As Donald Trump takes office, he has revived one of his most audacious ideas: acquiring Greenland. When asked directly if he would rule out using military force to take Greenland from Denmark, Trump refused to do so, sparking international outrage. This renewed interest in Greenland is closely tied to his plan to build a nationwide anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which he calls the “American Iron Dome.”
The only thing worse than Trump’s Iron Dome being an enormous boondoggle that doesn’t work, is that it does work. A functional system would undermine global strategic stability by incentivizing adversaries to build even more offensive weapons and countermeasures, increasing the risks of nuclear confrontation. Even a fully operational Iron Dome would offer little protection against a large-scale first strike. Thousands of missiles and decoys would overwhelm any conceivable defense system. At best, the system provides a false sense of security while provoking adversaries to expand their arsenals. At worst, it increases the likelihood of nuclear war.
Following the Money
The drive for an “American Iron Dome” reflects a familiar pattern in U.S. military policy: manufactured threats serving corporate profits. Just as the aerospace industry needed Soviet threats to justify military spending after WWII, today’s military-industrial complex requires new enemies and weapons systems to maintain profitability.
Traditional defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon stand to make billions from the Iron Dome project. But now Silicon Valley billionaires who backed Trump have joined the feeding frenzy. For instance, SpaceX could secure hundreds of billions in contracts for its Starlink satellite network and launch capabilities. Peter Thiel’s Palantir Technologies could profit enormously from developing AI systems for missile tracking.
This marriage between Silicon Valley and traditional military contractors represents a dangerous expansion of the military-industrial complex. What began as a civilian tech industry increasingly turns to military contracts for reliable government funding. Silicon Valley’s “move fast and break things” mentality, dangerous for social media, becomes catastrophic when applied to nuclear deterrence.
The Fantasy of Missile Defense
The fundamental challenge of missile defense hasn’t changed since the 1960s: hitting a bullet with a bullet. Intercontinental ballistic missiles travel at roughly 15,000 miles per hour. Intercepting them requires detecting, tracking, and destroying objects moving 20 times faster than a bullet across vast distances.
This technical challenge becomes even harder against modern threats. Russia and China deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), releasing several warheads from a single missile. They also use sophisticated decoys and countermeasures. A single missile might release dozens of decoys along with actual warheads, overwhelming defense systems.
The math is stark: even a 95% successful intercept rate (far beyond current capabilities) would allow dozens of warheads to reach targets in a large-scale attack. Meanwhile, the enormous cost of trying to achieve such effectiveness—likely trillions of dollars—incentivizes adversaries to build more offensive weapons, which are far cheaper than defensive systems.
The First Strike Temptation
While sold to the public as defensive, Iron Dome’s real strategic importance is offensive. A missile defense system that could intercept a small number of retaliatory missiles, even if unable to stop a full-scale first strike, could make nuclear war seem “winnable” to military planners.
Here’s the dangerous logic: If the U.S. launched a surprise first strike that destroyed most of an adversary’s nuclear weapons, the remaining retaliatory missiles might be few enough for Iron Dome to handle. This creates a destabilizing temptation to strike first during a crisis, while incentivizing adversaries to maintain hair-trigger launch readiness to avoid having their weapons destroyed on the ground.
This explains why Russia and China view U.S. missile defense as an offensive threat. They understand that combining first-strike weapons with even a partially effective missile defense system fundamentally undermines strategic stability based on mutual vulnerability.
Greenland’s Strategic Role
Greenland’s location makes it crucial for missile defense and nuclear strategy. The U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base in northwestern Greenland, hosting radar installations for missile defense. Trump’s plan would expand this infrastructure dramatically, integrating Greenland into a broader strategy of Arctic militarization.
Polar Politics and Missile Routes
Greenland’s position is uniquely critical for polar missile routes, which provide the shortest path between continents for nuclear weapons. Control of these routes could give the U.S. both faster strike capabilities and enhanced early warning. Expanding military presence in Greenland would place nuclear-armed systems closer to Russia and China, while providing key strategic points for missile defense installations.
This militarization would transform the Arctic from a region of relative cooperation into a nuclear flashpoint. Russia and China already view U.S. military presence in Greenland as a strategic threat. Expanding this presence through acquisition would accelerate Arctic militarization, potentially triggering a new nuclear arms race in the region.
This mirrors Cold War patterns. In the 1960s, the U.S. secretly constructed Camp Century in Greenland, officially a research station but actually testing “Project Iceworm”—a covert plan to house nuclear missiles beneath the ice sheet. The U.S. concealed this from Denmark, which prohibited nuclear weapons on its territory. The project failed when ice proved unstable, leaving toxic waste and radioactive material now surfacing due to climate change.
The ABM Treaty Lesson
The 1972 ABM Treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union limited each side to one missile defense site, maintaining strategic stability through mutually assured destruction (MAD). Its 2001 abrogation by the Bush administration unleashed a new arms race, with Russia and now China expanding arsenals to counter U.S. missile defenses.
This wasn’t accidental. Neoconservatives tied to the military-industrial complex had pushed to end the ABM Treaty since the 1990s, as outlined in the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) document “Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” This agenda resurfaces in Project 2025, developed by Trump administration members, which calls for a new nationwide ABM system.
Manufacturing Threats, Maximizing Profits
The pattern is clear: military contractors require threats to justify weapons programs. After WWII, the aerospace industry faced collapse without military contracts. As Lockheed’s CEO Robert Gross wrote explicitly in 1945: “If we have a true and lasting peace, obviously the demand for military airplanes will be limited. On the other hand, if we have an armed truce… the demand for military airplanes might be very considerable.”
Today’s push for an American Iron Dome follows this template. Corporate profits demand new weapons systems, which require new threats, driving policy toward conflict. Even Wall Street, which owns much of the military industry through direct investments and index funds, risks global catastrophe for relatively small profits from nuclear weapons manufacturing.
If Trump proceeds with his Iron Dome ABM system, it won’t enhance American or global security—it will dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war. The massive expenditure will enrich his Silicon Valley and military-industrial complex allies while proposed cuts to social programs and environmental protection threaten the actual security and well-being of ordinary people. This represents the continued triumph of profit over human survival, a pattern that must be broken before it breaks us