On March 18, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul and the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) presidential candidate, had his university diploma revoked. The decision was made by a committee at Istanbul University, where İmamoğlu had graduated, with a majority vote. Under Turkish law, a university degree is required to run for president, so the decision effectively disqualified İmamoğlu’s candidacy.
Many saw the İmamoğlu as the only politician capable of defeating President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has ruled the country for 23 years. İmamoğlu’s disqualification through such a crude maneuver sparked widespread anger among opposition supporters. However, in line with a longstanding tradition within Turkey’s opposition, İmamoğlu himself chose to absorb this anger rather than mobilize it. He responded to the annulment of his diploma with a restrained video statement filmed at a Ramadan dinner. In the video, he emphasized the Islamic concept of “kul hakkı” (right of the believer), and argued that the revocation of the diploma he obtained 33 years ago signaled a broader threat to private property and civil rights in Turkey. İmamoğlu’s statement included neither a call to protest the decision nor a clear roadmap for how he intended to challenge it.
The cost of this restraint would be heavy. On the morning after the university’s decision, dozens of police vehicles were stationed in front of İmamoğlu’s home. The mayor of Turkey’s most populous city was taken into custody. Around the same time, nearly 100 individuals, including journalists, opposition politicians, and municipal staff, were also detained, and İmamoğlu’s construction company was seized by the government. The charges against him included leading a criminal organization, corruption, bribery, and money laundering. A few days later, on March 23, İmamoğlu was officially arrested.
İmamoğlu’s detention sparked large-scale protests, particularly on university campuses. In response, the government canceled police leave, suspended public transportation in major cities, and placed public squares under heavy police control. Twelve years after the nationwide Gezi Protests, Erdoğan’s government and opposition groups were once again set to confront each other in the streets.
Timing the Takedown
In political trials, reality and fiction intertwine, and secret witness testimonies and questionable procedural practices are routinely employed. Since its early years, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has used such trials as its primary tool for political retaliation. Therefore, while the sudden branding of the mayor of the country’s largest city as the leader of a criminal organization was shocking, it was not unexpected. The key question here is why the AKP government felt the need to use this tool at this particular moment.
The primary factor that drove the government to launch an operation against İmamoğlu was, without a doubt, his political rise. In the March 2019 municipal elections, İmamoğlu defeated AKP’s former prime minister, Binali Yıldırım. However, the election was annulled on the grounds of alleged irregularities. When the vote was held again, İmamoğlu won with an even larger margin, securing the Istanbul mayoralty. In the 2024 elections, he successfully retained his position, increasing his vote share.
Erdoğan, who once served as Istanbul’s mayor himself, had famously stated that “Whoever wins Istanbul wins Turkey.” After winning Istanbul three times, and with the CHP emerging as the leading party in the 2024 local elections, it became increasingly clear that İmamoğlu’s next target would be the presidency.
On March 23, the CHP administration decided to hold a symbolic primary election, confirming İmamoğlu as the party’s sole candidate. This decision allowed İmamoğlu to enter the race with the political legitimacy derived from the support of millions of members of the country’s second-largest party. It also ensured that the CHP would not repeat the mistakes of the 2023 presidential elections, when it delayed announcing its candidate. Because the AKP government knew that ousting a successful presidential candidate elected by millions would be far more difficult than detaining the mayor of Istanbul, the CHP’s decision spurred the government to act swiftly and eliminate İmamoğlu.
Yet this motivation alone was insufficient for such an operation, and favorable conditions in both international and domestic politics were essential. The Biden administration, which had always been distant from Erdoğan and had received significant financial support from the Fethullah Gülen sect that attempted to overthrow Erdoğan in 2016, had left office. In its place came Donald Trump, who has called Erdoğan as “my friend.” It was almost certain that the geopolitically focused Trump administration would remain indifferent to Turkey’s domestic affairs. Furthermore, Trump’s hesitation to sustain the Ukraine conflict significantly elevated Turkey’s strategic importance in the eyes of its European allies. The government understood that neither the United States nor Europe could afford to jeopardize their relations with Turkey over concerns about Turkish democracy. Official statements made since İmamoğlu’s detention have only validated this understanding.
Domestically, the government was engaged in a series of negotiations with Kurdish separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). A few weeks before İmamoğlu’s arrest, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, had issued a brief yet stunning statement calling on the organization to dissolve itself. This was followed by an agreement in Damascus between the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-majority group supported by the United States, and the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham administration, backed by Turkey. The Kurds, who had been a significant opposition force in recent years and supported the CHP candidate in the 2023 presidential elections, were neutralized by the negotiation process led by their leaders.
The Tragedy of the Rentier Opposition
Yet even these factors fall short of fully explaining how such an operation could be carried out against the CHP, which is not only Turkey’s founding political force but also the leading party in the last elections and the governing authority in all the country’s major cities. For a full picture, one must understand the nature of the CHP itself.
Marx defines rent as the value derived from monopolizing a specific resource, often land; a rentier is someone who earns rent by taking a share of the product without contributing to its production. If this concept is applied to politics, the CHP can be seen as having a rentier character, which prevents the party from converting its electoral victories and public support into genuine political power, leaving it vulnerable to the AKP’s maneuvers. The CHP’s voter base largely supports the party not because of its policies, but because it is perceived as the strongest alternative to Erdoğan’s AKP. Ironically, this very perception solidifies the CHP’s position as the primary opposition party. In this sense, the CHP functions as a rentier party, relying on its status as the main opposition rather than on substantive policy proposals. And in fact, a closer examination of the CHP’s policies reveals striking similarities to those of the AKP.
On paper, the CHP is a social democratic party, as outlined in its program and charter. However, the rhetoric of its leaders and its election promises reveal a strong adherence to neoliberal principles—arguably as much as, if not more than, that of the AKP. During the 2023 presidential elections, the Nation Alliance, led by the CHP, proposed an economic program that included privatizing the railways—a step even the AKP had not fully taken—and implementing austerity measures to address the economic crisis. Furthermore, the CHP nominated Ali Babacan, a former economy minister under Erdoğan and a staunch advocate of neoliberal policies, as vice president for economic affairs. Ironically, while the public ultimately chose Erdoğan’s economic approach—characterized by low interest rates, high exchange rates, and low unemployment—the AKP government reverted to its traditional neoliberal stance after the election. Mehmet Şimşek, a former finance minister with close ties to London’s financial circles, was reinstated and introduced strict austerity measures aligned with IMF guidelines. İmamoğlu even expressed support for Şimşek’s policies, stating, “We see Mr. Şimşek’s efforts to outline correct steps, good measures, and a respectable journey.” Ultimately, the economic differences between the CHP and AKP are superficial.
The relationship between the “social democrat” CHP and the working class likewise needs a closer analysis. AKP officials frequently criminalize strikes under the guise of security concerns, and even accuse striking workers of serving foreign powers. Yet the CHP shows similar tendencies: In CHP-governed municipalities, party-affiliated media and politicians often portray striking workers as agents of the AKP. Moreover, CHP municipalities have been known to engage in organized strike-breaking. In one district of Istanbul, İmamoğlu dispatched cleaners to remove garbage left uncollected by striking sanitation workers.
In the dichotomy between secularism and Islamism—a defining theme in Turkish politics—the CHP draws support primarily from secular urban populations. However, the party has long sought to emulate the AKP’s Islamist rhetoric and political strategies. While the CHP outlawed religious orders during Kemal Atatürk’s presidency, it appears to have recognized the political and organizational advantages these groups have provided the AKP. As a result, the CHP has actively pursued relationships with various religious orders to secure their backing. Despite these efforts, a significant majority of the population, including nearly all CHP voters, remain uneasy about the influence of religious groups in Turkish society. These organizations, which wield considerable economic and political power, frequently make headlines for scandals involving corruption, sexual harassment, and violence against children in unlicensed educational institutions.
İmamoğlu, who launched his political career within Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist Motherland Party, embodies a moderate Islamist political approach. His tenure as mayor began with a prayer led by an imam in his office. Like Erdoğan, İmamoğlu has consistently used Friday prayers as platforms for political messaging. He also expressed admiration for Istanbul’s Islamic religious orders, and cultivated relationships with pan-Islamist organizations such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, a key tool in the AKP’s foreign policy agenda.
One of the CHP’s key criticisms of the AKP centers on the concept of “meritocracy.” While the CHP’s own economic policies show little divergence from those of the AKP, the party attributes the country’s economic crisis to the AKP’s practice of appointing loyal but unqualified individuals to key decision-making positions. However, the CHP’s own commitment to “meritocracy” appears largely superficial. The experience of Hatay, the city hardest hit by the February 2023 earthquake, gives a striking example. In the preceding years, under Haray’s CHP mayor Lütfü Savaş, illegal construction permits were issued, which played a significant role in the loss of thousands of lives. Despite Savaş’s widely acknowledged responsibility for this devastating tragedy, the CHP leadership decided to renominate him for the 2024 local elections, sparking widespread public outrage. At a ceremony commemorating the one-year anniversary of the earthquake, protests erupted against CHP leaders. When one woman pleaded, “Please don’t nominate Lütfü Savaş,” İmamoğlu’s response to was characteristic of his Islamist tendencies: “Please, sister. The Quran is being recited right now; let’s listen together.”
The CHP often criticizes the AKP as a system dominated by a single individual, where decisions are made without checks or balances. While Erdoğan’s extensive control over his party and the state apparatus is undeniable, the CHP operates in a remarkably similar fashion. The party’s chairman holds exclusive authority in selecting parliamentary candidates and mayors, consolidating decision-making power within the leadership. In some instances, the CHP leadership has even gone further than Erdoğan in its unilateral actions. After losing the first round in the May 2023 elections, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, then the CHP leader and opposition presidential candidate, secretly signed a pact with Ümit Özdağ, leader of the far-right, anti-immigrant Victory Party. According to the agreement, later disclosed by Özdağ, the Victory Party would pledge its support for Kılıçdaroğlu in exchange for key positions, including the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and the head of intelligence services. The arrangement effectively subjected millions of Kurdish and leftist voters to political manipulation, pushing them to vote for a candidate who had agreed to empower a far-right party. Despite this political maneuver, Kılıçdaroğlu ultimately lost the election.
Overall, there is no significant difference between the CHP and the AKP in economic and social policies or political practices. Both parties share a common vision for an economic system characterized by unchecked corruption, declining real wages, deepening social inequalities, and workplace accidents resolved through compensation rather than regulation. This alignment reflects the preferences of Turkey’s capitalist class, which backs both parties. While the CHP may aspire to take the helm of the ship, it shows no intention of steering it in a different direction.
The CHP has also worked just as diligently as the AKP to establish a political system where the public remain passive spectators instead of active participants. CHP leaders and their affiliated media have focused on reducing political engagement by opposition groups to mere electoral participation. They have promoted the idea that political commitments and demands are obstacles to defeating the AKP, urging opposition groups to prioritize electoral victory—even at the cost of abandoning their principles and identities. This strategy culminated with the 2023 parliamentary elections, in which millions of CHP voters, who deeply resented the AKP and held it responsible for the hardships in their lives, ended up electing former AKP Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, along with other former AKP ministers and deputies, into parliament under the CHP’s banner. Ironically, some of these deputies later returned to their original political home, the AKP.
The CHP’s obsession with electoral politics has significantly contributed to the near-eradication of protest culture in Turkey. Despite enduring a prolonged economic crisis and societal traumas like the 2023 earthquake, protests remain infrequent and lack broad participation. While the AKP government, which has criminalized the right to protest, bears primary responsibility, the CHP leadership and its affiliated media are no less complicit. The party has consistently framed protests against the government as actions that might portray the AKP as victims, potentially strengthening the AKP’s electoral position. Much like the AKP, the CHP dismisses any forms of political expression outside of elections as undemocratic. This has created a paradoxical situation where nearly everyone closely follows politics day by day and voter turnout always exceeds 90 percent, yet political demands are almost invisible in daily life. İmamoğlu refrained from calling for protests even after his disqualification from the election for the same reason: the very concept of protest has been excluded from the CHP’s political playbook.
The CHP’s strategy—suppressing genuine public demands, discouraging mass politics, and relying on voters to support it solely because it is not the AKP—has encouraged people to overlook their ongoing struggles and impoverishment, clinging instead to the hope of better days under CHP rule. Yet even this strategy collapsed when the AKP government seized an opportunity to launch a sweeping judicial operation against the CHP. Leveraging favorable domestic and international conditions, the AKP shifted the political landscape, detaining the CHP’s most prominent politician and leveling corruption charges against the party.
The tragedy of Turkey’s rentier opposition lies in this paradox: the ballot box, which the CHP has championed as the ultimate solution, has been rendered ineffective, and the only viable path left for the CHP is mass protest—which the CHP has spent over a decade undermining. The extent to which the AKP can push its operation against the CHP will ultimately depend on the resistance it faces in the streets.
Resistance on the Street
İmamoğlu’s detention has ignited widespread protests across Turkey, transforming the political landscape. Initially, a large crowd assembled outside the Istanbul Municipality building, resembling a CHP rally rather than a protest. Soon students from leading universities organized massive marches, which escalated into clashes with the police. Over time, streets and squares across the nation became hubs of resistance, with most cities witnessing significant demonstrations. A notable exception was the southeast, where the Kurdish political movement, still actively negotiating with the government, refrained from joining the protests.
A large share of the protesters are young people who see İmamoğlu as their only hope against the oppressive and impoverishing politics they attribute to the AKP. Many are joining protests for the first time, signaling a shift in how they engage with politics. They are beginning to move beyond the limitations of the ballot box and social media, and learning to voice their demands in the public sphere.
These protests have the potential to disrupt the two-party system that has shaped Turkish politics for decades. Many young demonstrators have openly criticized CHP leaders, including Chairman Özgür Özel, for their cautious and conciliatory stance. The arrest of İmamoğlu, combined with the CHP’s inability to mount an effective response, may drive people to explore new political alternatives.
Among these alternatives, socialist parties emerge as a compelling option. Despite their limited electoral presence, they have shown remarkable organization and active participation in the protests. To harness this momentum, socialist parties must transcend the electoral focus of İmamoğlu and the CHP, channeling public opposition to the AKP into concrete political demands. This shift is essential for fostering a broader, more inclusive political transformation—one that could ultimately liberate Turkey from the grips of neoliberalism and Islamism. In this lies the true hope for change.