On 22 July, Tehran hosted a high-level trilateral summit with senior officials from Russia and China to coordinate nuclear and sanctions strategies ahead of Iran’s scheduled negotiations with the European Troika in Istanbul today.
All three delegations reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining close coordination on the nuclear file and pledged to expand consultations aimed at countering western policies, particularly U.S.-led sanctions.
The trilateral meeting followed a sharp escalation in nuclear tensions. Just last month, the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, prompting Tehran to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While agency inspectors have since exited the country, Iran’s permanent mission in Vienna continues to liaise with the IAEA.
Western threats and the trigger mechanism
France, Germany, and the UK (also known as the European 3, or E3)—resentful over their exclusion from indirect U.S.—Iran talks—have begun circling the “trigger mechanism” embedded in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot was the first to signal the shift, warning the UN Security Council in late April that Paris would “not hesitate for a single second” to restore pre-2015 UN sanctions if European interests were perceived to be under threat.
The trigger mechanism is widely seen as a lever for the European Troika to return to the negotiating table with Iran. If the trigger mechanism is implemented, all of the six sanctions resolutions of the Security Council against Iran before 2015 (resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929) will return in one place, which will be a great shock to Iran’s economy.
The E3’s resolve has only intensified since Iranian nuclear sites were struck. On 15 July, Barrot issued a fresh warning that unless Tehran offered a “firm, tangible, and verifiable commitment,” Europe would reimpose sanctions “by the end of August at the latest.” That same day, the E3’s UN envoys convened at Germany’s UN Mission to coordinate positions. The matter also came up in a phone call on 14 July between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three countries, according to two U.S. officials.
Michael Waltz, the U.S. nominee for UN ambassador, declared during his Senate hearing that activating the snapback was “one of his priorities,” and expressed confidence that Britain, France, and Germany would fall in line. Echoing this view, Israeli officials have pressed European powers to trigger sanctions as soon as possible.
In addition, in a phone call with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on 18 July, the E3 foreign ministers and the EU’s top diplomat warned Tehran they are prepared to trigger the UN “snapback” mechanism—reimposing international sanctions—if Tehran fails to make concrete progress on reviving the nuclear deal by the end of summer.
What has emerged is a trilateral western consensus—Washington, the E3, and Tel Aviv—intent on cornering Iran before key provisions of the JCPOA expire on 18 October 2025. After that date, if Iran violates the JCPOA, the UN will no longer have the ability to automatically reimpose sanctions. Any reimposition would require a new Security Council resolution, which could be subject to a veto by any of the five permanent members, including both China and Russia.
With the UN Security Council process requiring 30 days, any move to initiate the trigger mechanism must come by late August to allow sanctions to snap back by September’s end.
Iran’s legal rejection and allied leverage
Tehran has rejected the legality of the mechanism outright. Araghchi, in response to French Foreign Minister Barrot’s threat to activate the trigger mechanism, said,
From our perspective, this action would be equivalent to a military attack.
In a strongly worded 20 July letter to the UN Secretary-General and Security Council president, Foreign Minister Araghchi described the E3’s threats as “legally baseless, morally flawed, and politically dangerous.” He accused the European powers of violating both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231, citing their military and political complicity in U.S.—Israeli aggression as grounds for disqualification from participation in the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement.
Speaking earlier this week, the Iranian top diplomat warned:
If the EU “wants to have a role, they should act responsibly, and put aside the worn-out policies of threat and pressure, including the ‘snap-back’ for which they lack absolutely [any] moral and legal ground.”
Iran’s strategic response is unfolding on several fronts. The 22 July meeting with Russia and China was a clear bid to shore up nuclear diplomacy through a multipolar axis. Both Moscow and Beijing reaffirmed their rejection of unilateral sanctions and backed Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy.
While neither country has signaled a withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iranian officials have floated the possibility that if the U.S. and Europe fully abandon the deal, there will be no legal basis left for its enforcement. Ahmad Bakhshish Ardestani, a senior member of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, stated that if Russia and China were to exit the JCPOA,
there will be practically nothing left… that would prompt the Europeans to activate this mechanism.
Snapback diplomacy and nuclear brinkmanship
While diplomatic coordination continues, Europe has privately signaled a potential softening. According to a post on X by Wall Street Journal reporter Laurence Norman:
During the call with Araghchi, [EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja] Kallas offered an extension of the snapback deadline under the nuclear deal, provided Iran resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and place specific limits on its enriched uranium stockpile.
Tehran has yet to confirm the offer, and former Iranian diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi dismissed the utility of such a delay, arguing that “the passage of time is not in Iran’s favor.”
There is one drastic option that remains on the table: Iranian officials have hinted that if the trigger mechanism is activated, Tehran may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) altogether—as did North Korea in 2003 when its nuclear file became highly politicized and western actors became “aggressive” and “intrusive” in their demands.
On 11 June, Iranian UN envoy Amir Saeed Irvani warned the UN Security Council that such a step was under active consideration. A withdrawal would end all IAEA oversight and intensify Tehran’s policy of nuclear ambiguity.
Countdown to confrontation
The Istanbul meeting on Friday was held at the level of deputy foreign ministers from Iran, the UK, France, and Germany.
Following the meeting, Iran, the European troika, and the European Union agreed to continue negotiations on sanctions relief and Iran’s nuclear file.
Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, said discussions were “serious, frank, and detailed,” covering recent developments and key disagreements, including criticism of Europe’s stance on the recent Israeli aggression.
He noted that both sides presented specific proposals and agreed to hold further consultations.
The months leading to October 2025 are shaping up to be decisive. The E3, backed by Washington and the occupation state, seeks to constrain the Islamic Republic before the JCPOA’s core clauses expire. Tehran, in turn, is moving to neutralize the threat through diplomacy, deterrence, and defiance.
Whether the trigger is pulled or defused will hinge on what unfolds in Istanbul—and in the rooms where Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing now speak with one voice.