One proposal is to establish a Climate Club

#### International Treaties as "Clubs"

#### Clubs are agreements where:

- Have economies of scale or public goods
- Members pay dues
- Can exclude non-members (avoid free riders)


#### Important successful international clubs:

- Multinational trade negotiations (1930s to today)
- NATO
- European Union

#### A Climate Club to Overcome Free-Riding

- A climate club has incentives to overcome free-riding.
  - Club members "pay dues" through costly abatement.
  - Non-members are penalized through tariffs.
- Proposal here involves a regime with two features:
  - Target carbon price, say \$50 per ton CO<sub>2</sub>
  - Penalty tariff on non-participants, say 3% uniform
- So the "dues" to the club are expensive abatement, while the "penalties" for non-membership are tariffs on exports to the club region.

#### C-DICE model: Simulation of different penalty tariffs



#### Four steps for today

- 1. People must understand the gravity of global warming. This involves intensive research and resisting false and tendentious reasoning.
- 2. Nations must raise the price of CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse-gas emissions.
- 3. Policies must be global and not just national or local. The best hope for effective coordination is a climate club.
- 4. Rapid technological change in the energy sector is essential.