I. Three Metropoles, Four Peripheries
Many of us on the Left have pondered what would replace the Cold War division of the planet into the First, Second, and Third World. Though the three worlds thesis was arbitrary at best — the social divisions within nation-states are often more significant than the distinctions between nation-states — it did have the merit of emphasizing the primacy of the US Empire. From 1945 to 1985, the US was the reigning global superpower. It had the richest economy in the world, the most advanced technology, and the most productive workforce on the planet. While it did have significant regional challengers, e.g. the Soviet Union and China, and suffered local defeats everywhere from Cuba to Vietnam, it had no truly worldwide economic or cultural competitors.
Times have changed. Today, the European Union and the East Asian region have caught up and surpassed their erstwhile mentor. The EU and East Asia are self-financing, autonomous economies, endowed with world-class technologies and some of the highest productivity levels on the planet. They dominate world trade and financial flows the way the US once did. Both are the leading creditors in the world-economy, and control most of the key levers of the world financial system. Today, the US is not only the world’s biggest debtor, it is also shockingly dependent on capital inflows from East Asia and Europe.
Perhaps the best way to think of the contemporary world-system is to see it as “three metropoles and four peripheries.” Contrary to what you may have heard, most global trade occurs within each metropole and its corresponding semi-periphery, and only secondarily between metropoles or semi-peripheries. The four peripheries, by contrast, have the blessing (or curse) of not yet being fully integrated into any single bloc. They do have significant trading links with one or two metropoles, but they are not structurally integrated into any single metropole. This makes it more difficult for them to access metropolitan markets, but also gives them more freedom to maneuver.
The European metropole consists of a core of 30 countries (the EU-25, Norway, Switzerland, and future EU accession countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia) and 18 semi-peripheral nations, or what can be termed the E-48 group. The East Asian metropole has a much narrower core — Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong — which trades mostly with 11 other nations and regions, forming what can be called the EA-16 group. In North America, the US-Canadian core has powerful trade links to semi-peripheries such as Mexico and 11 other Central American and Caribbean countries.
At current market exchange rates, the size of each trading region is as follows:
Table 1. Absolute and per capita GDP levels at current market exchange rates, end of 2005. Data calculated at rate of 1 EUR = 1.2 US$ = 145 Japanese yen. Sources: World Bank, IMF, Eurostat. Population data current as of July 2006. Note that certain countries are counted in more than one region.
|
Three Metropoles, Four Peripheries |
Population (million) |
GDP (€ billion) |
Per Capita GDP |
Share of World Population |
% World GDP |
|
North America-14 (US, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, |
514.2 (three-fifths US) |
11,964 (nine-tenths US) |
€23,268 |
One in 13 |
33.3% |
|
of which: US |
298.4 |
10,392 |
€34,819 |
One in 22 |
29.0% |
|
Europe-48 |
956.8 |
13,057 |
€13,647 |
One in 7 |
36.4% |
|
of which: ES-18 |
452.6 |
1,328 |
€2,933 |
One in 14 |
3.7% |
|
of which: E-30 core (EU-25 + EU accession countries: |
504.2 |
11,729 |
€23,263 |
One in 13 |
32.7% |
|
East Asia-16 (Japan, China plus Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, |
2,101.2 (half China) |
8,052 (half Japan, one quarter China) |
€3,832 |
One in 3 |
22.4% |
|
Latin America (including Caribbean, Mexico and Central |
558.3 (one third Brazil) |
1,793 (one third Mexico, one third |
€3,213 |
One in 11 |
5.0% |
|
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) |
1,428.7 (three-quarters India) |
746 (four-fifths India) |
€522 |
One in 5 |
2.1% |
|
Africa (including Maghreb) |
910.0 (one eighth Nigeria) |
689 (one third Maghreb, one fifth |
€758 |
One in 7 |
1.9% |
|
Central Asia (former Soviet Central Asian countries plus |
260.2 (one quarter Iran) |
679 (one third Saudi Arabia, one |
€2,610 |
One in 25 |
1.9% |
|
World Total |
6,517.3 |
35,888 |
€5,507 |
— |
— |
In terms of raw GDP, the NA-14 is only 92% as big as the E-48, while the EA-16 region is 70% as large as NA-14 and only 62% as large as the E-48. That said, growth rates in the EA-16 region are much higher than the other two regions — so high that East Asia will catch up with the NA-14 within a decade.
Currently, the new metropoles are transforming their economic might into cultural and political capital. The rapidly-expanding European Union, for example, has developed a thriving cinema and media culture and, since the watershed of 2003, has moved inexorably towards an independent (and reasonably sane) foreign policy, light-years distant from US bellicosity. There are strikingly similar processes occurring in East Asia, everywhere from the expansion of ASEAN and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to the emergence of powerhouse film, media, and videogame producers in South Korea, China, and Japan.
II. Another Long Wave of Accumulation?
You may have heard about the profit boom for US corporations, but there’s a similar boom happening in the new metropoles. The main reasons are low real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates, plus a structural recovery in profit margins, powered by the fast growth of the East Asian and European semi-peripheries. Interestingly, only about a fifth of the US profit boom can be explained by the neoliberal crackdown on US labor, suggesting we may be entering another long wave of extended accumulation.
According to the US Federal Reserve’s June 2006 Flow-of-Funds report, pretax corporate profits in the US bottomed out at 7.0% of GDP during the recession year of 2001, before rebounding strongly to 11.5% in 2005. Currently, pretax profits are on track to hit 12.7% of GDP by the end of 2006. Not all of this increase is due to the neoliberal class war on labor, however. The same report suggests that only about one-fifth of the profit increase can be explained by the decline in US employee compensation as a percent of GDP, which means that core profits are still somewhere around 10% of GDP.
Profit rates have been rising smartly in the new metropoles. The Nikkei Weekly (May 31, 2006, pg 2) estimated that pre-tax profits for all firms in Japan’s Nikkei index rose 20% in 2005, to ¥17.71 trillion (€122 billion). Meanwhile, total sales rose 8.9% to ¥258.47 trillion (€1.782 trillion). Pretax profit rates rose from 6.0% in 2004 to 6.9% in 2005. (This number isn’t directly comparable to US pretax profits, but the trend is similar).
Data from Japan’s Ministry of Finance confirm this. After hitting an all-time high of 94.0% in 1999, debt levels fell rapidly to 59.6% in 2005, the lowest level since 1989. The same is true of operating profits, which bottomed out at 2.3% of sales in 1998, and rose rapidly to 4.0% in 2005, the highest level since 1990, the peak of the Japanese Bubble.
Table 2. Japan’s Profit Boom. Source: Japan Ministry of Finance. Accessed August 3, 2006. Web: www.mof.go.jp/english/ssc/historical.htm
|
Period |
Operating Profits as % Sales |
Debt as Percent Sales |
|---|---|---|
|
1960s |
5.5% |
51.4% |
|
1970s |
4.3% |
58.7% |
|
1980s |
3.6% |
51.5% |
|
1990s |
3.0% |
80.9% |
|
2000s |
3.2% |
77.1% |
The analysts at Allianz, Europe’s giant bancassurance firm, estimated recently that net operating profit for German firms as a percent of capital stock fell in an almost straight line from 12% in 1960 down to a low of 6% in 1982, and then rose steadily to 10% in 2005, the highest level in 35 years (Allianz Dresdner Economic Research, “Economic Forecast 2006/2007,” May 26, 2006).
If profits are increasing, the logical question is, who is buying all those goods? In the past, the US was the final source of global demand. However, the US current account deficit has been deteriorating by about €110 billion per year, reaching €673 billion in 2005. This is not sustainable. Sooner or later, US consumers will have to rein in their appetite for foreign goods. But who is going to replace the US and its depreciating currency as world consumers? The short answer is, Euroconsumerism today plus Asiaconsumerism tomorrow — or a combination of trade and credit expansion.
On the trade side of the ledger, total EU-25 world imports were €1.175 trillion in 2005, a figure which has increased 5% per year since 2001. This is a net increase of €60 billion per year. Add in net demand from the E-48’s thriving semiperipheries, and the figure is close to €70 billion. The comparable figure for the East Asian region is somewhere around €75 billion. Add the two up, and this equals €145 billion of fresh annual demand — significantly larger than the US stimulus.
The stimulative effects of the credit system are even more significant. The EU’s internal credit system is expanding at 8-10% per annum. (The European Investment Bank, with total assets of €248 billion, lent €47.4 billion in 2005 alone, and Europe’s publicly-owned banks, which own €2 trillion in assets, continue to lend with gusto). In fact, the European banking industry has become the largest single source of credit in the world economy:
Table 3. Debtor Region and Creditor Bank by Location, September 2005. Data: BIS (All figures in millions of US$)
|
Region |
Total Regional Debt |
Owed to European Banks (Excluding UK) |
Owed to UK Banks |
Owed to Japanese Banks |
Owed to US Banks |
Owed to Other Banks |
|
Africa and Middle East |
299,697 |
44.9% |
34.3% |
3.4% |
6.2% |
11.3% |
|
Latin American and Caribbean |
577,480 |
57.9% |
9.2% |
1.6% |
21.3% |
10.1% |
|
Europe (developing) |
699,543 |
85.5% |
3.2% |
1.5% |
4.1% |
5.8% |
|
Asia and Pacific |
748,327 |
29.2% |
23.4% |
9.9% |
18.4% |
19.1% |
|
All developing nations |
2,325,047 |
55.3% |
15.2% |
4.5% |
13.2% |
11.8% |
|
Offshore banking centers |
1,545,346 |
40.7% |
21.4% |
19.9% |
6.2% |
11.9% |
|
Developed countries |
17,521,846 |
59.2% |
10.8% |
6.7% |
3.6% |
19.7% |
|
All countries |
21,475,772 |
57.4% |
12.0% |
7.4% |
4.8% |
18.4% |
The Eurobanks’ total share of the global banking system rose from 55.1% in mid-2002 to 57.4% in 2005, while the UK’s share rose from 10.3% to 12.0%. Meanwhile, Japan’s share has declined slightly from 8.6% to a still-formidable 7.4%. Most remarkable of all is the sharp drop in the US share, from 6.9% down to 4.8%. In fact, the US is now the world’s largest debtor nation:
Table 4. World Credit Position (Total Bank Loans Owned Minus Loans Owed), September 2005. Data: BIS. Plus means more loans owned than owed, minus means more loans are owed than owned.
|
Region |
Net Position |
Percent of Region’s GDP |
|---|---|---|
|
Europe (excluding UK) |
+ $4,237.6 trillion |
+ 45% |
|
Japan |
+ $823.1 billion |
+ 17% |
|
Canada |
+ $133.0 billion |
+ 15% |
|
Australia |
– $77.0 billion |
– 15% |
|
UK |
– $472.2 billion |
– 27% |
|
US |
– $3,767.1 trillion |
– 32% |
While the E-48 currently dominates the global credit system, don’t be fooled by the seemingly minor contribution of the “other banks” category in the BIS statistics. Those banks control $4 trillion in assets, about one sixth of the world banking system. They are mostly located in the booming economies of Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and mainland China, and their size and heft will increase dramatically in the future, as the East Asian boom rolls on.
III. Forces of Multinational Production
While the new metropoles are revolutionizing the worlds of finance and trade, they are also transforming the forces of multinational production. Over the course of several decades, the EU has created one of the most sophisticated and intelligent industrial policy networks the world. Powerful unions helped create the world’s most skilled and productive workforce, enabling EU firms to catch up with and eventually surpass their US mentors in fields ranging from autos to telecoms, aviation to renewable energy. In the past, East Asia had a more narrowly targeted developmental agenda, geared towards specific sectors of the electronics, cars, and computer industries.
However, East Asia is learning fast. South Korea’s developmental state is now actively investing in its film, media, animation, and videogame industries. Meanwhile, China boosted its spending on research and development from 0.6% of its GDP in the mid-1990s to 1.3% of GDP in 2003, and plans to reach 2.0% by 2010. The research boom in China has increased the number of Chinese research personnel from 485,500 in 1998 to 926,252 in 2003.
One of the unexpected side-effects of the rise of the new metropoles is the reactivation of Russia’s world-class scientific base. After a century of being the sacrificial lamb of the semi-periphery — the site of two unimaginably destructive world wars, successive economic blockades, and the heavy burden of Cold War military expenditures — Russia has finally hit the geopolitical jackpot. Its location halfway between Europe and Asia, formerly a curse, is now the greatest blessing imaginable. Over the course of the next decade, Russia will play the role of economic bridge and political intermediary between the EU, East Asia, and South Asia.
Currently, Russia is participating in two economic booms, the Eastern European and East Asian expansions. As a result, the Putin government has been able to channel Russia’s energy-rents into high-tech development parks and domestic infrastructure, enabling Russian firms to power up at an astonishing rate in the electronics and software sector. According to the OECD, total business expenditure on R&D as a percent of GDP is almost the same in China and Russia — 0.82% for China (2003) and 0.81% in Russia (2004).
Table 5. Total researchers in 2003. Source: OECD Main Scientific and Technological Indicators Vol. 2005/2.
|
Country or Region |
Number of Researchers (Full-time equivalents) |
|---|---|
|
US |
1,334,628 |
|
EU-25 |
1,169,628 |
|
China |
926,252 |
|
Japan |
675, 330 |
|
Russia |
477,647 |
|
South Korea |
151,254 |
|
Taiwan |
67,599 |
|
Switzerland |
25,808 |
|
Singapore |
21,359 |
|
Romania |
20,965 |
|
Memo item: East Asia total (China plus Japan, Korea, |
1,841,794 |
|
Memo item: Europe total (EU-25 plus Russia, Switzerland |
1,694,048 |
While the US still retains a vast pool of researchers, laboratories, and a world-class university system, it does have one key weakness. It continues to spend far too much on military R&D, and not enough on civilian R&D.
Table 6. Civilian Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) as Percent of GDP, 2003. Source: OECD Main Scientific and Technological Indicators Vol. 2005/2 and Asian Development Bank, Outlook 2006.
|
Country or Region |
Civilian GERD as Percent of GDP |
Amount in € billion |
Public Outlays for Military |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Japan |
3.1 |
125.2 |
5.1% |
|
South Korea |
2.5 |
16.7 |
13.4% |
|
US |
2.2 |
228.6 |
55.8% |
|
EU-25 |
1.7 |
188.6 |
14.9% |
|
China |
1.3 |
21.3 |
N/a |
|
Memo item: Total |
— |
163.2 |
N/a |
One of the most important avenues for scientific learning and innovation is studying abroad. Visitors learn about host countries, and of course the host countries learn a great deal from their visitors. While the US likes to think of itself as the multicultural mecca of the world, the reality is that the EU now has the largest pool of exchange students in the world.
Table 7. Foreign Students in Tertiary Education per 1,000 Residents. Source: OECD Education Statistics 2005, UNESCO 2004.
|
Country |
Total Foreign Students in 2004 |
1999 Students per 1,000 Residents |
2004 Students per 1,000 Residents |
|
Australia |
121,000 |
4.89 |
5.97 |
|
Austria |
31,700 |
3.64 |
3.87 |
|
UK |
226,700 |
3.84 |
3.74 |
|
Switzerland |
27,800 |
3.36 |
3.69 |
|
Belgium |
38,200 |
3.48 |
3.68 |
|
Sweden |
28,700 |
2.17 |
3.18 |
|
France |
147,400 |
2.15 |
2.42 |
|
Germany |
219,000 |
2.16 |
2.66 |
|
Denmark |
14,500 |
N/a |
2.66 |
|
US |
583,000 |
1.51 |
1.95 |
|
Canada |
40,000 |
N/a |
1.21 |
|
Spain |
44,900 |
0.82 |
1.11 |
|
Portugal |
11,200 |
N/a |
1.06 |
|
Netherlands |
16,600 |
0.83 |
1.01 |
|
Japan |
74,900 |
0.44 |
0.59 |
|
Italy |
29,200 |
0.40 |
0.50 |
|
Russia |
70,700 |
N/a |
0.49 |
|
Memo item: Twelve European countries |
835,900 |
N/a |
2.26 |
What’s even more striking is that the residents of the new metropoles have noticeably higher rates of foreign study compared to their US counterparts. While US students still receive one of the best educations in the world, they are limited by a deep-seated cultural provincialism.
Table 8. Domestic Students Studying Abroad per 10,000 Residents, 1999. Source: OECD Education Statistics, 2005.
|
Country |
Domestic Students Studying Abroad per 10,000 Residents, 1999 |
|---|---|
|
Ireland |
46.9 |
|
Norway |
25.9 |
|
Finland |
18.1 |
|
Sweden |
14.8 |
|
Austria |
13.9 |
|
South Korea |
12.9 |
|
Denmark |
11.5 |
|
Switzerland |
11.2 |
|
Netherlands |
9.3 |
|
Belgium |
9.1 |
|
Canada |
8.2 |
|
France |
7.9 |
|
Italy |
6.8 |
|
Spain |
6.4 |
|
Hungary |
6.3 |
|
Germany |
6.3 |
|
Turkey |
6.2 |
|
Japan |
4.4 |
|
Poland |
3.9 |
|
Czech Republic |
3.7 |
|
UK |
3.7 |
|
Australia |
2.6 |
|
Mexico |
1.3 |
|
US |
1.0 |
While the US maintains a formidable scientific and educational infrastructure, the same cannot be said of its industrial base, which is in deep crisis. The rot runs much deeper than the well-publicized troubles of Ford and GM. Simply, the entire US machine-tools sector is close to death. Machine-tools are a relatively small industry, amounting to only $51.8 billion globally in revenues in 2005. However, they are the tools which produce all the other goods and services in a given society, and thus an excellent proxy of an economy’s ability to make things.
Back in the mid-1970s, the US share of world machine-tools production averaged around 18-19%. This dropped to 13-14% in the mid-1980s and drifted down to 10.9% by 2000. (This is based on data from the 1970-86 National Machine Tool Builders Association/Association of Manufacturing Technologies). Since 2000, the US industry has fallen off a cliff, sinking to 6.1% of world production.
Table 9. World Production of Machine Tools 2004-2005, as Percent of World Total. Source: GardnerWeb <www.gardnerweb.com/consump/produce.html>. Accessed May 23, 2006.
|
Region |
2004 |
2005 |
|
Total East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, |
43.6% |
47.0% |
|
Of which: China |
8.9% |
9.6% |
|
Total Europe (EU-25 plus Turkey, Russia, SE |
45.4% |
42.8% |
|
Total US |
6.9% |
6.1% |
|
Total Brazil |
1.6% |
1.3% |
|
Total India |
0.5% |
0.6% |
|
Total Russia |
0.4% |
0.3% |
|
Total BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) |
11.3% |
11.9% |
The picture isn’t much better in machine-tools consumption. The US absorbs less than one ninth of world production, about half of Chinese demand.
Table 10. Total Machine Tools Consumption as Percent World Total, 2005. Source: GardnerWeb <www.gardnerweb.com/consump/consume.html>. Accessed May 23, 2006.
|
Region |
Share of World Consumption |
|
Total East Asia |
48.5% |
|
Of which: China |
21.8% |
|
Total Europe |
32.2% |
|
Total US |
11.6% |
|
Brazil |
2.2% |
|
Total India |
2.0% |
|
Total Russia |
0.8% |
|
Total BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) |
26.7% |
IV. New Metropoles, New Media
The days of the American mass media ruling the global airwaves are long gone. Today, the highest-rated TV programs in most areas of the world are locally-produced shows, everywhere from Russia to China, and Brazil to the EU. The case of the Russian media is paradigmatic of a larger shift. In the mid-1990s, the most popular Russian TV programs were US imports. Ten years later, Russian TV ratings are dominated by indigenous programming.
While US films continue to take the lion’s share of profits at the global box office, total US film production has stagnated for a decade, hovering between 600 and 700 films per year. Currently, the US accounts for only 18% of world film production. By contrast, India produces well over a quarter of the world’s films. The cinema of Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea continues to flourish, while the EU has boosted its annual film production from 600 in the mid-1990s to over 800 today. Both Eastern Europe and Russia have experienced a true cinema renaissance, powered by the rapid growth of indigenous broadcasting markets. In fact, the five largest cinema producers of the Third World — India, China, Iran, Mexico, and Brazil — experienced noticeable upturns since the mid-1990s.
While the new metropoles have always been significant producers of cinema, they only recently began to dominate the videogame market. The world videogame market, it should be noted, is already larger than world box office revenues of film and is likely to grow somewhere between 15% and 20% annually for the next decade. Videogame culture is becoming ubiquitous thanks to the arrival of the next-generation consoles, a plethora of portable game devices, and game-capable cellphones.
Interestingly, much of the videogame boom is being powered by the semi-peripheries of the EU and East Asia — Eastern Europe and a renascent Russia, and South Korea and China. The former Eastern bloc has rapidly become a major-league producer of game software, with world-class design houses springing up everywhere from Hungary and Croatia to Russia and the Ukraine. While China is already a major producer of software, most of its products are still sold locally, though this is likely to change in a hurry (most analysts expect China’s total game market to surpass Japan’s by 2009 or 2010).
Last but not least, the up-and-coming star in the videogame industry is India, which has some of the finest programmers in the world, and long-standing traditions of film, music, and mass media. India already produces somewhere around €250 million in entertainment software, but the take-off of India’s cellphone and portable game markets is likely to kick this into overdrive.
Table 11. Global videogame sales 2005, in billions of euro. Source: PricewaterhouseCooper, Global Entertainment and Media Outlook (2005, 2006). Note these data exclude certain types of game hardware and accessories, so the total game market is slightly higher. Data calculated at exchange rate of $1.2 US = 1 € = 133 yen.
|
Region |
Revenues 2003 |
Revenues 2004 |
Revenues 2005 |
Percent 2003 |
Percent 2004 |
Percent 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Asia-Pacific |
€7.00 |
€8.42 |
€8.17 |
37.5% |
39.7% |
36.2% |
|
US |
€6.33 |
€6.83 |
€7.00 |
33.9% |
32.2% |
31.4% |
|
EMEA (Europe, Africa, Middle East) |
€4.25 |
€5.00 |
€6.33 |
22.8% |
23.6% |
28.1% |
|
Canada |
€0.650 |
€0.508 |
€0.610 |
3.5% |
2.4% |
2.7% |
|
Latin America |
€0.428 |
€0.443 |
€0.443 |
2.3% |
2.1% |
2.0% |
|
Total |
€18.66 |
€21.20 |
€22.55 |
— |
— |
— |
Table 12. Total feature films produced by region, 1995-2005. Source: European Audiovisual Observatory 2005, Screen Digest. China data from press reports and Yingchi Chu, pg 50, in: Media in China, Ed. by Stephanie Donald, Michael Keane, Yin Hong, Routledge: London, 2002. Korean data from KOFIC Annual Report 2005. Hong Kong data from Hong Kong Film Archive filmography.
|
Country or Region |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
EU-25 |
N/a |
N/a |
626 |
605 |
669 |
669 |
715 |
727 |
746 |
761 |
798 |
|
Russia |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
38 |
31 |
39 |
47 |
62 |
68 |
77* |
86 |
|
Switzerland |
25 |
25 |
20 |
32 |
25 |
27 |
29 |
40 |
31 |
39 |
41 |
|
SE Europe (Turkey, |
N/a |
54 |
30 |
34 |
27 |
32 |
34 |
36 |
36 |
33 |
40 |
|
Total European region (EU-25 + Russia + |
N/a |
N/a |
>676 |
709 |
752 |
767 |
825 |
865 |
881 |
910 |
965 |
|
US |
637 |
735 |
767 |
686 |
758 |
683 |
611 |
543 |
593 |
611 |
699 |
|
Japan |
289 |
278 |
278 |
249 |
270 |
282 |
281 |
293 |
287 |
310 |
356 |
|
China |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
82 |
102 |
79 |
58 |
88 |
132 |
181 |
N/a |
|
South Korea |
64 |
65 |
59 |
43 |
49 |
59 |
65 |
78 |
80 |
82 |
N/a |
|
Hong Kong |
143 |
108 |
87 |
84 |
163 |
144 |
119 |
91 |
77 |
62 |
55 |
|
Philippines** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
130 |
204 |
N/a |
109 |
97 |
90 |
53 |
N/a |
|
Thailand** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
12 |
30 |
50 |
46 |
N/a |
|
Taiwan** |
N/a |
18 |
29 |
22 |
16 |
35 |
17 |
21 |
14 |
24 |
N/a |
|
Malaysia** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
16 |
10 |
26 |
22 |
N/a |
|
Indonesia** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
10 |
17 |
12 |
17 |
N/a |
|
Vietnam** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
8 |
10 |
10 |
11 |
N/a |
|
Singapore** |
N/a |
1 |
3 |
4 |
N/a |
3 |
6 |
7 |
9 |
8 |
N/a |
|
Total East Asian region (EA-10) |
>496 |
>470 |
>456 |
>614 |
>803 |
>602 |
701 |
742 |
787 |
806 |
N/a |
|
Brazil** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
40 |
42 |
48 |
50 |
81 |
N/a |
|
Argentina** |
N/a |
N/a |
28 |
36 |
N/a |
40 |
47 |
48 |
67 |
78 |
N/a |
|
Mexico** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
21 |
14 |
36 |
54 |
N/a |
|
Chile** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
10 |
7 |
7 |
14 |
N/a |
|
Colombia** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
7 |
7 |
8 |
7 |
N/a |
|
Total 5 largest Latin American countries |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
127 |
124 |
168 |
234 |
N/a |
|
India |
777 |
683 |
697 |
693 |
764 |
855 |
1013 |
943 |
877 |
N/a |
N/a |
|
Iran |
62 |
63 |
55 |
54 |
54 |
60 |
87 |
76 |
82 |
83 |
N/a |
|
Pakistan** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
51 |
N/a |
55 |
52 |
48 |
40 |
25 |
N/a |
|
Egypt |
72 |
60 |
54 |
48 |
30 |
20 |
20 |
27 |
21 |
24 |
N/a |
|
Morocco** |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
N/a |
5 |
6 |
8 |
12 |
N/a |
* Estimated data.
** Screen Digest and Film Variety data, which may slightly from EAO.
Appendix I: Consolidated Foreign Bank Claims, in Millions of US$, September 2005. Data: BIS (Quarterly Report, April 2006)
|
|
|
|
Owed to: |
|
|
|
|
|
Country |
Total Foreign Debt |
Debt as Percent of GDP |
European Banks (excl UK) |
UK Banks |
US Banks |
Japanese Banks |
Other Banks |
|
Mexico |
246,593 |
35.3% |
53.8% |
9.9% |
26.9% |
1.2% |
8.2% |
|
South Korea |
220,758 |
27.6% |
24.0% |
29.7% |
25.6% |
7.6% |
13.2% |
|
Brazil |
156,687 |
25.3% |
59.8% |
13.7% |
16.9% |
2.2% |
7.5% |
|
Poland |
124,701 |
51.4% |
88.5% |
0.9% |
5.4% |
2.5% |
2.7% |
|
China |
115,337 |
6.0% |
26.5% |
21.6% |
12.1% |
15.9% |
23.8% |
|
Czech Republic |
97,693 |
88.7% |
93.7% |
1.7% |
3.0% |
0.5% |
1.2% |
|
India |
91,952 |
12.8% |
33.1% |
21.0% |
22.2% |
5.1% |
18.7% |
|
Russia |
86,455 |
11.7% |
74.6% |
2.7% |
7.0% |
3.1% |
12.6% |
|
Malaysia |
86,183 |
71.1% |
16.8% |
28.4% |
14.5% |
7.0% |
33.4% |
|
Hungary |
82,757 |
79.2% |
89.5% |
1.1% |
2.6% |
1.4% |
5.4% |
|
Taiwan |
79,252 |
24.3% |
37.6% |
21.9% |
20.8% |
7.7% |
12.0% |
|
South Africa |
78,948 |
42.3% |
18.0% |
68.5% |
5.8% |
2.3% |
5.3% |
|
Turkey |
71,570 |
21.3% |
57.0% |
13.1% |
9.0% |
2.6% |
18.3% |
|
Chile |
53,536 |
46.3% |
69.8% |
3.7% |
16.2% |
2.1% |
8.2% |
|
Croatia |
43,584 |
124.6% |
96.5% |
0.5% |
0.6% |
0.8% |
1.6% |
|
Thailand |
43,027 |
24.3% |
17.5% |
13.7% |
16.7% |
27.5% |
24.6% |
|
UAE |
42,193 |
41.5% |
31.5% |
46.9% |
8.3% |
3.0% |
10.2% |
|
Indonesia |
41,328 |
15.3% |
42.2% |
14.5% |
8.1% |
15.0% |
20.2% |
|
Slovakia |
39,078 |
91.4% |
94.8% |
1.6% |
2.6% |
0.2% |
0.8% |
|
Romania |
27,829 |
38.6% |
92.0% |
0.7% |
4.0% |
0.6% |
2.6% |
|
Argentina |
27,628 |
15.2% |
67.3% |
7.8% |
18.3% |
1.3% |
5.3% |
|
Philippines |
25,875 |
28.7% |
48.5% |
11.5% |
16.0% |
10.3% |
13.7% |
|
Iran |
25,554 |
14.3% |
63.3% |
5.6% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
31.1% |
|
Cyprus |
22,072 |
143.0% |
84.6% |
5.1% |
0.6% |
0.0% |
9.8% |
|
Venezuela |
22,024 |
19.0% |
82.0% |
4.1% |
8.9% |
1.8% |
3.3% |
|
Liberia |
19,039 |
N/a |
60.5% |
19.9% |
0.4% |
11.2% |
8.1% |
|
Saudi Arabia |
18,433 |
6.7% |
44.5% |
22.4% |
6.3% |
7.3% |
19.5% |
|
Estonia |
18,262 |
148.7% |
98.2% |
0.4% |
0.1% |
0.2% |
1.1% |
|
Slovenia |
17,357 |
49.7% |
92.8% |
0.3% |
0.4% |
1.4% |
5.2% |
|
Colombia |
15,210 |
15.4% |
57.2% |
2.2% |
22.7% |
2.6% |
15.3% |
|
Egypt |
14,978 |
16.2% |
53.8% |
20.7% |
16.6% |
1.5% |
7.4% |
|
Morocco |
13,750 |
26.7% |
92.1% |
1.3% |
2.5% |
0.5% |
3.6% |
|
Peru |
13,501 |
18.8% |
79.6% |
1.3% |
10.2% |
2.1% |
6.8% |
|
Israel |
13,082 |
10.8% |
42.5% |
17.8% |
10.1% |
1.6% |
28.0% |
|
Malta |
12,062 |
245.7% |
53.6% |
37.5% |
1.2% |
0.0% |
7.7% |
|
Lithuania |
11,870 |
50.6% |
97.7% |
0.3% |
1.0% |
0.0% |
1.1% |
|
Bulgaria |
11,577 |
45.0% |
94.1% |
0.3% |
2.7% |
0.5% |
2.4% |
|
Latvia |
9,120 |
62.3% |
97.3% |
0.4% |
0.3% |
0.4% |
1.7% |
|
Qatar |
8,434 |
28.6% |
34.4% |
27.3% |
4.2% |
6.6% |
27.5% |
|
Kuwait |
7,931 |
14.2% |
52.1% |
15.3% |
11.3% |
4.0% |
17.3% |
|
Ukraine |
7,076 |
9.1% |
90.9% |
0.0% |
6.1% |
0.6% |
2.5% |
|
Kazakhstan |
6,960 |
16.3% |
67.9% |
6.0% |
12.8% |
3.9% |
9.3% |
|
Marshall Islands |
6,726 |
N/a |
89.1% |
7.9% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
3.1% |
|
Tunisia |
6,345 |
20.5% |
91.1% |
1.1% |
2.9% |
0.0% |
4.9% |
|
Algeria |
6,322 |
7.3% |
74.5% |
1.1% |
15.6% |
1.1% |
7.7% |
|
Serbia |
6,229 |
24.8% |
95.4% |
0.3% |
0.1% |
0.2% |
4.1% |
|
Vietnam |
5,747 |
12.9% |
29.0% |
17.7% |
6.2% |
11.7% |
35.4% |
|
Pakistan |
5,709 |
6.4% |
31.8% |
35.0% |
23.1% |
3.5% |
6.6% |
|
Ivory Coast |
5,464 |
33.9% |
94.6% |
1.0% |
3.1% |
0.2% |
1.1% |
|
Oman |
5,316 |
20.9% |
38.9% |
39.1% |
2.2% |
11.1% |
8.8% |
|
Bosnia-Herzegovina |
4,541 |
52.3% |
95.3% |
0.0% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
4.5% |
|
Nigeria |
4,483 |
5.9% |
55.5% |
18.2% |
15.2% |
1.5% |
9.5% |
|
Trinidad and Tobago |
4,251 |
31.6% |
40.7% |
3.9% |
15.1% |
2.8% |
37.5% |
|
Uruguay |
3,975 |
23.3% |
55.3% |
7.6% |
20.3% |
1.2% |
15.6% |
|
Jamaica |
3,505 |
38.4% |
9.4% |
1.3% |
20.2% |
0.7% |
68.4% |
|
El Salvador |
3,290 |
19.9% |
20.6% |
0.4% |
24.7% |
0.0% |
54.4% |
|
Dominican Republic |
3,231 |
18.3% |
37.9% |
2.4% |
24.8% |
0.0% |
35.0% |
|
Costa Rica |
3,222 |
16.7% |
20.6% |
1.1% |
15.2% |
1.3% |
61.7% |
|
Cameroon |
3,202 |
20.9% |
83.5% |
10.9% |
4.3% |
0.0% |
1.2% |
|
Sri Lanka |
2,908 |
13.5% |
33.3% |
45.2% |
7.9% |
0.9% |
12.8% |
|
Bangladesh |
2,692 |
4.2% |
10.0% |
69.5% |
8.7% |
0.0% |
11.9% |
|
Albania |
2,593 |
30.4% |
99.1% |
0.5% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.4% |
|
Jordan |
2,279 |
19.6% |
19.1% |
34.3% |
14.5% |
1.1% |
31.0% |
|
Belize |
2,274 |
250.4% |
81.4% |
2.1% |
0.9% |
0.0% |
15.7% |
|
Cuba |
2,247 |
13.6% |
65.5% |
1.2% |
0.0% |
4.8% |
28.6% |
|
Kenya |
2,201 |
13.5% |
21.5% |
57.7% |
17.3% |
1.0% |
2.5% |
|
Ecuador |
2,081 |
6.8% |
39.5% |
9.4% |
25.3% |
5.4% |
20.3% |
|
Guatemala |
2,047 |
7.4% |
14.6% |
5.1% |
33.6% |
0.0% |
46.8% |
|
New Caledonia |
1,940 |
N/a |
99.2% |
0.1% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.6% |
|
Angola |
1,796 |
7.9% |
74.2% |
18.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
7.5% |
|
Ghana |
1,788 |
19.4% |
40.4% |
57.0% |
1.6% |
0.0% |
1.0% |
|
Senegal |
1,672 |
20.9% |
81.6% |
2.5% |
9.3% |
0.0% |
6.5% |
|
Brunei |
1,599 |
47.0% |
9.7% |
59.7% |
7.2% |
0.0% |
23.4% |
|
Botswana |
1,587 |
17.1% |
2.0% |
97.0% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
0.9% |
|
Paraguay |
1,511 |
20.4% |
44.2% |
20.0% |
7.7% |
0.0% |
28.1% |
|
Mozambique |
1,435 |
24.8% |
98.0% |
1.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.6% |
|
Belarus |
1,224 |
4.6% |
96.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
3.7% |
|
Uzbekistan |
1,197 |
11.8% |
86.8% |
8.6% |
2.5% |
1.9% |
0.2% |
|
Gabon |
1,138 |
15.9% |
93.6% |
0.6% |
4.4% |
0.0% |
1.4% |
|
Zimbabwe |
1,028 |
18.7% |
68.5% |
29.3% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
2.0% |
|
French Polynesia |
975 |
N/a |
98.5% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
1.5% |
|
Papua New Guinea |
949 |
23.2% |
14.2% |
3.6% |
4.0% |
1.8% |
76.4% |
|
Myanmar |
941 |
11.7% |
100.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
|
Cape Verde |
831 |
73.7% |
97.8% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
2.2% |
|
Honduras |
810 |
10.3% |
26.0% |
2.3% |
34.4% |
0.0% |
37.2% |
|
Tanzania |
794 |
6.8% |
20.3% |
40.1% |
35.3% |
0.6% |
3.8% |
|
Samoa |
750 |
7.6% |
17.7% |
3.3% |
0.3% |
0.0% |
78.7% |
|
Bolivia |
723 |
7.3% |
74.6% |
0.7% |
7.2% |
0.0% |
17.6% |
|
Macedonia |
711 |
13.5% |
94.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
6.0% |
|
Congo |
653 |
13.6% |
97.5% |
1.1% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
1.4% |
|
Zambia |
645 |
11.7% |
10.7% |
68.5% |
16.4% |
0.0% |
4.3% |
|
Azerbaijan |
611 |
5.7% |
81.5% |
8.7% |
5.9% |
0.0% |
3.9% |
|
Sudan |
583 |
2.6% |
54.0% |
4.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
41.7% |
|
Turkmenistan |
566 |
4.0% |
92.9% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
3.5% |
3.5% |
|
Burkina Faso |
560 |
10.4% |
97.0% |
2.5% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.5% |
|
Yemen |
558 |
4.1% |
76.3% |
10.2% |
2.3% |
2.0% |
9.1% |
|
Uganda |
539 |
6.5% |
11.9% |
67.3% |
18.0% |
0.0% |
2.8% |
|
Syria |
533 |
2.1% |
45.4% |
1.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
53.3% |
|
St Vincent |
475 |
N/a |
72.4% |
2.9% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
24.6% |
Dennis Redmond is an independent scholar, cultural critic, and acting editor of Uplink, a webzine covering videogames and the multinational media.
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